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Abstract 
 
A new computing paradigm such as ubiquitous computing is coming due to computing 
powers and rapid progress for networks. Such kind of paradigm offers human-centered 
convenient and delightful services at any time, at anywhere, and in any devices. Recently, 
Human-Centric Ubiquitous Computing (H-Ubi Comp) has been studied on the basis of smart 
space, human computer interaction, intelligent services and universal device connection. 
However, H-Ubi Comp is closely connected to networks and in this connection there exist 
essential security issues concerning security vulnerability and exposure of user’s privacy. In 
order to provide secure H-Ubi Comp environments, we need intelligent and dynamic security 
frameworks suitable for H-Ubi Comp environments. The user manual authentication, static 
access control and management which are the key of traditional security mechanisms have 
lots of restrictions for being adapted in H-Ubi Comp environments.  
 
In this thesis, I propose a hybrid intelligent security framework for H-Ubi Comp: HUC-
HISF. The HUC-HISF consists of core technology layer, security layer, application and 
service layer. The Core technology layer contains wireless sensor network/RFID, context-
awareness, mobility and information fusion which are key technologies of H-Ubi Comp, and 
security layer contains lightweight security algorithms, security protocols, users’ privacy and 
security mechanisms. Finally, in application and service layer, surveillance systems and 
mobile IPTV for H-Ubi Comp are considered.  
 
In this thesis, I design and simulate light-weight secure advanced cryptography algorithm, 
effective key distribution for secure fast hand-over, and dynamic context based access control 
mechanism reflecting human-contexts, and privacy-enhanced key recovery mechanisms. I 
also propose and analyze surveillance service and mobile IPTV service through applied-
service layers.  
 
The HUC-HISF provides an advanced key schedule of mCrypton algorithm suitable for H-
Ubi Comp devices to give a better security of mCrypton against related-key rectangle attacks. 
We also provide wireless authentication, key establishment mechanisms suitable for H-Ubi 
Comp environments, secure authentications and key-exchange protocols. Furthermore, I 
propose dynamic human-context role based access control mechanism, and surveillance 
service and mobile IPTV service which are applied-services of the HUC-HISF.   
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
New computing paradigms such as H-Ubi Comp are up and coming due to rapid advances 
in computing power and network development. Such paradigm changes offer convenient and 
delightful, human-centered services at anytime, anywhere, and in any devices. Recently, H-
Ubi Comp has been studied in terms of smart spaces, human-computer interaction, intelligent 
services, and universal device connectivity. However, H-Ubi Comp is closely related to 
networks and in this realm there exist essential security issues concerning the vulnerability 
and exposure of users’ privacy. Traditional security mechanisms require manual 
authentication by users, static access control and static management which significantly 
restrict adaptability which is absolutely fundamental in H-Ubi Comp environments. In order 
to provide secure, yet flexible H-Ubi Comp environments, we need intelligent and dynamic 
security frameworks suitable for H-Ubi Comp environments.  
1.2 Scope, Aim, and Method 
The HUC-HISF, the novel security framework presented in this thesis, provides an 
advanced key schedule of mCrypton suitable for H-Ubi Comp devices providing better 
security for mCrypton against related-key rectangle attacks. The framework also provides 
wireless authentication, key establishment mechanisms, secure authentications and key-
exchange protocols suitable for H-Ubi Comp environments. Furthermore, I introduce how the 
HUC-HISF may be applied to dynamic human-context based access control mechanisms, 
surveillance service and mobile IPTV service. 
1.3 State of the Problem and Motivation 
We could say that today's computing technology has reached the highest level it can. 
Personal computers and servers have reached the highest level possible in terms of design and 
speed and now we are working to reduce the power consumption and heat generated by 
Central Processing Units (CPU), such as the major chipset, by increase its density. In addition, 
projects such as multi-core, multi-processor, and grid computing are enhancing computational 
power through the collaboration of multiple processing devices. In addition, computer 
network technology is bringing about development in a variety of fields including moving 
beyond wired communications to wireless communication, mobile communication, and lower 
energy communications. Recently in the United States, Juniper and Cisco have expanded the 
bandwidth of wired network communications by developing routers having 10Gb/s interfaces. 
In the case of wireless communications, 802.11/n has become commercially available and 
theoretically promises wireless communication speeds of up to 300Mb/s. The world of mobile 
communication technologies has witnessed the worldwide popularization of the smart phone 
and smart pad empowered with 4Generation mobile communication technologies such as 
Long-Term Evolution (LTE) and Wi-MAX. In addition, thanks to low-power 
communications technology for wireless sensor networks (WSN), research on applications 
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such as Zigbee and Bluetooth is progressing quite rapidly and many related products are 
being commercialized and widely used. 
Through the advancement of such computer and network technologies, complex functions 
are increasingly being performed remotely by servers and personal computing devices are 
becoming increasingly miniaturized. Accordingly we are witnessing the rise of a new services 
paradigm known as cloud computing. Cloud computing places great importance on inter-
operability, a key providing services to devices having respectively different operating 
systems and hardware specifications. This development came on the back of multiple 
environment service technologies such as HTML5 and is transferring the life, information 
exchange, and transactions of offline environments onto online environments. Thanks to these 
developments in computer and network technology, it has become increasingly convenient for 
users to produce, share, and use digital information whenever and wherever they like. On the 
other hand, this growth of proper uses for computers and networks has been paralleled by a 
rise in opportunities for misuse to malicious ends. We can even see such adverse effects for 
the portable devises applying the newest computer and network technologies. By cracking the 
operating system of their portable device, users are able to acquire ultimate administrator 
access, circumvent the DRM inserted by device and content providers to protect their 
intellectual property rights, and illegally use for-pay content. Consider the following 
examples of Sony’s PlayStation Portable (PSP) and Apple’s iPhone, both sold worldwide. In 
the case of PSP, hackers developed custom firmware in order to run games illegally. With the 
iPhone, hackers used jailbreak to acquire maximum administrative authority for the iOS 
platform, disable Digital Right Management (DRM) for those contents serviced by Apple, 
and made cracked Apple and contents available fee of charge. Both industries and society 
responded to these illegal episodes in their own ways and the result for industries in cases 
such as the Sony PlayStation Network hacking incident is that they incur enormous damages 
[IEEE11]. 
The aforementioned Sony PSN hacking episode is merely one of the many hacking 
episodes that are currently underway, however the Sony incident has a special meaning. Prior 
to the PNS hacking incident, attacks had typically included those propagated to acquire 
information or administrator privileges from a single server, Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attacks which were primarily performed with the goal of paralyzing the service of a 
specific company or organization, or attacks on an individual or specific organization for the 
purpose of acquiring information possessed by a specific company. However after the PSN 
incident, America declared war on hackers, hacker groups began to direct ideologically 
motivated attacks against the government agencies of several countries, and these hacking 
attacks began to pose a national threat. We use cellular networks in my everyday lives to 
exchange a variety of information and access apply of services. Were these networks to ever 
be subject to manipulation or a denial of service attack, it is predicted that the many services 
using these cellular networks would be paralyzed and that a great calamity would ensue. Also 
cloud computing and ubiquitous computing will become the base of Internet environments of 
the future. As user devices become gradually lighter, complicated computing and high 
volume information will be provided by servers. These systems will take several forms, be 
applied to a variety of fields, and play an increasing role in the private lives and health of 
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individuals and the information of organizations. As a part of this process, terminal user 
devices will contain important information for identifying the user’s personal information 
contained in servers. Should this data be leaked, it could result in great harm to individuals 
and organizations and therefore must be distributed through secure channels. Accordingly, 
there is a need for research on those methods which enable services to be provided both 
securely and conveniently. Also, as ubiquitous computing is applied to automobiles and the 
area of public health, data is exchanged which contains information about individual’s health 
or the control and condition of an automobile. Should this information be altered or made 
public, it could lead to dangerous situations. Even were the data not altered or leaked, should 
a DDoS attack or something like it suspend normal service, the likelihood of unexpected 
malfunctions and the resultant damage is very high. 
This thesis addresses this type of service availability problems for ubiquitous computing 
environments and defines a security framework maximizing security. This framework 
proposes a cryptographic algorithm and some protocols which offer both light-weight 
processes and strong security. 
1.4 Thesis Contribution 
The expected contributions of this thesis are: 
 The proposed framework provides a light-weight cryptography algorithm for security 
in resource-constrained applications, such as low-cost RFID tags and sensors in USN 
for H-Ubi Comp. It has the structure with some improvements in software and 
hardware efficiency under resource-restricted environments – such as ubiquitous 
mobile devices. 
 The proposed framework provides improved security protocols for H-Ubi Comp. 
- A session key distribution mechanism for fast secure handover in wireless 
mobile networks such as H-Ubi Comp: The proposed mechanism is based on the 
stream control transmission protocol wherein a mobile node actively changes its 
IP address without a loss of connection. 
- A security-enhanced Key Recovery (KR) protocol and a privacy-enhanced KR 
protocol: The proposed protocol is based on that security-enhanced KR protocol 
in order to protect users’ location privacy. Wireless Authentication and Key 
Establishment (WAKE) protocols are essential for secure information 
transmission for in mobile communication environments such as H-Ubi Comp.  
- A security simulation model based on Contract Network Protocol (CNP): I 
design and construct a general simulation environment for a network security 
model which coordinates by means of a contract net protocol (CNP) for the 
effective detection of an intrusion.  
 The proposed framework provides dynamic human-context role based access control 
mechanism for H-Ubi Comp. It improves the existing access control mechanism 
based  human-context (temporal and spatial information). 
 The proposed framework can be applied to surveillance service and mobile IPTV 
service for H-Ubi Comp. 
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1.5 Thesis Outline   
The structure of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, I review research papers related to 
this thesis. In Chapter 3, I propose the HUC-HISF, a novel security framework for ubiquitous 
and human-centric computing environments. In Chapter 4, I discuss advanced mCrypton, a 
light-weight cryptography algorithm appropriate for the HUC-HISF. In Chapter 5, I describe 
security protocols fitting for the HUC-HISF and in Chapter 6, propose dynamic human-
context role based access control mechanism. In Chapter 7, I discuss services such as the U-
Surveillance service and the Mobile IPTV service to which the HUC-HISF may be applied. In 
Chapter 8, I simulate and analyze the proposed algorithms, protocols, and services for the 
HUC-HISF. Finally, I end in Chapter 9, with discussion and conclusions.  
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Chapter 2. Background 
2.1 Ubiquitous Computing Vision 
The words ubiquitous computing was first used by Mark Weiser to describe computing 
technology of the future. Weiser proposed the concept of ubiquitous computing in 1988, 
asserting that technology that is invisible is the most profound. Ubiquitous computing 
transcends the boundaries of space and time, perceiving the tasks that human are attempting 
to do and helps them to perform those tasks. Mark Weiser’s concept of ubiquitous computing 
requires all computing devices to be connected to each other. Ubiquitous computing does not 
draw the users attention and it must be functional in all times and places. It also has the 
properties of being embedded in the objects and environment of the real world and is 
integrated into everyday life [We91]. This kind of ubiquitous computing is the computing 
technology of the future that is gradually being realized with the development of mobile 
telecommunication technologies, mobile devices, sensor technology, and so on. 
Ubiquitous computing not only includes remote communication, fault tolerance, high 
availability, remote information access, distributed computing such as distributed security, 
but also a variety of technologies related to mobile computing and pervasive computing. 
The following table lays out the various requirements that computing must satisfy in order 
to be deemed ubiquitous. 
Table 2.1 Requirements for Ubiquitous Computing 
Requirements Description 
Adaptability 
 Laissez-faire approach : by each app 
 Application-transparent approach : fully supported by system 
 Application-aware approach : collaborative between app. & system 
 Agile approach : combined with them 
Augmented Reality 
 Fidelity: consistency, data type, tradeoff btw. Applications 
 (e.g.) sampling rate, timeliness, size, resolution, frame rate 
Heterogeneity 
 Integrated networks to different devices, user interaction models, radio 
capabilities, memory, power, processing capabilities like mobility 
 Multi-modality 
Interoperability 
 Understand the exchanged info 
 Provide something new originating from the exchanged info 
 Dynamic binding according to the change of context 
Mobility 
 Terminal, personal, session, service 
 Actual : transfer code, data, exe, state 
 Agent : follow nomadic user 
 Virtual agent: move to exe, env. 
 Physical agent : move to access point 
Security and Privacy 
 Self-healing in attacks and failures 
 Survival by protection (SP) : access control, encryption 
 Survival by adaptation (SA) : increasing key length in intrusive threat 
Self-Organization 
 Automatically organized 
 Self-learning, expert systems, chaotic theory, fuzzy logic 
 Spontaneous systems or dynamically re-organized software architecture 
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2.2 Collaboration Work and Processing based on Human-Centric 
Computing  
Existing collaboration based on software or system vs. Human-centered computing based 
collaboration, software or system based shortcoming of the system to communicate with most 
of the human exchanges and the resulting synergy is something lacking in creation. In 
particular, software or system centric, the center or some parts of the features and software 
configuration of the joint development or joint development of exchanges in the unit, or part 
of the target unit was limited to that cavitation is a typical drawback [Sch11]. 
In terms of composing the system easy to configure, traditional computer science, consists 
of traditional on-course or at the stage of development, however present a variety of services, 
according to a variety of environments in terms of non-human-centered computing 
environment is a sufficient differences. Especially, the human-centered computing based 
collaborative processing system is configured with sufficient synergies can be triggered with 
the various opinions, various adjustments, a variety of environments are structured around 
both the ease of humans is also occurring. Therefore, there is a variety of subsequent related 
research. In this chapter describes the system in the study were collaboration based on 
Human-Centric Computing. Since several years ago, many of the systems and services and its 
environment has changed a lot. In particular, users of the Web environment to provide rapid 
information exchange model for a given service in a variety of environments has been used to 
organize content. 
These Web services take advantage of the user-friendly tool, but also a major tool used in 
Service-Oriented-Architecture (SOA) as an extended automatic exchange of information with 
people who are for that purpose [Sch11]. However, when many people to exchange 
information using by Web environment, actually it is not user friendly and human-centric 
computing rather than only the center is composed of a thorough service. In the case of Web 
services to provide a variety of interfaces are configured in parallel to this, Software-Based 
Service (SBS) and the Human-Provided Services (HPS) should be defined first as human-
centric services can be composed 
2.3 Human-Provided and Software-Based Service Mixture Model 
In various researches, these human-centric and software-centric model is configured with 
the proper convergence has been studied. 
This is both human and software-centric as a model for convergence in order to satisfy the 
user-friendly with well-defined interfaces, and it is based on information sharing between 
people. 
In addition, the existing problems which are the configuration of human-
centered problems were to configure the current system, also the composing by using an 
intermediate medium layer in the context of a web-based system that contains a human-
centric configuration.  
Proposed in the context of Web-based human-centered interactive system consists of the 
following three were to form. 
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 Crowdsourcing: As a variety of related research, one of important thing is the study 
of Crowdsourcing. It is complexities connecting of a society, basis of involve network, 
incentives and aggregate behavior of groups; these are aimed [EK10]. Human 
computation is motivated by the need to outsource certain steps in a computational 
process to humans [GRS05]. An application of human computation in genetic 
algorithms was presented in [KGD01]. A variant of human computation called games 
that matter was introduced by [Ah06]. Related to human computation are systems 
such as Amazon Mechanical Turk1 (MTurk). MTurk is a Web-based, task-centric 
platform. Users can publish, claim, and process tasks. For example [SPCB07], 
evaluated the task properties of a similar platform in cases where large amounts of 
data are reviewed by humans. In contrast to common question/answer (Q/A) forums, 
for example Yahoo! Answers2, MTurk enables businesses to access the manpower of 
thousands of people using a Web services API. Mixed service-oriented systems target 
flexible interactions and compositions of Human-Provided and Software-Based 
Services [STD08]. This approach is aligned with the vision of the Web 2.0, where 
people can actively contribute services. In such networks, humans may participate and 
provide services in a uniform way by using the HPS framework [Sc09]. A similar 
vision is shared by [Pe10] who defines emergent collectives which are networks of 
interlinked valued nodes (services). 
 Interaction Modeling: In business processes (typically closed environments), 
human-based process activities and human tasks can be modeled in a standardized 
service-oriented manner.WS-HumanTask (WS-HT) [Am07] and BPEL4People (B4P) 
[Ag07] are related industry standards released to address the need for human 
involvement in service-oriented systems. These standards and related efforts specify 
languages to model human interactions in BPEL [Ag07], the lifecycle of humans 
tasks [Am07] in SOA, resource patterns [RA07], and role-based access models 
[MPS08]. A concrete implementation of B4P as a service was introduced in 
[TPBE07]. A top-down approach, however, demands for the precise definition of 
roles and interactions between humans and services. The application of such models 
is therefore limited in crowdsourcing scenarios due to the complexity of human tasks, 
people’s individual understanding, and unpredictable events. Other approaches focus 
on ad-hoc workflows [Du04], self-contained child processes [AHEA06] based on 
activity theory, and task-adaptation [GPSS04] to cope with changing environmental 
conditions. In [MGMTM06], business activity patterns were introduced to design 
flexible applications. 
 Metrics and expertise mining: Human tasks metrics in workflow management 
system have been discussed in [KAV02]. A formal approach to modeling and 
measuring inconsistencies and deviations, generalized for human-centered systems, 
was presented in [CNFG96]. Studies on distributed teams focus on human 
performance and interactions [BPW04, PD05], as well as in Enterprise 2.0 
environments [BPD09]. Models and algorithms to determine the expertise of users are 
important in future service-oriented environments. Task based platforms allow users 
to share their expertise [YAA08]; or users offer their expertise by helping other users 
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in forums or answer communities [ACDGM08]. By analyzing email conversations 
[DECZ03], the authors studied graph-based algorithms such as Hyperlink-Induced 
Topic Search (HITS) [Kl99] and PageRank [BMW98] to estimate the expertise of 
users. The authors in [SA05] used a graph-entropy model to measure the importance 
of users. The work by [ZAA07] applied HITS as well as PageRank in online 
communities (i.e., a Java Q/A forum). Approaches for calculating personalized 
PageRank scores were introduced in [Ha02, JW03] to enable topic-sensitive queries in 
search engines, but have not been applied to interaction analysis (social networks). 
Most existing link-based expertise mining techniques do not consider information 
related to the interaction context. 
2.4 Human Computer Interaction (HCI) for context aware ubiquitous 
computing 
Differences of state-of-art approaches for human context acquisition in smart environments 
for personalization of services are also one of important issue in Human-Centric Computing 
research area. Abhijan Bhattacharyya is proposed a human conventional mobile 
communication technology for human context awareness in ubiquitous computing 
environments [Ab11]. This paper compared them based on some real-life human centric 
attributes which proposed a possible scheme through exploring the potential of using standard 
mobile communication method for human presences identifying. 
Human context acquisition is an important aspect of human computer interaction (HCI) for 
context aware ubiquitous computing. There are many proposed and in-use techniques for 
achieving the purpose of human context acquisition which is the key in terms of 
personalization of services. However, there are some advantages and some disadvantages 
when we try to evaluate them in terms of real life aspects which essentially involve human 
factors. For example, Mobile phones can be a good choice for such a purpose by virtue of its 
normal course of operation in the very basic form without relying on convergence with other 
associated technologies like Bluetooth, WiFi, etc. However, mobile phone operations don’t 
have that in personalization of smart environment services compared to other approaches. 
This is the problem of mechanized presence detection and identification in a premise / system 
to perform some predefined task relevant to the identified person is not new. As a software 
system which gets unlocked only when the right user ID and password leading the system to 
activate with the settings user profile. However, these kind of conventional systems, though 
context aware in true sense, are not ‘unobtrusive’ so far as the HCI is considered as they 
require explicit human interaction to initiate the process. Following part concisely presents a 
survey of different dominant technologies proposed in different literatures. 
 Active Badge using modulated infrared beacon: The Active Badge Which emits a 
periodic unique code in the form of a beacon by way of pulse-width-modulation of 
infrared signals as described in [WHFG92]. 
 RFID based detection: It uses electromagnetic coupling in the radio frequency (RF) 
portion of the electromagnetic spectrum to uniquely identify an object or a person 
with an RFID tag. RFID tags are passive or active. Passive RFID tags receive their 
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power to exchange from the signal sent by the RFID reader itself. Active RFID tags 
are battery powered. 
 Detection using short range wireless communication – Bluetooth and WiFi: Short 
range wireless communication like Bluetooth and WiFi have become a very popular 
choice for human presence detection [MMNV05, VMNLVPM05, SPD06, xAP08, 
Le08]. The devices are usually personalized and thus their addresses can be tagged 
with the users using them. 
 Detection based on computer vision – Face Recognition:  Face recognition using 
computer vision is a promising technology for presence detection in smart 
environment [PC00, HWRB05, IRK02, RSM04, SFV05]. This technique uses 
artificial intelligence (AI) on captured camera images and the identification works 
using a classifier which has been trained with the end users (like members of a home, 
preferred customers of a superstore, etc.) in advance. 
This paper analysis with several issues in line with Ref. [WHFG92] and [IRK02]. That 
issues can be treated as real life attributes for judging the effective approaches methods like 
Confidence, Detection range Technical issues, Power requirement, Ease of use / 
unobtrusiveness, Psychological factors, and Cost effectiveness. On this wise, this paper 
perform a surveyed of the state-of-the approaches from computer vision to short range 
wireless communications and compared them against some real life issues. After this, who 
studied a technical feasibility for using the mobile phone. There is potential of using this 
conventional technology for such purpose and thereby opening up huge possibilities in 
context aware services through mobile HCI, By Using the standard mobile communication 
for presence detection and identification for personalization of services in smart environments. 
In case of Ref. [Ab10] proposed different approaches to detect user’s presence by a suitable 
IP (Internet Protocol) domain to control active hand-off between cellular and IP domain. One 
of the schemes used a pseudo base station that broadcasts the ‘registration invitation’ signal. 
 Pseudo a mobile phone base station would transmit back its ‘registration information’ 
containing the mobile identification number (MIN) and electronic serial number (ESN) 
(Figure. 2.1).  
Figure 2.1 Ubiquitous Mobile Node Identify Procedure [Ab10] 
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These identify methods are used to route all calls to the MIN to the appropriate device and 
location. This approach method can be generalized and explored for providing different 
personalized services in a smart space like conceptualized in Figure. 2.2. 
Figure. 2.2 The conceptual smart space is equipped with a gateway that the user presence 
through a virtual base station and controls the applications as each of the personalized 
requirements of the user. Through this shows, we can confirm the potential of unobtrusive use 
of conventional mobile communication for human context acquisition in a smart space in a 
very unobtrusive way. 
 
Figure 2.2 Extracting human context by mobile node identifiers in a smart space 
This paper analysis of the mobile communication based scheme, First, In terms of 
confidence the mobile phones are very much personalized. Second, Detection range should 
not be a problem. 
Third, this approach method does not require any additional power just to perform the 
detection activity unlike schemes like Bluetooth/ Wi-Fi, etc. Fourth, this scheme should be 
quite unobtrusive which is quite habitual and does not need to switch on additional services 
like Bluetooth / WiFi for this purpose. Fifth, this scheme does not add any psychological 
discomfort. Finally, this scheme does not incur any additional cost other than that of the 
mobile phone. 
These kinds of points show the advantages of the proposed scheme over others. However, 
that needs to be addressed before arriving at an applicable solution. The major issues on this 
paper identifies are first, may overlap with neighboring region causing false alarm Because of 
broadcast nature advertiser’s radiation. Second, a breach of the standard security feature may 
need special permission from competent authority. Third, using the licensed band for 
detection need spectrum usage permission. However, it does not apply for scenarios where 
the premises are equipped with legitimate femto-cells like [MTRSO10]. 
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This scheme can provide us with a very good unobtrusive HCI compared to other 
techniques. 
Also, this issues that need to be addressed for making the proposed scheme a usable choice. 
And, this scheme can provide good motivation to come up with innovative solutions with 
mobile HCI for personalization of services in a ubiquitous environment. 
2.5 Security Issues for H-Ubi Comp 
We have been discussed the following traditional concept - Confidentiality, Integrity, 
Availability as the most principal security properties; Confidentiality is that information is 
only made available to those who are authorized to have it.  Integrity is that only authorized 
users may manipulate information. Availability is that information services must be 
accessible to those authorized. However, in H-Ubi Comp in which wireless networks and 
various other network environments have been integrated, there exists a much greater 
likelihood of exposure to security threats compared to ordinary computing environments. 
Furthermore, H-Ubi Comp environments are vulnerable to additional threats not present in 
traditional computing environments; such threats include tampering, signal interference, and 
battery consumption attacks. The types of security threats arising in this kind of ubiquitous 
computing environment may be largely expressed as follows [CGRZ04, St02]. 
Table 2.2 Security Threats for H-Ubi Comp 
Name Description 
Denial of Service (DoS) 
 Attacks compromising availability 
 Consuming their resources for networking or computing 
 Ubiquitous computing networks dependent on multi-hop 
routing protocols 
 Occurrence of DoS in the event that a single node refuses to 
cooperate 
Disturbing Signal 
 Attacks compromising availability 
 Cross-talk attack 
Exhausted Battery 
 Ordinary message use that does not violate security 
 Send data request message 
 Send request message for network connection 
IP Spoofing 
 When traffic is not encrypted, then attackers can get your 
traffic data and be spoof your information 
Malicious Code/Program 
 General threat for computer networking 
 Violations of confidentiality, integrity, or availability 
Privacy 
 Leakage of personal information such as user’s location, time 
at which the device was used, etc. 
Rogue Access Point 
 Only one-way authentication is available 
 Unreliability of access points 
Tampering devices 
 Physical attack 
 e.g. Re-flashing firmware, Defective device, etc. 
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In order to respond to the security threats in Table 2.2, H-Ubi Comp must satisfy the 
security requirements listed as follows; 
Table 2.3 Security Requirements for H-Ubi Comp 
Name Description 
Confidentiality 
 Key management 
 Data Encryption 
 Light-weight crypt algorithm 
Integrity  Encryption techniques for guaranteeing integrity 
Availability  Provisions for DoS attacks 
Authentication 
 Mutual authentication 
 Use dynamic key 
 Key distribution protocol 
Access Control  User discernment and information access control 
Anonymity  Guarantee of anonymity 
2.6 Research Trends 
2.6.1 H-Ubi Comp Projects 
Efforts to realize ubiquitous-human centric computing may be seen around the world. 
Basically, both ubiquitous-computing and Human-centric computing provide us convenient 
lives automatically. However human-centric computing is not a device but it is based on 
human. These are why they are basically different. Human-centric computing demand a 
device, but it can be inputted by human only and it is embedded by objects which are came 
from human's life.  
In this sub-section, these kinds of internationally researching projects are being discussed 
in America, Europe, and Japan [Sc03].  
United States of America 
 EasyLiving: EasyLiving refers to Microsoft’s ubiquitous computing technologies 
research program. When Microsoft launched the project in 1995, it announced that 
ubiquitous computing would be achieved through mobile computing and intelligent 
environments. Microsoft’s ubiquitous computing entails non-integrated computing, 
location sensing computing, enhanced reality and object sensing user interfaces. 
These resources are not connected to each other but they are able to interact through 
the Internet. The EasyLiving Project automatically detects when a person enters a 
room and sits down, it searches email or pre-selects a movie for that person to watch, 
and shots off the display when they stand up and leave. The project also enables a 
user to be logged off from one computer as they move to another and the work they 
processed on their desktop to be displayed on a screen [SKBMCR98]. 
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 CoolTown: CoolTown refers to Hewett Packard’s ubiquitous computing technology 
and architecture. In the virtual space of the Internet, websites such as virtual shopping 
malls and chat rooms are constructed to represent the information of physical objects, 
persons, and spaces. However, very few of the resources in those physical spaces are 
systematically linked to their representative virtual spaces online. Thus there is a large 
gap between the information online and the physical reality. HP launched this project 
with the aim of closely fusing physical spaces and online virtual spaces. HP coined 
the term “web-presence” which term refers to new web interfaces that serve as an 
infrastructure between people, places, and objects. Web presence systems act to 
maintain the automatic support and interconnectivity between all physical elements 
and related web pages. CoolTown is the realization of a futuristic city model that uses 
wired and wireless communication network technology and web-based 
communication. CoolTown attempted to link real-world people and objects with 
virtual spaces made up primarily of existing web infrastructure, and devices equipped 
with electronic tags, internal web servers, and close-range wireless communication. 
Given its goal of constructing environments to link real-world people, places, and 
objects to virtual worlds, CoolTown may be applied to environments such as art 
galleries, conference rooms, mass transportation, e-business, remote education, 
remove medical treatment, fire response services, and so on [Co00]. 
 Smart Space: Smart Space is a research initiative conducted by the Smart Space Lab 
at NIST. Smart Space is an environment meant to help people perform tasks more 
efficiently through embedded computers, information devices, and multimodal 
sensors. Smart Space provides useful services for embedded devices. As a project 
supporting industries that graft pervasive computing onto actual useful services 
relying on computers, information devices, and multimedia planted within the 
environment, the goal of Smart Space is to increase the efficiency of work by 
applying new types of information and computer functionality. The project not only 
researched technologies for recognizing users, but also user actions and intentions for 
the purpose of assessing the user’s needs and predicting their next action even as they 
work. Perceptual interfaces, mobility and networking, pervasive devices, information 
access, and other technologies were used in the implementation of Smart Space 
[SS08]. 
 Smart Room: Smart Room is research being conducted in the MIT Media Lab and 
uses vision based tracking and a large-sized projection screen to interpret the actions 
of people as detected by camera, mikes, and various sensors installed in a room. A 
smart room has already been implemented that detects the identity of people presently 
in the room and what actions their hands are performing. Smart Room technology has 
also been implemented within the interior of a car and can tell when a driver turns, 
stops and passes. In conjunction with this project, the MIT Media Lab is conducting a 
number of related projects including Smart Desk, Smart Chair, and Smart Cloth 
[SR94]. 
 Smart Dust: Smart Dust is a project initiated at UK Berkeley in 1997 to develop 
small-scale perception devices. The goal of the project was to develop micro-sized 
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chips that contained a sensor, transmitter-receiver, and solar cell within a cubic silicon 
mote no larger than 1mm3, and could act as an autonomous sensor network. Smart 
Dust concentrated on minimizing the energy consumption of tasks and loading 
necessary information gathering sensors in as small a space as possible. It also aimed 
at using tele-communications to mutually detect each other and compute more 
efficiently. Applied areas of the Smart Dust project include energy management, 
management of product quality, management of circulation channels, military areas, 
and so on and implemented functions such as detection of atmospheric conditions, 
biochemical pollution, and movements of military troops and material [SD01]. 
 Oxygen: The Oxygen project, underway at MIT, recognizes that as computers 
become as plentiful and common as oxygen, there is an increasing need to build 
computing environments and services that meet users needs anywhere and in any 
place, and with natural interfaces such as voice or vision, that require no special 
knowledge or training  [Ox00]. A number of Oxygen-type environments have been 
implemented, namely E21s, H21s, N21s, and O2S; each is described below. 
- E21s: computers installed in home basements, office walls, and automobile 
trunks 
- H21s:conversing with a screen by voice alone, this device supports any user’s 
speech and computer use 
- N21s: a network capable of installing itself according to changes in its 
neighboring environment 
- O2S: software supporting services adaptable to changes in the environment or 
users demands 
 Aura: The Aura Project is related to invisible computing and was begun at Carnegie 
Mellon University in 1999. The Aura Project asserts that the user’s attention is more 
precious a resource of a computing system than processors and memory and thus 
conducted research on hardware network user interfaces and applications with the 
goal of creating invisible computing and information service environments that 
supported users, like a halo, magnifying them wherever they go  [Au00]. 
 Portolano: Portolano, a project begun at the University of Washington, aimed to 
implement computing environments transparent to users by means of invisible user 
interfaces, ubiquitous connectivity, and intelligent services. In this way, the program 
hoped to link the real world and the virtual world. The core research of this program 
focused on user interfaces, network infrastructure, and dispersed services [Po02]. 
 Endeavour: The Endeavor project was conducted at the University of California, 
relied on a variety of IT devices such as MEMS sensors, PDAs, and cameras, and had 
the goal of establishing standards and prototypes for widely applicable information 
processing environments capable of large-scale self-organization. This project began 
in 1999 and was collaboration between news agencies, manufacturers, and others. 
Technologies used in this project included MEMS, expandable computing structures, 
network oriented OS, user interfaces, data management systems, and so on [En99]. 
 Smart Kindergarten: Smart Kindergarten was a research project designed to 
examine how children learned in the physical space of a kindergarten using ubiquitous 
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computing and sensor-based wireless networks. This project began in 2000 under the 
joint cooperation of the computer engineering department, electrical engineering 
department, and educational information sciences department at UCLA. In the Smart 
Kindergarten research, wireless recognition technology was used to assess in real time 
the names and locations of children and toys. The project also used sensor 
technologies, interaction features, action sensing, and context awareness technology 
for tracking dynamic changes, and data-mining and Jini-based technologies for 
analyzing and deducing situations as they were transmitted by sensors in real time 
[SK02]. 
 Smart Medical Home: Smart Medical Home was implemented by Rochester 
University in five rooms and consisted of infrared sensors, computers, bio-sensors, 
video cameras, and so on. One core component of Smart Medical Home, named 
Smart Mirror, had the ability to monitor changes in skin and detect the onset of cancer. 
Smart Medical Home’s Personal Medical Advisor (PMA) System provided a natural 
conversation interface. Smart Band-Aid contained an embedded chip that 
continuously monitored the recovery state of wounds and information collected by 
these sensors installed in various places was conveyed to the Personal Medical 
Advisor System as well as a doctor. When this happened, patients were able to 
manage the transmission of their data making it possible for doctors, nurses, and 
attendants receiving the data to write prescriptions or make home visits as the 
situation required [SMH98]. 
European Union 
 Smart Its: Smart Its was a project jointly coordinated by ETH Zurich (Swiss Federal 
Institute of Technology), Germany’s TeleCooperation Office, and the VTT Technical 
Research Institute of Finland. In this project, internal devices known as Smart Its were 
inserted into objects creating information artifacts capable of detection, recognition, 
computing, and wireless communication. By communicating with each other, these 
intelligent artifacts constituted a new environment capable of cooperative situation 
recognition and action. This project developed wireless recognition technology based 
on RFID which attached labels to the interactions between objects. It also conducted 
research on Bluetooth-based wireless communication technology, location and safety, 
and the interaction between smart objects and the environment. This project also 
developed Media Cup by loading Smart Its into ordinary coffee mugs capable of 
recognizing, processing, and transferring information about both the cup and even the 
user [BG03]. 
 Paper++: Kings College and HP, Germany’s Anitra, ETH, France’s Argo Wiggings, 
and others participated in a research project to create Paper++, an electronic teaching 
aid more useful than conventional paper aids in which were embedded sensors and 
location-based devices. The augmented math textbook developed through this 
research was designed so that when a smart pen touched a graph or picture in the book, 
related information and animations would appear on a device connected to the smart 
pen [NS05]. 
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 Grocer: The Grocer project, initiated by the University of Navarra in Spain, loaded 
micro-processors into each product in a market and allowed consumers to transcend 
the limitations of space and purchase products using mobile devices or 
communication equipment. Grocer was implemented using Bluetooth, WAP, RFID, 
and other similar communications technologies [Gr02]. 
 2WEAR: The 2WEAR project was research jointly conducted by ICSForth, Nokia, 
ETH, and MA System. This project was carried out on the premise that computers of 
the future would be comprised of a variety of devices that are worn or carried about. 
If a person took a picture with a camera having 2WEAR capability, then the camera 
would be linked to GPS and a clock, the picture would be recorded along with the 
location and time of where and when it was taken, and if the camera’s memory was 
full, the picture would automatically be saved to a wristwatch or MP3 player. Also, 
when a user lost their way when on vacation, the computers they were wearing would 
search for nearby road direction boards and other such devices in their immediate 
vicinity, which would then connect them to yet other devices that could instruct them 
where they were and how to proceed [2W01]. 
Japan 
 Goopas service: Goopas Service was jointly developed by Omron and Tokyo Metro 
and is a service that provides information used to automatically examine subway 
tickets. Users of this service pre-register simple information about themselves and 
their station of interest and then receive exclusive permission to board. Afterwards, 
the user is automatically allowed to pass through the ticket gate of the corresponding 
station. In addition, event information matching the tastes of users in the area is 
transmitted to them by cell phone four times a day [Hi02]. 
 eHII (Matsushita): The eHII project was begun by Matsushita in 1995. HII refers to 
information-based devices in the home such as AV, information devices, and home 
electronics that connect families with social infrastructure and services such as 
broadcasts, communication, public services, and so on. eHII went on display in April 
2001 and introduced a convenient and ideal image of family life in which the daily 
life spaces were connected to internal information devices and the external network, 
from kitchen to bathroom, from the living room to the bedroom [BBBR04]. 
 MY parent’s Concierge: A service fit for the age of the aging, My Parent’s 
Concierge created a ubiquitous computing environment that attached various sensors 
on the bed of an aging parent including a doll positioned on the bed to which was also 
attached a sensor. In the event that the senior citizen did not trigger sensors during the 
day, the system would automatically contact the senior’s children and health services 
in the parent’s neighborhood [Hi02]. 
 TRON (The Real Time Operating System Nucleus): Tron was first launched in 
1984 by Professor Ken Sakamura and investigated intelligent and regionally 
distributed systems in Japan’s first attempt to unify the software specifications for a 
variety of internal kernels. In the process, Professor Ken developed the TRON chip 
and proposed domain-specific specifications. The TRON intelligent house applies the 
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TRON system, deploying over 1000 computers in a house of 330 square meters, to 
achieve a ubiquitous computing living environment [Ye00]. 
2.6.2 Security Framework 
Today, organizations and businesses apply Information Technology (IT) in order to 
efficiently manage their assets. In the process, Enterprise Architecture (EA) was developed 
and applied in order to simplify the derivation, development, management, maintenance, and 
repair of resources and the interoperability between each resource. In addition to the 
Enterprise field, the field of Information Security is also being applied. 
In the field of security, the security requirements of products or serves are derived 
systematically. Security architecture is developed in order to develop, manage, maintain and 
repair products and solutions, and the various methodologies and procedures for developing 
this architecture constitute the security framework. Sherwood Applied Business Security 
Architecture (SABSA) is a representative framework for enterprise information security, and 
is currently a being used and applied in the field of information security as a framework for 
enterprises and organizations such as the Open Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF). 
As this paper focuses primarily on security frameworks, I will briefly describe enterprise 
architecture and then explain SABSA in greater detail. 
 The Zachman Framework: The Zachman Framework was proposed by John 
Zachman in 1987 and is a framework for enterprise architecture. John Zachman 
defined an interface integrating all of the components of a system in order to handle 
the ever increasing size and complexity of information systems. He also noted the 
need for a logical control structure. Zachman presented three categories of 
information for a given system, namely the what (data), how (process), and where 
(network), as well a method for distinguishing between the three at five levels of 
specificity. Then in 1992, Zachman thee additional pieces of information, Who 
(People), When (Time), and Why (Purpose) were added to the original three and 
together these six are still being used up to the present [Za87]. 
 Technical Architecture Framework for Information Management (TAFIM): In 
order to describe DoDAF, we need to discuss Enterprise Architecture and a few other 
topics. When the Gulf War broke out in 1991, it was discovered that the weapons 
systems developed over the decades by the Army, Navy, and Air Force did not 
actually work together in war time. Shortly after the Gulf War in 1992, the 
Department of Defense began developing TAFIM to solve this problem. TAFIM was 
developed as the DoD’s Technical Architecture but rather than detailed system 
architecture, it more closely resembled a Technical Reference Model systematizing 
the requirements that must be satisfied in the development process such as services, 
standards, components, and form. Following the development of TAFIM, the DoD 
realized that in order to reliably communicate information between all sensors, signal 
processing and command centers, attack weapons and support activities, there was a 
need for standardization between all systems. In response to this need, the DoD 
continued to develop TAFIM and in 1997 instituted standards known as the Joint 
Technical Architecture (JTA) for technical standard specifications and information 
 18 
 
support in war-time. While TAFIM developed the JTA, C4ISR, and DoDAF, it also 
played a role of promoting the need for Enterprise Architecture to the U.S. 
government. Additionally, TAFIM opened these technologies to the public through 
the Open Group and was the base upon which The Open Group Architectural 
Framework (TOGAF) v1.0, introduced in 1995, was developed [SLL10]. 
 Federal Enterprise Architecture Framework (FEAF): As each U.S. government 
institute created its respective Information Technology Architecture (ITA), the need 
for common guidelines was raised. Accordingly federal government’s Chief 
Information Officer (CIO) Council developed FEAF based on the Zachman 
Framework and developed methods known as “A Practical Guide to the Federal 
Enterprise Architecture” based on the EAP proposed by Dr. Steven H. Spewak. 
 Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF): In 1996, the DoD 
developed the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Architecture Framework (C4ISR-AF) and proposed 
a system design scheme for greater compatibility between systems, projects, and 
services. After undergoing several revisions, C4ISR-AF later evolved into DoDAF. 
Along each step of the way, from TAFIM to C4ISR-AF and now DoDAF, much 
interest has been focused on integrating the technology of each sophisticated weapons 
system. Since the goal has been to standardize information technology architecture 
that include weapons systems, the DoD’s architecture has developed more from the 
point of view of ITA rather than EA. DoDAF consists of a total of four views which 
include the Operational View (OV), Systems View (SV), Technical View (TV) and a 
main view to oversee the entire architecture, All View (AV). Operational View 
describes the tasks, activities along with the flow of information relevant for 
accomplishing DoD missions and consists of a total of nine products. Systems View 
lays out all information assets and systems supporting the Operational View and 
consists of a total of thirteen products. Technical View consists of two products 
related to technology standards [SE08]. 
 The Open Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF): TOGAF is currently being 
developed and managed by Open Group as a framework for developing Enterprise 
Architecture (EA). TOGAF Version 1, developed in 1995, was based on TAFIM and 
developed with the transfer of technology from DoDAF, which was developed by the 
DoD. Architecture Description Method (ADM), Technical Reference Model (TRM), 
and Standard Information Base (SIB) have all been provided as important components 
of TOGAF. In 2001, TOGAF Version 7 was developed from an architecture point of 
view and differs from Version 8 which specifically elucidates business from an 
architecture standpoint, applications, information systems, and architecture from a 
technology standpoint. In recent years, TOGAF Version 9 was released which is now 
being applied to Model Driven Architecture [TOG09]. 
 Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture (SABSA): SABSA was first 
proposed by the John Sherwood in 1996 [Sh96]. SABSA consisted of three layers, 
namely a Logical Architecture for representing security services, a Physical 
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Architecture for representing security mechanisms, and an Operational Architecture 
for security management. 
Table 2.4 The Layer of SABSA Model 
View Architecture 
The Business View Contextual Architecture 
The Architect’s View Conceptual Architecture 
The Designer’s View Logical Architecture 
The Builder’s View Physical Architecture 
The Tradesman’s View Component Architecture 
The Facilities Manager’s View Operational Architecture 
 
 
O
perational A
rchitecture 
 
Contextual Architecture  
  
Conceptual Architecture  
  
Logical Architecture  
  
Physical Architecture  
  
Component Architecture  
  
Figure 2.3 SABSA Model 
Sherwood added two additional upper layers, a Contextual Architecture and a Conceptional 
Architecture, which added a business point of view, and added a Component Architecture 
below, presenting architecture of six layers overall. Each respective layer can be expressed in 
terms of each user’s point of view, including process specification, design, development, and 
use. 
SABSA matrix is a 6x6 matrix whose row values are the six architectural elements and 
whose column values are the answers to the questions used in the framework presented by 
Zachman. 
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Table 2.5 The SABSA Matrix for Security Architecture Development 
 
Assets 
(What) 
Motivation 
(Why) 
Process 
(How) 
People 
(Who) 
Location 
(Where) 
Time 
(When) 
Contextual The Business 
Business Risk 
Model 
Business Process 
Model 
Business 
Organization and 
Relationships 
Business 
Geography 
Business Time 
Dependencies 
Conceptual Business Attributes Profile 
Control 
Objectives 
Security 
Strategies and 
Architectural 
Layering 
Security Entity 
Model and Trust 
Framework 
Security Domain 
Model 
Security-Related 
Lifetimes and 
Deadlines 
Logical 
Business 
Information 
Model 
Security Policies Security Services 
Entity Schema 
and Privilege 
Profiles 
Security Domain 
Definitions and 
Associations 
Security 
Processing Cycle 
Physical Business Data Model 
Security Rules, 
Practices and 
Procedures 
Security 
Mechanisms 
Users, 
Applications and 
the User Interface 
Platform and 
Network 
Infrastructure 
Control Structure 
Execution 
Component 
Detailed Data 
Structures 
Security 
Standards 
Security Products 
and Tools 
Identities, 
Functions, 
Actions and 
ACLs 
Processes, Nodes, 
Addresses and 
Protocols 
Security Step 
Timing and 
Sequencing 
Operational 
Assurance of 
Operational 
Continuity 
Operational Risk 
Management 
Security Service 
Management and 
Support 
Application and 
User 
Management and 
Support 
Security of Sites, 
Networks and 
Platforms 
Security 
Operations 
Schedule 
SABSA’s Development Process is developed sequentially as in Figure 2.4, however 
the Operational Architecture is simultaneously defined in the process of defining the 
Local, Physical, and Component Architecture. 
Figure 2.4 SABSA Development Process 
The following describes the SABSA life cycle. In the Strategy and Concept phase, the 
Conceptual and Contextual Architecture are defined. The Design phase includes the 
Logical, Physical, and Operational Architecture. After the Implement and Manage and 
Measure phases, the cycle returns to the Strategy and Concept phase. 
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Figure 2.5 SABSA Life Cycle 
The process was developed improved to correspond to needs such as management of 
an agency list, information assurance, governance, and maintenance, and may be used 
freely by any one in an open manner. With SABSA, it is possible to analyze the risk-
based effects of costs and benefits and by using the architecture that has been developed 
to protect businesses’ primary assests it is possible to strengthen an institution’s 
reputation, keep customer’s trust, and maintain business relationships, which all 
contribute to revitalizing business and adding value [SCL05]. 
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Chapter 3. HUC-HISF 
In this chapter, I define a hybrid intelligent security framework for H-Ubi Comp(HUC-
HISF) that provides secure and intelligent services including core technologies such as 
WSN/RFID, context awareness, information fusion, authentication, authorization and access 
control, and surveillance. 
Figure 3.1 HUC-HISF 
3.1 Core Technology Layer 
The Core Technology Layer consists of technologies for network communication in a 
ubiquitous computing environment. These technologies include wireless sensor networks 
(WSN)/radio frequency identification (RFID), context awareness, authentication, access 
control, surveillance, information fusion, and so on. 
In a sensor network, a large number of small-scale sensor nodes are deployed in a 
designated location or area. Recognition data is collected about the surrounding objects or 
environment and the network uses this information to activate applications and services. 
When wireless network interfaces are used to implement a sensor network, this is referred to 
as a wireless sensor network (WSN). The purpose of a WSN is to construct an environment 
wherein communication between objects is possible. It accomplishes this by infusing objects 
with computing and network communications abilities. 
WSN have the following properties. One, sensor nodes must not malfunction on account of 
insufficient power, physical damage, or environment disruption factors. Two, sensor network 
protocols must be efficient and operate without regard to the scale of the network. Unlike in 
ad-hoc networks, this is particularly important as the number of nodes demanded may 
increase indefinitely, depending on the application. Lastly, as each sensor node has a limited 
amount of power, the WSN must minimize the use of power. 
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RFID is the next generation of recognition technology and uses wireless radio and an IC 
chip to manage information about a variety of objects including food, animals, and objects. 
RFID are often referred to as smart tags or electronic labels because they store information 
about all processes, from production to sales, on an internal microchip which may then be 
tracked on a wireless frequency. 
RFID systems consist of three components including an RFID tag, antenna, and RFID 
reader. The reader uses its antenna to request information from the RFID tag by radio. Also 
using the antenna, the RFID tag sends a radio message to the reader containing the requested 
information. A computer then interprets and analyzes the data received by the reader. 
Access control is a function that allows or refuses specified uses access to certain resources. 
Generally, it applies to all non-authenticated users as well and includes the comprehensive 
management of access including the connection IP of the system being protected, connection 
time, date, day, and category of client. 
Context awareness detects contextual changes and either provides appropriate information 
and services to users or changes the system state directly. In order for the computer to 
comprehend contextual changes, the context must first be defined. Contextual information 
includes things such as identity location, state, and so on. 
Table 3.1 Some example of Context 
Context Description 
Identity object identifier 
Location 
2D location information, direction, altitude, relationships between 
objects 
States Characteristic properties of the object 
Time 
In most cases, temporal context increases the value of historical 
information when used to recognize periods or encounter different 
contexts; in certain cases it simply means confirming the order of a 
sequence or confirming a cause-effect relationship 
Authentication confirms who a user is, typically through confirming a user’s account and 
password. Other methods include smart card, retinal scan, voice recognition, fingerprint 
recognition, and so on. 
3.2 Security Layer  
The Security Layer consists of security technologies that provide secure, H-Ubi Comp 
services. In this thesis, I propose some security methods and a cryptographic algorithm that 
will improve the security of such services. 
If we categorize information as a kind of asset, then cryptography can be defined as a 
means created to protect information assets from attack. The following three demands must 
be satisfied in order to safely protect information. First, it must be kept safe from those not 
authorized to access it (confidentiality). Second, it must be protected from data tampering 
(integrity), and third, authorized users must be able to access it when necessary (availability). 
Cryptographic algorithms are used to guarantee confidentiality. Cryptographic algorithms 
may largely be divided into symmetric key ciphers and asymmetric key ciphers. Symmetric 
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key ciphers are cryptographic algorithms that use a single key to encrypt the data, one block 
at a time. The block size of a single block is fixed to be the length of the key. Examples of 
this category of cryptographic algorithm included Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), 
Data Encryption Standard (DES), SEED, Camellia, and so on. One the other hand, 
asymmetric key ciphers are also called public key cryptography. These encryption algorithms 
encrypt and decrypt plain text with a pair of keys. Examples of this encryption method 
include Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman (RSA) which uses prime-number factorization, Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography (ECC) which uses elliptic curves, and LUC which uses the Lucas series. 
Generally in asymmetric key cryptography or public key cryptography, no key exchange 
procedure is necessary because keys are publically available. However, secure key exchange 
is a critical aspect of symmetric key cryptography, or block cryptography. Key exchange is 
especially an issue in the event that the private key is long. The technology for a user or 
agency establishing a private key and transmitting it to another user is called key distribution. 
Key recovery refers to the bypassing of regular procedures and urgent decryption of 
encrypted data. Ciphers may also be decrypted into plain text in the event the decryption key 
is lost or when the connection with the person who has the key is severed. There are several 
methods of key recovery, but the most widely used entrusts a decryption key or some 
equivalent key with a trusted third party. While key recovery methods increase convenience 
for the user, many avoid this for fear that it comprises the security of the cipher. 
In Chapters 4 and 5, I present light-weight encryption algorithms, key distribution/recovery 
methods, and dynamic access control mechanisms for H-Ubi Comp environments. 
3.3 Application and Service Layer 
Several types of applications and services are found in the Application and Service Layer. 
This thesis applies HUC-HISF to two in particular, surveillance services and mobile IPTV 
services, and simulates the results. Accordingly, I provide the following description of these 
two services ahead of presenting the content of this thesis.  
The details of my proposed enhancements to these two services may be found in the 
Application and Service Layer section of Chapter 7. 
3.3.1 Surveillance 
As the Air Force Research Laboratory researched their surveillance system, they placed 
less emphasis on the nature of the dangerous activities that people do and more on 
understanding why they do certain things. The US Department of Homeland Security is 
conducting the Hostile Intent Project. In this project, DHS is researching a system that 
distinguishes changes in emotion or whether or not a terrorist is trying to hide something 
based on minute changes in facial expression that are difficult for the naked eye to discern. In 
an attempt to conceal his emotions, a terrorist may actually make an unnatural expression or 
act unnaturally. The research being conducted by the DHS attempts to discover these factors 
using a surveillance system. 
Such surveillance systems take several forms. Recently, computer network technology has 
been grafted onto surveillance systems allowing high quality images to be transmitted over a 
network from any location and over any distance. The advantages of this technology are that 
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it makes possible real-time monitoring, recording and replay of images from anywhere in the 
world.  
These systems are also able to digitize camera imagery and search for previously defined 
patterns, analyze the position and patterns of objects, activate defense and quarantine systems, 
or notify security administrators in the event of an intrusion or accident. As these systems are 
based on attributes in image data, they typically store image data making it easier to quickly 
search for context and efficiently manage data. These systems are called intelligent 
surveillance systems. 
The following describes the advantages of surveillance systems to which have been applied 
the aforementioned two technologies. 
 The video transmission cable, power, and control cables can all be combined into one. 
 As the video feed is digitalized and compressed, long distance transmission and high 
volume storage of data is possible. 
 As the technologies can be applied without any change in output devices, no 
additional equipment is necessary. 
 Searching and long-term storage is convenient since the data is saved. 
 Also, because the data is saved in a digital format, it is more free of background noise 
and interference than conventional CCTV. 
Just like conventional CCTV, these surveillance systems may be applied to the security 
objective of protecting from intrusion and theft. They may also be applied for the purposes of 
accident prevention, safety management, regulation compliance, and guarding from facilities 
damage. 
3.3.2 Mobile IPTV 
Television service providers transmit video services to users through IP networks. IPTV is 
a TV service made more advanced than conventional TV by computer networking technology, 
specifically IP. IPTV offers the following advantages. 
 High quality audio and video reception creates a high quality viewing experience 
 Unlike conventional TV which simply received audio and video signals and displayed 
them on the television screen, information is now sent and received in both directions, 
allowing, for example, a user to search for information about the product he is 
currently viewing. 
 In addition to real-time broadcasts, viewers can view saved Video-On-Demand (VOD) 
whenever they want. 
With mobile IPTV, users can connect to their home TV using a cell phone, notebook, or 
smart phone, stream audio and video from their TV, and freely watch whatever broadcasts, 
video files, MP3 files, or any media they own, anywhere, any time. 
Table 3.2 displays the requirements of mobile IPTV [LKCRL11]. 
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Table 3.2 Requirements for mobile IPTV 
context requirements 
Service 
 Defines multimedia content, codecs, and meta data that takes 
into consideration the mobile environment 
 Supports a variety of protocols 
 Supports user and terminal mobility 
Terminal 
 Detects link properties in a wireless region 
 Provides service according to the performance of the receiving 
terminal 
 Provides a multi-interface 
Network 
 Guarantees that transmitters are authenticated and that content 
received is appropriate 
 Manages user profiles 
 Supports seamless service by following the terminal as it moves 
Quality of Service 
(QoS) 
 Network QofS technology for processing per-class, per-flow 
traffic 
 End-to-end signaling that reflects changes in bandwidth and 
terminal performance 
 Quality assessment functionality 
Security 
 Security service for service access control 
 Security for content backup; management of data distribution 
and tracking 
 Terminal security such as management of software downloads 
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Chapter 4. Advanced mCrypton: Light-weight Crypto Algorithm for 
HUC-HISF 
Wireless mesh networking plays an important role in the next-generation wireless 
communication systems and is attracting significant interest as a low-cost networking 
platform to support ubiquitous broadband access in the context of home networking, 
enterprise networking and so on. As wireless mesh networks become more ubiquitous, the 
concerns for designing devices and applications suitable for such environment are also 
increasing. However as ubiquitous computing technology requires low-cost, low-power, and 
lightweight platforms, existing cryptographic algorithms can hardly be implemented under 
such resource constraints. Thus, the most promising candidate for security in such 
applications must be compact and efficient cryptographic algorithms. 
The block cipher mCrypton [LK05], a light-weight version of Crypton [Li99], was 
designed with these constraints in low-cost ubiquitous computing devices such as RFID tags 
or sensors in wireless sensor networks in mind. Extremely efficient in resource usage and 
power consumption, mCrypton can be directly integrated into hardware or implemented in the 
software run on tiny processors embedded in low-cost products. mCryton is a 64-bit block 
cipher with 12 rounds and variable key sizes of 64 bits, 96 bits and 128 bits. mCrypton is 
known to be strongly resistant against differential and linear attacks.  
In this chapter, I show that 8-round mCrypton with 128-bit key is vulnerable to related-key 
rectangle attacks. First, I describe how to construct two related-key truncated differentials on 
which the 7-round related-key rectangle distinguisher is based and then I exploit it to attack 8-
round mCrypton. This attack requires 246 dada and 246 time complexities, which is faster than 
exhaustive search. This is the first known cryptanalysis for mCrypton. My result shows that 
real applications employing 8-round mCrypton may be broken due to the insecurity of the 
underlying block cipher.  
Related work. There has been no security analysis of mCrypton published in the literature, 
prior to my cryptanalytic results. However, the related-key rectangle attack that has been used 
to analyze mCrypton in this chapter is well known to be a powerful cryptanalytic tool for 
block ciphers. The first introduction of this kind of attack was published in ACISP 2004 to 
conduct a security analysis of SHACAL-1 [KKHLH04]. Since its introduction, it has been 
used to analyze popular block ciphers AES [BDKR05, HKLP05, KHP07] and KASUMI 
[BDKA05] as well as many earlier block ciphers [DKK06, KKLLS04, LKHSL08, Lu09, 
LU08, LKKDR06, LKKDD06, LLK06, Wa07]. Recently, variants of this kind of attack, 
namely the related-key boomerang attack and related-key amplified boomerang attack1
Organization of the chapter. This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1 and 
Section 4.2, I offer a brief description of mCrypton and related-key rectangle attacks, 
, have 
been applied to several block ciphers including AES [BDKR05, GL08] and MISTY 
[LKHLSHL08].  
                                                     
1 Note that the related-key amplified boomerang and rectangle attacks are both chosen plaintext attacks, while the 
related-key boomerang attack is a chosen plaintext and adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. 
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respectively. I present a related-key rectangle attack on 8-round mCrypton in Section 4.3. I 
conclude this chapter in Section 4.4 
4.1 Description of mCrypton 
In this section, I introduce notations used in this chapter and briefly describe mCrypton. 
4.1.1 Notations 
The following notation will be used throughout this chapter. 
 A 64-bit data consists of sixteen 4-bit nibbles {a0, a1,…, a15} and is internally 
represented as a 4×4 nibble array as follows : 
  (4.1)
 
where Ar[i] and Ac[i] are the i-th row and column of A, respectively. 
 At : transposition of an array A. 
 f ∘ g : composition of functions f and g. 
 X << k : left rotation of a 16-bit word X by k-bit positions. 
 ∙, ⨁ : bit-wise logical operations for AND and XOR, respectively. 
4.1.2 mCrypton 
mCrypton encrypts data blocks of 64 bits with 64, 96 or 128-bit key by iterating a round 
function 12 times. The round function of mCrypton consists of four basic steps as follows: 
 Nonlinear Substitution . This step consists of nibble-wise substitutions on a $4 
\time 4$ array using four 4-bit S-boxes, Si, ( ). 
Table 4.1 S-boxes, Si (  ) 
Si 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
S0 4 15 3 8 13 10 12 0 11 5 7 14 2 6 1 9 
S1 1 12 7 10 6 13 5 3 15 11 2 0 8 4 9 14 
S2 7 14 12 2 0 9 13 10 3 15 5 8 6 4 11 1 
S3 11 0 10 7 13 6 4 2 12 14 3 9 1 5 15 8 
 
For a 4-nibble word  from the i-th row (or column),  is 
operated as follows: 
 
    (4.2) 
 
Thus,  can be defined for  data array A by 
  
 (4.3) 
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Note that , , and iii aa
4416
0 )()(
−= γγ . 
 Bit Permutation ( ). This step mixes each column of a  array A using column 
permutation  for each column I ( ): 
   (4.4) 
Each  is defined by 
   (4.5) 
 
Figure 4.1 The column-wise bit permutation  
 
where a column , a column , , ,
, and . Note that  is an involution permutation, i.e., . 
 Column-to-Row Transposition . It moves the nibble at the (i,j)-th position to the 
(j,i)-th position, i.e., . So, . 
 Key Addition .  is defined by  where 
 is a round key. 
Each round function of mCrypton applies the , ,  and  steps in order and 
is defined for round key Ki by  
      (4.6) 
 
So, the encryption transformation EK of mCrypton under master key, K, consists 
of an initial key addition,  , $\rho$ repeated twelve times, and a final output 
transformation, EK , defined as 
   (4.7) 
 
where . Note that the output transformation,  , can be incorporated 
into the final round as  where 
is a equivalent key.  
Key Scheduling. mCrypton supports three key sizes : 64 bits, 96 bits and 128 bits. 
In this section, however, I focus on the 128-bit key version of the mCrypton that is 
composed of 12 rounds. It consists of two stages: round key generation through nonlinear S-
box transformation in which the key variables update through simple rotations (word-wise 
rotation and bitwise rotation within word). 
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Let  be the master key, where K[i] represents the i-th 16-bit 
key word in K. Let C[i] be the round constant for round i. Each round constant C[i] consists 
of four identical nibbles, i.e., , where ci is generated by xi in $GF(24) defined 
by the irreducible polynomial , that is, , etc. Let 
 be a key register for state update in the encryption key schedule. 
To generate round keys, the key register U is first initialized with K and then encryption 
round keys are computed for round  as : 
    (4.8) 
   (4.9) 
)]4[],3[],2[],1[,]0[],7[],6[],5[( 8≪3≪ UUUUUUUUU ←   (4.10) 
where the S-box operation on a word in the key schedule is performed nibble-wise with the 
same S-box S0, M0 = 0xf000, M1 = 0x0f00, M2 = 0x00f0, and M3 = 0x000f. 
4.2 The Related-Key Rectangle Attack 
In 2004 the related-key rectangle attack was first introduced by Kim et al. to analyze the 
SHA-1 based block cipher SHACAL-1 [KKHLH04]. Since then, it has been widely used as a 
cryptanalytic tool to evaluate the security of block ciphers such as AES [BDKR05, HKLP05, 
KHP07] and KASUMI [BDKA05]. In this section, I describe how to make the related-key 
rectangle distinguisher used in the attack. 
I assume that an n-bit block cipher  is divided into , 
denoted , where P is an n-bit plaintext, K is a k-bit secret key, and E0, E1 and 
E are all permutations on n bits for each k-bit secret key. The related-key rectangle attack 
exploits various related-key differentials to make its distinguisher: 
 related-key differentials  for E0 with probability , i.e., 
,   (4.11) 
 related-key differentials  for E1 with probability , i.e., 
,   (4.12) 
where  and  are non-zero key differences chosen by the attacker. If  
where , , the attacker can make a related-key rectangle distinguisher as 
follows: 
1. Collect m pairs of  with difference  and m pairs of (P',P'*) with difference 
, where  and P'* are encrypted with the keys K, K*, K' and K'*, respectively, 
resulting in their ciphertexts  and C'* (here, key relations are , 
 and ). 
2. Compute the number of ciphertext quartets satisfying 
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.     (4.13) 
In Step 1, about  pairs of  and  pairs of  will satisfy the related-
key differentials  for E0 under the key difference . Thus, I have about  
quartets satisfying the related-key differentials for E0. Moreover, I get  
with probability $2^{-n}$ under the assumption that the intermediate encrypted values are 
uniformly distributed over all possible values. Once I have 
 (with probability ) and  (with 
probability $2^{-n}$), it holds that  with probability 1. Since each of 
the pairs  and  satisfies the related-key differentials  
for E1 with probability , for each  and  about  quartets are expected to 
satisfy Eq. (4.13). Therefore, the expected number of right quartets (satisfying Eq. (4.13)) is 
about 
.    (4.14) 
On the other hand, for a random cipher the expected number of right quartets is about 
, as it requires a 2n-bit filtration. Thus,  must hold for the related-key 
rectangle distinguisher to work. 
4.3 Related-Key Rectangle Attack on 8-Round mCrypton 
In this section, I first describe a 7-round related-key rectangle distinguisher of mCrypton 
and then exploit it to attack an 8-round mCrypton with 128-bit key. 
The following notation is used throughout my attack. 
 : whitening keys generated from master keys , respectively. 
 : subkeys of round i generated from master keys , 
respectively. 
 a: a fixed nonzero nibble value. 
 b: output difference of S-box for fixed input difference a. 
 *: a variable and unknown nibble. 
 : particular differences described in Figs. 4.2 and 4.3. 
 : particular difference set described in Figure. 4.3. 
 : 8-round mCrypton encryption with key K. 
 : 4-round mCrypton encryption from round 1 to round 4 with key K. 
 : 3-round mCrypton encryption from round 5 to round 7 with key K. 
4.3.1 7-Round Related-Key Rectangle Distinguisher 
Figures. 4.2 and 4.3 show my two related-key truncated differentials with probability 1 to 
form my 7-round related-key rectangle distinguisher. If the master key difference is  
(resp., ), then the subkey difference in rounds 1-4 (resp., 5-7) is , ,  
and  (resp., ,  and ) described in Figure. 4.2 (resp., Figure. 4.3).  
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Our first 4-round differential on E0. Let  and  be four keys with difference 
 and and  be four plaintexts with difference 
, where the plaintexts  and  are encrypted under , , 
and , respectively. Then  and  both follow the 4-round related-key 
truncated differential described in Figure. 4.2.  
 
Figure 4.2 The first related-key truncated differential for rounds 1-4 (E0) of mCrypton 
Our second 3-round differential on E1. A similar argument can be applied to my second 
related-key truncated differential for E1. Let  and  be four keys with difference 
 (in order to satisfy the two key differences  and I need to 
set ,  and ).  
If , then  and  
both follow the 3-round related-key truncated differential described in Figure. 4.3. Note that 
the output difference of this 3-round differential is one of the elements in . In Figure.4.3, 
b is an unknown variable which can be one of 7 elements since the b is the output difference 
of the S-box for a given input difference a.  
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Figure 4.3 The second related key truncated differential for rounds 5-7 (E1) of mCrypton 
Our 7-round rectangle on . As stated above, these two related-key truncated 
differentials allow us to make a 7-round related-key rectangle distinguisher that has a 
relatively high probability. In order to compute the probability of this distinguisher I need the 
following two assumptions A1 and A2.  
 A1 : The key quartet ( ) is related as follows; 
,    (4.15) 
;   (4.16) 
where , , , , 
, , . 
 A2 : A plaintext quartet ( ) is related as follows; 
    (4.17) 
Let  and be , ,  and , respectively. Then the 
probability that  is equal to  is about . 
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This is due to the differentials that the active S-box with input difference a and the other 
four active S-boxes can produce. Since the  and are linear layers, the  and  of the last 
round can be ignored in computing the probability (see Figure. 4.3). Thus . 
In order to concatenate the first related-key truncated differential to the second one, I need 
to compute the probability that  is equal to  as : under the assumption that 
the intermediate encrypted values are uniformly distributed over all possible values, the 
probability that is 2-64 under the condition that . This leads 
to the probability that  
 and    (4.18) 
is , and thus  and are in the difference set 
 with probability  (note that my second related-key truncated differential for E1 is 1, 
leading to ). On the other hand, the same statement can be applied to a random cipher 
with probability , as the number of elements in  is 7. The quartet 
( ) satisfying (4.18) is called a right quartet. 
4.3.2 Key Recovery Attack on 8 Rounds mCrypton 
Using the 7-round related-key rectangle distinguisher my 8-round attack recovers 5 bytes 
of each subkey for whose nibble positions are marked as * on  depicted in 
Figure. 4.3, where , , , and  (recall that 
). Since the keys  and  are related, the number of possible key 
quartets is 240. In order to understand the relations of the round keys of round 8, refer to 
Figure. 4.4. 
The basic idea of my attack is as follows. Let ( ) be right quartet, ( ) 
be the corresponding ciphertext quartet and  be a partial one round decryption with k, 
where k is a 5-byte key candidate of round 8. I guess a 5-byte key quartet  and 
check that  and , where  is a set of 5 gray 
nibbles described in  of Figure. 4.3. If the number of ciphertext quartets passing the above 
test is more than an appropriate threshold, I consider the guessed key quartet as the right one.  
Attack algorithm. 
Input: Two pools of 244 plaintext pairs. 
Output: 5-byte key quartet of round 8. 
1. Collect 244 plaintext pairs  and 244 plaintext pairs  with 
. Encrypt the ,  with the keys  and 
$K'^{*}$, respectively, to obtain their ciphertexts  and . Keep all the 
obtained ciphertexts in a table. 
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2. Check that  and  for all i,j. Discard all the ciphertext 
quartets that do not satisfy this test. 
3. Guess a 5-byte key quartet  for round 8. 
3.1. For all ciphertext quartets ( ) passing the test of Step 2, check 
that  and . 
3.2. If the number of quartets  passing Step 3.1 is greater than or 
equal to 3, output the guessed key quartet as the right key 
quartet of round 8. Otherwise, repeat Step 3. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Differential Property of 4 related keys for rounds 1-8 of mCrypton 
Security analysis. Since the attack requires two pools of 244 plaintext pairs and memory 
space for their ciphertext pairs, the data complexity of this attack is 246 related-key chosen 
plaintexts and the memory complexity is  bytes. 
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Step 2 requires 244 searches of 244 ciphertext pairs, which can be done efficiently by sorting 
the ciphertext pairs, 's by 's. In Step 2, the test requires a 88-bit filtration (this is 
due to the fact that  and  with probability  for a wrong 
quartet ), and thus the expected number of ciphertext quartets passing the test of 
Step 2 is about  (here,  ciphertext quartets passing the test 
are expected to be right quartets due to my 7-round related-key rectangle distinguisher). 
Using this expected number of quartets I can estimate the time complexity of Step 3, i.e., Step 
3 requires about  8-round mCrypton encryptions on average. Hence, the time 
complexity of this attack is dominated by Step 1, and thus this attack requires about 246 8-
round mCrypton encryptions. 
The success rate of the attack is computed as follows. The probability that for the right key 
quartet there exist at least 3 quartets passing the test of Step 3.1 is about 0.94
, while the probability that a wrong key is outputted by the 
attack algorithm is . Therefore, the success rate of this 
attack is about ). 
4.4 Summary 
mCrypton was designed for security in resource-constrained applications, such as low-cost 
RFID tags and sensors in USN. It is based on the structure of Crypton with some 
improvements in software and hardware efficiency under resource-restricted environments. In 
this chapter, however, I have analyzed the security of 8-round mCrypton with a 128-bit key 
against a related-key rectangle attack. According to my result, this attack requires 246 data and 
time complexity of equal magnitude, 246. As the first known cryptanalytic result on mCrypton, 
it is worthwhile to apply this attack to other block ciphers and to study simple key scheduling 
algorithms which may be resistant to this kind of attack. 
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Chapter 5. Security Protocol Issues for HUC-HISF 
In this chapter, I discuss security protocol issues for HUC-HISF. First, I propose a session 
key distribution mechanism for fast secure handover in wireless mobile networks. The 
proposed mechanism is based on the stream control transmission protocol wherein a mobile 
node actively changes its IP address without a loss of connection. When a mobile node moves 
between different access routers, the required session key at a new access router is distributed 
through the tunnel previously established between the previous access router and the new 
access router. Due to the reduced key distribution time, the mobile node achieves a secure and 
seamless handover. The provided performance analysis offered in this chapter demonstrates 
how the proposed mechanism reduces signaling costs relative to existing mobility protocols. 
In addition, the proposed mechanism reduces handover latency such that the reduced amount 
of packet loss stabilizes handover performance for real-time applications. 
Second, I propose both a security-enhanced KR protocol and construct a privacy-enhanced 
KR protocol based on that security-enhanced KR protocol in order to protect users’ location 
privacy. In mobile communication environments, Wireless Authentication and Key 
Establishment (WAKE) protocols are essential for secure information transmission. KR 
protocols, including WAKE protocols, can enable an authorized third party to gain access to 
encrypted message data under certain lawful circumstances. However, due to the limited 
resources of mobile hardware, it is not easy to construct KR protocols for mobile 
communication environments which are both secure and strongly preserve privacy.  
Third, I import software products with network security features such as intrusion detection 
systems (IDS) and a firewall in order to solve the security problems that occur in the networks 
such as the Internet. In this chapter, I have designed and constructed a general simulation 
environment for a network security model composed of multiple IDSs and a firewall, which 
coordinate by means of a contract net protocol (CNP) for the effective detection of an 
intrusion. CNP, the methodology for efficient integration of computer systems in 
heterogeneous environments such as distributed systems, is essentially a collection of agents 
that cooperate to resolve a problem. In the network security model, each model of the 
simulation environment is hierarchically designed by discrete event system specification 
(DEVS) formalism. The purpose of this simulation is to evaluate the characteristics and 
performance of CNP architecture in order to shorten the inference cycle phases of the 
intrusion detection expert system.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1.1 provides an overview 
of SCTP and its enhanced handover procedure and then Section 5.1.2 introduces the proposed 
fast session key distribution mechanism. Section 5.2.1 briefly introduces KR systems and 
Section 5.2.2 describes previous KR systems used in the WAKE protocol of the ASPeCT 
project. I propose a security-enhanced KR-WAKE protocol in Section 5.2.3, and a second 
protocol guaranteeing location privacy of mobile users as well as security in Section 5.2.4. 
Section 5.3.1 presents results of the about network system modeling that was constructed by 
network simulation. Section 5.3.2 describes the coordination of the contract net protocol. 
Finally, I conclude this chapter in Section 5.4. 
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5.1 Effective Key Pre-Distribution for Fast and Secure Handover 
As mobile technologies provide advanced access service to the Internet, security issues for 
mobile networks have increased dramatically. Several mobility protocols have been proposed. 
For instance, as an IP layer protocol, Mobile IPv6 has been introduced to allow a mobile node 
to move around the Internet without a loss of connection [JPA04]. Since the costs of mobility 
support for Mobile IPv6 are high, other IP based mobility protocols such as Fast Mobile IPv6 
and Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 have been introduced [Ko05, SCMB05]. Moreover, some 
mobility protocols that extend the transport layer for supporting mobile networks have 
recently been introduced. Apart from various mobility protocols, security mechanisms for 
mobility protocols have also been introduced. Unfortunately, however, most of these new 
protocols have merely applied those security mechanisms used in legacy networks which do 
not well reflect the properties of mobile networks. 
From the perspective of seamless handover technology, the main issue is how to reduce 
handover latency as a mobile node moves among different networks. Mobile IPv6 is a 
fundamental protocol. In other words, Mobile IPv6 results in long handover latency when the 
mobile node attaches to another network. This problem is accentuated in the case of latency 
sensitive services such as multimedia streaming services, voice services, etc. To address such 
unacceptable latency, extensions of Mobile IPv6 have been proposed. Among them, the fast 
handover mechanism defined in [Ko05] promises reduced handover latency and packet loss 
via the tunnel established between access routers. The main feature of this mechanism is the 
packet-forwarding tunnel. When the mobile node receives a wireless link-layer signal from 
the new access router, the mobile node generates the new address and then informs the 
previous (current) access router that it will attach to the new access router. The previous 
access router makes a tunnel for packet forwarding with the new access router. Accordingly, 
the mobile node can attach to the new access router with reduced handover latency and packet 
loss. As a transport layer mobility protocol, stream control transmission protocol (SCTP) 
provides the dynamic address configuration for mobile nodes. The mobile node can add and 
delete its communication address with its corresponding node by using SCTP. This feature 
provides a simple way to change the mobile node's communication address and is easily 
extended to the fast handover procedure. 
For several years, some methods have been proposed to provide secure mobile 
communication on IPv6 networks. However, current security mechanisms for secure mobile 
communications do not reflect the properties of mobile networks. For example, in [KC04], a 
fast session key distribution mechanism introduced to reduce the handover latency, the 
mobile node receives previously used session key from the previous access router as the 
mobile node moves to the new access router. The mechanism obviously reduces the 
authentication and handover latency due to the reduced key distribution time, however it 
exposes the session key to a spoofing attack. 
In this chapter, I propose an effective session key distribution mechanism that reflects the 
properties of mobile networks. In the proposed mechanism, SCTP is used to establish its 
communication session with corresponding nodes. In addition, the session key is securely 
distributed when a mobile node moves to a new access router. The mobile node establishes its 
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secure communication session with the new access router based on the pre-distributed session 
key. 
5.1.1 Stream control transmission protocol for handover managements 
Stream control transmission protocol (SCTP) is a reliable transport layer protocol that 
operates on top of connectionless IP protocol. SCTP provides end-to-end multi-sessions 
[SXMSSTRKZP00, SSO02, St07]. In other words, SCTP allows more than one active address 
for both the data source and destination. In addition, these addresses can be added and deleted 
dynamically while maintaining sessions. Note that this dynamic address configuration was 
originally developed as a backup feature that provides fault tolerance manners in the event 
that one communication path link fails. In SCTP based communication, each address of the 
mobile node is considered as a path for data transmission to the corresponding node. Actually, 
only one address, called the primary address, is used in data transmission even though other 
addresses are available. This allows another address to be used by the dynamic address 
configuration as defined in [SXTMK07]. This feature provides a concise handover 
management scenario 2
                                                     
2 Handover refers to a mobile node changing its wireless address as its actual location changes, e.g. as it moves to 
another access network. 
. As shown in Figure 5.1, a dynamic address configuration procedure 
consists of three steps [St07, SXTMK07]. First, the mobile node sends an ADD-IP Address 
Configuration (ASCONF) message including a new address to its corresponding node when 
the mobile node obtains the new address. Then, the corresponding node adds the included 
address in the ASCONF message to its communication address pool for the mobile node. As a 
result, the ASCONF ACK message is sent to the mobile node. When the mobile node needs 
to change the new address to the primary address to communicate with the corresponding 
node, the mobile node sends the ASCONF message including the newly set primary address. 
As the corresponding node receives this message, it recognizes that the communication 
address with the mobile node needs to be changed. The corresponding node updates its 
communication address. Accordingly, packets sent to the mobile node have the new primary 
address set as their destination address. In the case that the mobile node does not need to 
maintain the old address, the mobile node sends the ASCONF message along with the old 
address to its corresponding node and the corresponding node deletes the old address. 
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Figure 5.1 Dynamic address configuration procedure in SCTP 
Studies that use the dynamic address configuration for handover management have recently 
been published recently. In [KCL04], the authors have introduced a soft handover mechanism 
based on SCTP. The mechanism uses the dynamic address configuration when a mobile node 
informs its new address to the corresponding node. As the corresponding node recognizes the 
new address, it uses this address as a primary address for communicating with the mobile 
node. This simple mechanism reduces the complexity of handover management compared to 
Mobile IPv6. Note that a mobile node operating on Mobile IPv6 has to send its new location 
to all corresponding nodes by sending binding update messages and these procedures are all 
known to be high cost procedures. Thus, the SCTP based handover mechanism introduced in 
[KCL04] results in reductions of handover latency and cost. In [HT07], the authors have 
focused on the multi-path transmission feature of SCTP and adopted it to improve handover 
performance. They have concluded that multi-path transmission helps to reduce packet re-
transmission and re-ordering problems. Other studies on handover performance demonstrate 
that SCTP based handover mechanisms provide obvious improvements in performance 
compared to Mobile IPv6 [HNH05, ZS07]; however, these mechanisms have not addressed 
the packet loss problem. For instance, packets sent to a previous address will be lost as the 
mobile node changes its primary address from the previous one to new one. Moreover, 
security issues have not been considered in such SCTP-based handover mechanisms. One 
major security issue in mobile networks is session key distribution for a mobile node. Due to 
its mobile nature, session keys for mobile nodes must be distributed from the key distribution 
server (KDS) every time that the mobile node moves to another access network. Accordingly, 
seamless handover (providing low handover latency) and secure communication (providing 
authentication materials) for mobile nodes ought to be considered simultaneously. The AAA 
(Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting) architecture is currently believed to provide 
and control effective network access control mechanisms in wireless mobile networks. Thus I 
propose implementing KDS within the AAA server that manages all network access control 
for mobile nodes in its domain [LCGJM07, KKG07]. 
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In order to address both of seamless handover and secure communication in wireless 
mobile networks, I propose an effective session key distribution mechanism. The proposed 
mechanism prevents packet loss issues, which previous SCTP-based mechanisms have not 
considered [KCL04, HT07]. Moreover, the proposed mechanism also enables the mobile 
node to actively obtain a session key through a tunnel established between access routers as 
the mobile node moves from one to the next.3
5.1.2 Effective session key distribution mechanism 
 
In this section, I present an effective session key distribution mechanism that provides low 
handover latency and cost. In the proposed mechanism, a mobile node uses signaling defined 
in SCTP to establish its communication session with the corresponding nodes 
[SXTMK07]after which a tunnel is established between the previous and new access routers 
in order for the previous router to distribute the session key to the next [Ko05]. 
5.1.2.1 Signaling for establishing communication session 
As the mobile node receives the wireless link-layer signaling from a new access router, the 
mobile node sends a Router Solicitation for Proxy Advertisement (RtSolPr) message to its 
current access router as defined in [Ko05]. As a result, the mobile node receives the Proxy 
Router Advertisement message from the current access router. The mobile node obtains a new 
address that will be used in the new access router and then generates the new care-of address 
(CoA) based on the new address obtained from the PrRtAdv message. This newly generated 
CoA is sent to the corresponding node. In other words, the mobile node actively sends the 
ASCONF message including both the new CoA and setting primary address information to its 
corresponding node to inform it that henceforth the mobile node will use this address as a 
communication session address. Accordingly, the mobile node can immediately begin to 
receive data packets sent from the corresponding node as soon as the mobile node connects to 
the new access router. 
Figure 5.2 shows the proposed handover procedure where the mobile node actively 
establishes its communication session with the corresponding node by sending the ASCONF 
message. In the following steps, I describe the proposed handover procedure in detail. 
 
 
                                                     
3 When the mobile node changes its location by handover, the mobile node has to obtain its new session key to 
perform its security association with the new access router. 
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Figure 5.2 Proposed handover procedure 
1. The data packets sent from the corresponding node to the mobile node are 
delivered to the current mobile node's address through the previous (current) 
access router. 
2. The mobile node receives the wireless link-layer signals from the new access 
router as the mobile node moves toward to the new access router. 
3. The mobile node sends the RtSolPr message to the previous access router to obtain 
the new address that will be used for generating the new CoA address. 
4. The previous access router replies with the PrRtAdv message including the new 
address for the mobile node. 
5. The mobile node sends the ASCONF message including the new CoA indicating 
the primary address to the corresponding node. 
6. The corresponding node replies with the ASCONF ACK message upon changing 
its communication session address with the mobile node. 
7. Prior to connecting to the new access router, the mobile node sends the Fast 
Binding Update (FBU) message to the previous access router as defined in [Ko05]. 
8. Subsequently, the previous access router sends the FBU Ack message back to the 
mobile node. The previous access router on receiving the FBU message 
acknowledges that the mobile node has moved to the new access router. 
Accordingly, the previous access router can send the session key for the mobile 
node used within the previous access network. Note that the detailed session key 
distribution procedure is described in the following sub-section. 
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9. The mobile node connects to the new access router because the ASCONF ACK 
sent from the corresponding node confirms that the corresponding node now 
knows where the mobile node has moved. 
10. Data packets sent from the corresponding node to the mobile node are delivered to 
the new mobile node's address through the new access router. 
11. Now connected to the new access router, the mobile node sends messages to both 
its home agent and corresponding node. The first one is the binding update (BU) 
message as described in [JPA04] and the second one is the ASCONF message 
indicating the deletion of the old address. Note that this deletion for the old address 
is optional. 
12. The mobile node receives the replies (BA message and ASCONF ACK message) 
sent respectively from its home agent and corresponding node in response to the 
BU message and ASCONF message . 
Through the described handover procedure, the mobile node obtains its new CofA and 
promptly preserves its communication session as it moves from one access router to the next. 
5.1.2.2 Key distribution 
In the previous sub-section, I described the proposed handover procedure. Here, I 
concentrate on key distribution for the mobile node. As a mobile node accesses a new router, 
it must establish a new session key in order to protect its communication session. Standard 
protocols in the past have required the mobile node to request a session key with every 
movement. Accordingly, as the mobile node moves to a new network, it needs to obtain a 
session key from the KDS. Note that in my proposed scheme, I apply the AAA architecture to 
the task of network control, [LCGJM07, KKG07], and embed the KDS within this control 
architecture. A key distribution procedure that does not reflect the properties of mobile 
networks causes long authentication latency thus increasing handover latency. In the proposed 
mechanism, the mobile node obtains the session used key in the previous access network 
when it moves to the new access network. 
In the proposed key distribution procedure, the previous access router recognizes the 
movement of mobile node based on the FBU message. When the previous access router 
receives the FBU message, the previous access router forwards the session key to the new 
access router through the tunnel established between them. The mobile node can then use this 
session key forwarded from the previous access router to the new access network. 
Accordingly, the mobile node does not need to request a new session key from the KDS. The 
reduced session key distribution procedure is more effective when the mobile node frequently 
moves across different access networks and the distance increases between the mobile node 
and the KDS. 
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Figure 5.3 Fast key distribution procedure 
Figure 5.3 shows the proposed fast key distribution procedure. As the previous access 
router receives the FBU message sent from the mobile node, it sends its session key, which 
has been used for protecting communication session with the mobile node, to the new access 
router by sending the session key distribution (SKD) message. Once the new access router 
obtains the session key it can then use this session key when the mobile node attaches to its 
access network. As described in [KC04], an attacker can perform a spoofing attack if the 
distribution of the session key does not support the confidentiality. Accordingly, the SKD and 
SKD Ack messages are encrypted between the access routers using a long-term pre-shared 
key. Note that the access routers are connected by wired network infrastructures and they 
normally have enough computation power for encryption and decryption. 
5.2 Privacy-Enhanced Key Recovery  
Currently, I live in the Third Generation (3G) mobile communication environments, such 
as CDMA2000[OP98, Bu97] and W-CDMA (UMTS)[Bl99]. These cutting edge technologies 
have changed my life styles and have also prompted much interest in the field of mobile 
security. These environments offer nice advantages such as video calling, wide data 
bandwidth, global roaming, but on the downside, my location can easily be traced without my 
knowledge or permission. In other words, while there are advantages, there are also many 
security issues. 
One such security issue is related to the adoption of Key Recovery (KR) schemes. For the 
purposes of social security and national security, national governments allow legal 
eavesdropping on a criminal suspect under a judge-issued warrant. KR is a cryptography 
mechanism that allows authorized people (users, officers of an organization, and government 
officials), under certain conditions, to decrypt encrypted messages with the help of 
information supplied by trusted parties who hold special data related key recovery. And these 
special data-recovery keys are not normally the same as those used to encrypt and decrypt the 
data, but rather provide means of determining the data encryption/decryption keys [DB96]. 
Thus national governments have shown much interest in the application of key recovery and 
especially the lawful interception of encrypted communication messages for investigating 
serious crimes and for national security in mobile communication environments. 
In this section, I focus on enhancing the security and privacy of KR scheme in mobile 
communication environments. Normally mobile communication systems are composed of 
four entities, including mobile users, network operators (NO’s), value-added service 
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providers (VASP’s), and service providers (SP’s). Mobile communication systems typically 
provide fundamental security features, such as confidentiality on the air interface, anonymity 
of user, and mutual authentication between mobile users and NO’s/VASP’s. In fact, a mobile 
user’s location is often traced for VASP accounting purposes. However, in general I want to 
protect my location information as tracking a user’s location or retrieving a user’s location 
history without any approval would be a serious invasion of privacy.  
Horn and Preneel proposed the Wireless Authentication and Key Establishment (WAKE) 
protocol for mutual authentication between a mobile user and a VASP [HP98] in the research 
project, Advanced Security for Personal Communications Technologies (ASPeCT) [ACT97] 
in 1998. In the following years, Rantos and Mitchell proposed a modified WAKE protocol 
which includes a Key Recovery (KR) feature [RM99]. They modified the user-to-VASP 
interface of [HP98] to provide a KR capability. In 2000, Nieto et al. reported some security 
flaws in Rantos and Mitchell’s protocol and proposed a modified KR enhanced WAKE 
protocol [NPBD00]. In the following year, Kim and Lee also improved security and efficiency 
for the protocol of Nieto et al. [KL01]. In Kim and Lee’s proposed scheme, I found a serious 
problem related to the public KR information (KRI) validation process on the VASP side. In 
hits section I offer the example of a single rogue user attack on Kim and Lee’s protocol and 
then introduce a solution to that protocol. 
5.2.1 Definitions 
Since the Escrow Encryption Standard (EES) was published in 1993, many researchers 
have studied KR systems. I first describe the following terminologies as in [NPBD00, KL01] 
for explaining KR systems. 
 Key Recovery Agent (KRA). A trusted third party that performs KR in response to 
an authorized request. 
 Key Recovery Information (KRI). An assortment of data that is needed by the KRA 
in order to complete a KR request, e.g. a session key encrypted under the KRA’s 
public key. 
 Key Recovery Requestor (KRR). An authorized entity that requests KR from the 
KRA. The KRR would usually be a LEA (Law Enforcement Agency) in possession of 
a valid warrant. 
 Interception Agent (IA). An entity that acts in response to an authorized request for 
interception of a target identity by filtering out the communications traffic 
corresponding to the target identity. This function would usually be performed by 
NO’s who act as a collector of KRI’s[ETSI97, ETSI96]. 
5.2.2 Related Work 
In this section, I introduce some protocols [HP98, RM99, NPBD00, KL01] and commonly 
used notation and definitions from [NPBD00, KL01] to describe these protocols. 
5.2.2.1 ASPeCT Project’s WAKE Protocol [HP98] 
The ASPeCT Project introduced the WAKE protocol for the UMTS environment and this 
protocol is the first authentication and key establishment protocol developed for wireless 
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communications. The simplified protocol is described in Figure 5.4. A detailed description 
can be found in [HP98, ACT97]. In fact, the protocol shown in figure 5.4 is one of two 
variants of the ASPeCT protocol for user-to-VASP interface, which is called the B-variant 
protocol. Another variant, the so-called C-variant protocol, is an extended version of the B-
variant protocol and is expanded to include on-line trusted third parties (TTPs). For brevity I 
describe the B-variant and mainly consider key recovery within this protocol; however the 
same solutions can be applied to the C-variant protocol. I used the following notations to 
describe WAKE protocol. 
Table 5.1 Notations for WAKE Protocol 
Notation Description 
A the identity of the user 
B the identity of the VASP 
TTPA the identity of the TTP that A trusts 
g a generator of a finite group 
rA a random nonce chosen by A 
rB a random nonce chosen by B 
KAB a secret session key established between A and B 
KA-1 A’s private signature key 
ACert public key certificate of A that is signed by TTPA 
BCert public key certificate of B that is signed by TTPA 
b the private key component of the public-private key-agreement key pair of B 
gb the public key component of the public-private key-agreement key pair of B 
{m}KA-1 the message m signed by A with his private signature key KA-1 
{m}KAB the symmetric encryption of a message m using the session key KAB 
h,h1,h2,h3 one-way hash functions 
 
Initial Setup: 
KAB = h1(rB,gbrA) 
WAKE Protocol: 
A  B 
  [1] grA, TTPA    
  [2] rB, h2(KAB,rB,B), BCert   
  [3] {{h3(grA,gb,rB,B)}KA-1,ACert}KAB   
 
Figure 5.4 The ASPeCT WAKE protocol 
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5.2.2.2 WAKE KR Protocol of Rantos and Mitchell [RM99] 
Rantos and Mitchell proposed adding a key recovery feature to the ASPeCT WAKE 
protocol. The enhanced WAKE KR Protocol is described in figure 5.5. 
 
Initial Setup: 
KAB = h1(rB,gbrA) 
A: rA=f(wA,sA), L=(gxA) rA 
WAKE Protocol: 
A  B 
  [1] grA, sA, {A}L, TTPA   
  [2] rB, h2(KAB,rB,B), BCert   
  [3] {{h3(grA,gb,rB,B)}KA-1,ACert}KAB   
 
Figure 5.5 WAKE KR protocol 
Rantos and Mitchell slightly modified the method of computing A’s random nonce, rA as 
shown below; 
rA =f(wA, sA)      (5.1) 
where f is a one-way function, sA is a one-time random seed, and wA is a secret value 
shared between A and KRAA.  
5.2.2.3 Modified WAKE KR Protocol of Nieto et al. [NPBD00] 
This protocol, proposed by Nieto et al., resolves some security flaws inherent in Rantos and 
Mitchell’s WAKE KR protocol. They presented that the inclusion of {A}L in Token 1 was 
unnecessary. They also described how an impersonation attack could be mounted on the 
WAKE KR protocol in the case that wA was a temporary secret. Furthermore, A cannot be 
sure whether the protocol tokens are being exchanged with B or KRAB, since both B and 
KRAB know b. Thus they proposed the modified WAKE KR protocol as shown in figure 5.6. 
 
Initial Setup: 
KAB = h1(rB,gbrA) 
A: sA=(wAh(grA)+rA) mod q / B: rB=fB(wB,sB) 
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WAKE Protocol: 
A  B 
  [1] grA, TTPA   
  [2] rB⊕gbrA, h2(KAB,rB,B), {sB}KAB, BCert   
  [3] {{h3(grA,gb,rB,B)}KA-1,ACert}KAB, sA, sB   
 
Figure 5.6 Modified WAKE KR protocol 
5.2.2.4 Improved WAKE KR Protocol of Kim and Lee [KL01] 
This protocol, which was proposed by Kim and Lee, improves the security of Nieto et al.’s 
modified KR enhanced protocol by adding the public KRI validation property in domain B. 
They noticed that in the event that B authenticates to A, a public KRI validation property 
cannot be applied in B’s domain in the modified WAKE KR protocol. They also pointed out 
that the insertion of sA, sB, and {sB}KAB may incur transmission and computation overhead, 
thus they modified it. The improved WAKE KR protocol of Kim and Lee is described in 
Figure 5.7. 
 
Initial Setup: 
KAB = h1(gbrA+rB) 
A: sA=(wAh(grA)+rA) mod q / B: sB=(wBh(grB)+rB) mod q 
WAKE Protocol: 
A  B 
  [1] grA, TTPA   
  [2] grB, wB⊕rB⊕gbrA, h2(KAB,rB,B), {sB}KAB, BCert   
  [3] {{h3(grA,gb,rB,B)}KA-1,ACert}KAB, sA, sB   
 
Figure 5.7 Improved WAKE KR protocol 
In the description of the protocol, I use the following notations according to Kim and Lee’s 
paper [KL01]: p is a large prime, q is a prime with q|(p-1), and g is an element in the 
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multiplicative group Z*p of order q. All operations are performed modulo p, except where 
otherwise noted. The KR mechanism consists of three stages as follows. 
KRI Generation Phase: 
Each entity A and B generates wA and wB respectively, and also shares them with KRAA 
and KRAB respectively. The value φA= gwA and φB= gwB are made publicly available. User A 
selects a random integer, rA, computes µA=grA, and calculates sA as 
sA=(wAh(grA)+rA) mod q.     (5.2) 
Similarly the VASP B generates rB, µB, and sB. 
 
KR Phase: 
In A’s domain, KRAA first computes rA as  
rA= sA-wAh(µA) mod q,     (5.3) 
and KRAA computes (gb)rA and KAB = h1(gbrAgrB). 
In B’s domain, KRAB first computes rB as  
rB= sB-wBh(µB) mod q,     (5.4) 
and KRAB computes gbrA from wB⊕rB⊕gbrA. Then KRAB computes KAB = h1(grBgbrA). 
 
Public KRI Validation Phase: 
Given the public data µA, sA, and A, a third-party monitor, V, can verify the integrity of the 
KRI fields generated by A by doing the following: 
 obtain authentic public value φA 
 compute c’=h(µA) mod q 
 conclude that the validation process is successful if and only if gsA=φc’AµA 
In B’s case, the same procedure is applied. 
5.2.2.4.1 Problem with the Improved WAKE KR Protocol 
I found a security hole in the public KRI validation phase particularly in VASP B’s domain 
of the improved WAKE KR protocol above. In the worst case scenario, a single rogue user 
attack is possible on B. In Token 2, if B sends a bogus value wB⊕r’B⊕gbrA instead of 
wB⊕rB⊕gbrA to user A, KRAB may recover a fabricated session key KAB(see Figure 4). For 
example, during the KR phase, KRAB first computes rB from rB=sB-wBh(µB) mod q and then 
obtains rB⊕r’B⊕gbrA rather than gbrA as 
rB⊕r’B⊕gbrA =(wB⊕rB)⊕(wB⊕r’B⊕gbrA),   (5.5) 
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from wB⊕r’B⊕gbrA using wB , which he knows. Next, KRAB may recover session key KAB, 
h1((rB⊕r’B⊕gbrA)grB) instead of h1(gbrA+rB). This attack is possible due to the false public KRI 
validation check. In B’s domain, a third-party monitor, V, checks whether B sends a correct 
sB and grB from gsB=φc’BµB using φB and c’ which he knows. Consequently, that the problem 
lies in the fact that V does not check whether the rB sent by B is correct 
5.2.3 Security-Enhanced KR Protocol 
First I propose a new WAKE KR protocol that improves on the previous protocols 
described in Section 5.2.2. In particular, I improve on Kim and Lee’s protocol by modifying 
the public KRI validation check in domain B.  
5.2.3.1 Protocol Overview 
As already seen in Section 5.2.2.4, Kim and Lee’s protocol has the problem that it does not 
provide a correct public KRI validation check in B’s domain. However if I slightly modify the 
protocol, I can resolve this problem. The proposed protocol is described in Figure 5.8. 
Initial Setup: 
KAB = h1(wB⊕rB, gbrA) 
A: sA=(wAh(grA)+rA) mod q / B: sB=(wBh(wB⊕rB)+rB) mod q 
WAKE Protocol: 
A  B 
  [1] grA, TTPA   
  [2] grB, wB⊕rB⊕gbrA, h2(KAB,wB⊕rB,B), sB, BCert   
  [3] {{h3(grA,gb,wB⊕rB,B)}KA-1,ACert}KAB, sA, h(wB⊕rB)   
 
Figure 5.8 The proposed security-enhanced WAKE KR Protocol 
 
KRI Generation Phase:  
Each entity A and B generates wA and wB respectively, and also shares them with KRAA 
and KRAB respectively. The values φA= gwA and φB= gwB are made publicly available. The 
user A selects a random integer, rA, computes µA=grA, cA=h(grA) mod q, and calculates sA as 
sA=(wAh(grA)+rA) mod q.     (5.6) 
The VASP B similarly generates rB and µB except cB=h(wB⊕rB) mod q, and calculates sB as 
sB=(wBh(wB⊕rB)+rB) mod q,    (5.7) 
where h is a one-way and collision free hash function. 
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KR Phase: 
In A’s domain, KRAA first computes rA as  
rA= sA-wAh(µA) mod q.     (5.8) 
KRAA computes (gb)rA and calculates wB⊕rB from wB⊕rB⊕gbrA and KAB = h1(wB⊕rB, gbrA). 
In B’s domain, KRAB first computes rB as  
rB= sB-wBh(wB⊕rB) mod q.     (5.9) 
KRAB computes gbrA from wB⊕rB⊕gbrA. Then KRAB computes KAB = h1(wB⊕rB, gbrA). 
 
Public KRI Validation Phase: 
Given the public data µA, sA, and A, a monitoring third party V can check the integrity of 
the KRI fields generated by A by doing the following: 
 obtain authentic public value φA 
 compute c’A=h(µA) mod q 
 resolve the validation process as successful if and only if gsA=φc’AµA 
However, in B’s case, other procedure is applied. 
Given the public data µB, sB, h(wB⊕rB), and B, a monitoring third party V can check the 
integrity of the KRI fields generated by A, by doing the following: 
 obtain authentic public value φB 
 compute c’B=h(wB⊕rB) mod q 
 resolve the validation process as successful if and only if gsB=φc’BµB 
5.2.4 Privacy-Enhanced KR Protocol 
In this section, I propose a new protocol for ensuring mobile users’ location privacy based 
on the proposed security-enhanced WAKE KR protocol in the previous section. Location 
privacy [AMSW97, FJKP95] is an important requirement as the location information of 
mobile users should be untraceable to unauthorized parties, including the network operators 
in mobile communications. In relation to this, some solutions, including temporary 
pseudonym (TP) methods [KFJP96, KRJ98, KYPK05, BM07], MIXes [PPW91] and so on, 
have been proposed until now. Among these solutions, TP method is based on the concept of 
trusted devices (TD) which confidentially store sensitive data (authentication keys, location 
information etc.) [KRJ98, KYPK05]. The basic idea of the TP method is using protecting 
mobile users’ real identity for protecting their location information. To this end, users would 
be assigned pseudonyms, or pseudo mobile subscriber identities (PMSI). As long as one of 
the users who is registered under a pseudonym is currently at a certain place, attackers cannot 
link the user’s real identity with the user’s present location. 
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5.2.4.1 Protocol Overview 
I show the privacy-enhanced WAKE KR protocol using the above TP method, especially 
Kim et al.’s TP method [KYPK05]. Some additional notations used in this method and 
subsequent protocol descriptions are shown as follows; 
Table 5.2 Notations for privacy-enhanced WAKE KR protocol 
Notation Description 
TDA A’s trusted device (TD), which is similar to TTP and binds the 
key to the identity (for simplicity, I did not include this in my 
protocol). However, TDA can be connected and used only by user 
A for secure external computation and storing. 
PMSIA the pseudonym identity of a mobile user A 
KA-1, KA the signature key and verification key of A 
KTDA-1 the signature key of TDA 
KATD the shared secret key between A and TDA 
 
Initial Setup: 
KAB = h1(wB⊕rB, gbrA) 
A: sA=(wAh(grA)+rA) mod q / B: sB=(wBh(wB⊕rB)+rB) mod q 
WAKE Protocol: 
A  B 
  [1] grA, KA, TDA, (grA, KA)KTDA-1   
  [2] grB, wB⊕rB⊕gbrA, h2(KAB,wB⊕rB,B), sB, BCert   
  [3] {{h3(grA,gb,wB⊕rB,B)}KA-1}KAB, sA, h(wB⊕rB)   
 
Figure 5.9 The proposed privacy-enhanced WAKE KR Protocol 
 
KRI Generation Phase: 
Each entity A and B generates wA and wB, and shares with KRAA and KRAB respectively. 
The value φA= gwA and φB= gwB are made publicly available. User A selects a random integer, 
rA, computes µA=grA, cA=h(grA) mod q, and calculates sA as 
sA=(wAh(grA)+rA) mod q.    (5.10) 
User A additionally performs the following: 
 53 
 
 A→TD: (PMSIA, grA)KATD     (5.11) 
 A←TD: {TDA, grA, KA, KA-1, (grA, KA)KTDA-1}KATD   (5.12) 
Similarly B generates rB, µB, cB=h(wB⊕rB) mod q, and calculates sB as 
sB=(wBh(wB⊕rB)+rB) mod q,   (5.13) 
where h is a one-way, collision free hash function. 
The following two phases are the same as the above protocol (see Section 5.2.4.1)  
5.3 Security Simulation Model based on Contract Network Protocol 
Given the recent growth of the Internet, intrusion incidents are becoming common events 
of life. Some of these incidents are simply out of innocuous curiosity. Some, however, are 
due to malicious attempts to compromise the availability of the information system or the 
integrity and privacy of the information itself. Despite the best efforts of the protocol 
designers, implementers, and system administrators, it is prudent to assume that attacks will 
occur and some, unfortunately, will succeed. Therefore, it is vitally important to develop 
means to automatically detect and respond to these attacks in real-time in order to maintain 
critical information services [JGSWWCW00]. I have designed and constructed the general 
simulation environment of network security model composed of multiple IDSs [Ba00, Am99] 
and a firewall [ZCC00, MSK99], coordinated by CNP [YHHMW98, Pa87], for the effective 
detection of the intrusion. Intrusion detection systems monitor system activities to identify 
unauthorized use, misuse, or abuse of computer and network systems. A firewall plays a vital 
role in network security, restricting access between the external and internal networks. 
A network-based multiple IDSs, based on the theory of distributed systems, reduces system 
overloading by distributing jobs to agents and reduces detection time by selecting the best 
agent to detect an intrusion. Security models are made to coordinate in the multiple IDSs 
architecture for detection performance enhancement. Most of all, the effective allocation of 
tasks and coordination of agents is the most critical issue for achieving high performance in 
an agent-based cooperative design [SSM99]. Agents, as a new technology of distributed 
artificial intelligence (DAI), have become a new important issue of AI research as evidenced 
by the large volume of publications [HZZ99, BG98]. 
To allow effective coordination and control of tasks, CNP allocates agents to the tasks. In 
this approach, agents coordinate through contracts to accomplish a goal. Contracting involves 
an exchange of information among agents, an evaluation of the information, and a final 
agreement based on mutual selection. In other words, CNP selects the best agent to serve jobs 
by bidding and then the selected agent performs the jobs. 
Three different types of modeling and simulation have been conducted. First, a rule-based 
expert system [Wi93, Ja99] is applied to an IDS model for detecting intrusions. Second, a 
CNP model is constructed with multiple IDSs. Using the model, the distributed IDSs and 
firewall are coordinated for better intrusion detection. Lastly, a model is constructed with 
multiple IDs and a CNP that exploits the rete algorithm for further speeding up the process of 
intrusion detection activities. The above models are defined by DEVS formalism [ZPK00, 
SC03], a well-grounded means of expressing discrete event models. 
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5.3.1 Network System Modeling 
5.3.1.1 Target Network Structure  
Figure 5.10 shows the structure of the target network that has three subnets: subnet_49, 
subnet_50 and subnet_53. The types of component models in the network are IDS, Firewall, 
Router and Gateway models. Each subnet has a Unix server, Linux server, Windows NT 
server, and etc. The IDS is loaded within each host and cooperates with other IDSs in 
detecting intrusions. These models are constructed based on DEVS formalism. DEVS 
formalism, developed by Zeigler, is a theoretical, well-grounded means of expressing 
hierarchical, modular discrete-event models. 
 
Figure 5.10 Structure of target network 
5.3.1.2 Command Console Model  
The contract net protocol was originally proposed as a tool for communication and control 
in a distributed problem solver. It provides a mechanism for agents to communicate and 
negotiate to solve distributed problems via contracts. A contract is a set of tasks to be 
accomplished. Agents announce tasks that they need and make bids to perform tasks 
announced by other agents. Next, agents evaluate bids and award contracts. Contract net 
protocol is essentially a collection of nodes that cooperates to resolve a problem. 
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Figure 5.11 Structure of the Command Console mode 
The Command Console model, which controls all IDSs models and the firewall model in 
the CNP, is comprised of two models, the Messenger model and the Process model. 
Messenger model is composed of a Receiver and a Sender model and manages the 
communication of messages. The Receiver model receives messages from IDSs and other 
network components. The Sender model sends the messages formed in the Selector or 
Commander model to a certain IDSs or IDSs by means of unicast, multicast, or broadcast. 
The Selector model in the Process model selects an intrusion detection system with bids 
collected from all IDSs. The Commander model determines the message types that regulate 
IDSs and the firewall according to the state of the Inner Network. 
5.3.1.3 ID Model  
Figure 5.12 shows the structure of the ID model. The ID model is divided into a Detector 
model, a Response_Generator model, and a Logger model. 
The Detector model is composed of a Pattern_matcher and an Analyzer model. The 
Pattern_matcher model is a rule-based expert system that detects intrusions through a pattern 
matching procedure that compares packet data to rules. The Analyzer model is a statistical 
detection engine that detects intrusions by analyzing system logs and audits. The 
Response_Generator model determines responses according to the detection results of the 
Detector model and sends a message. The Logger model records all information of the 
detection procedure in the log file. 
Figure 5.12 Structure of IDE model 
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The Detector model detects intrusions through state transitions. Figure 5.13 displays the 
state transition diagram of the Detector model. When packet data enters the input port, the 
state transition begins with an initial, or Passive state and transits to the Intrusion state that is 
a goal which may only be reached through the Vulnerable and Active attack states. When the 
Detector model reaches the Intrusion state, the intrusion is detected by the model. If the 
Detector model fails to detect an intrusion or if IDS overloading exceeds a predefined 
threshold value, the state transits to the Failed state and the Detector model requests another 
IDS to detect the intrusion [Pr01]. 
 
Figure 5.13 State transition diagram of detector model 
A single event signature can be identified by analyzing a packet that contains one or more 
abnormal flags in the packet’s header information. If the Detector model detects an intrusion, 
the state of Detector model transitions from the Passive state to the Intrusion state. Multiple 
event signatures can be defined by analyzing many packets as with a Denial of Service (DoS) 
attack. If the Detector model detects an intrusion by analyzing packets, the state of the 
Detector model transitions from the Passive state to the Intrusion state via the Vulnerable and 
Active attack states. 
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5.3.1.4 Firewall Model 
Firewall models basically carry out the filtering of ingress and egress packets. If an IDS 
detects an intrusion, the Firewall model blocks the packets related to the intrusion and 
responds according to policies. Firewall models filter packets attempting to access the 
Command Console from an external network. 
Figure 5.14 shows the structure of a Firewall model that has Controller, In_Filter, and 
Out_Filter models. The Controller model deals with all messages from the Command Console 
model. It is decomposed into Messenger and Commander models. The Messenger model 
manages all messages that come from the Command Console, In_Filter, and Out_Filter. The 
Commander model determines all activities of the Firewall model. The In_Filter model filters 
packets which pass from the external network to the internal network using four models: 
Protocol, Address, Port, and Data models. The Protocol model filters the protocol information 
found in packet headers and the Address model filters IP addresses. The Port model filters 
port information and the Data model carries out filtering with packet data. The Out_Filter 
model filters packets that pass from the internal network to external networks and has the 
same sub-model as the In_Filter model. 
5.3.2 Coordination of CNP  
5.3.2.1 Coordination in the Contract Net Protocol 
When a simulation begins and packets enter the internal network, the Command Console 
sends a bid message to all IDS agents. After receiving a bid message, each agent makes a bid 
and sends a bid_data message. The Command Console selects an IDS agent to detect the 
intrusion using a selection algorithm with bid_data and then sends an award message to the 
selected IDS agent. After receiving the award message, the selected agent prepares to detect 
intrusions and waits for packet_data messages. The Command Console copies packet data to 
a packet_data message and sends it. The selected IDS agent detects intrusions according to 
packet_data. If the state of the Detector model becomes the Failed state, the agent sends an 
Figure 5.14 Structure of a Firewall model 
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announcement message to the Command Console, which upon receiving it, repeats the 
coordination cycle. If the Detector model detects an intrusion, the agent sends an intrusion 
message to the Command Console followed by an intrusion_data message. The Command 
Console then forwards the intrusion and intrusion_data messages to the Firewall which in turn 
sends broadcast and broadcast_data messages, which include intrusion data, to all agents. The 
Command Console and IDS agent repeat this cycle. 
Figure 5.15 Coordination cycle of CNP 
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Figure 5.16 Coordination structure of CNP 
Figure 5.15 sequentially represents the coordination cycle among the IDS, Command 
Console, and Firewall models. The Command Console sends a bid message to all IDS agents 
for intrusion data acquisition. IDS agents that receive the bid message immediately respond to 
the Command Console with a bid_data message. The Command Console selects an almost 
adaptive IDS agent and then sends an award message to selected IDS agents. The selected 
IDS agent sends intrusion information to the Command Console which then uses these data. 
Figure 5.16 shows the coordination structure of CNP and the flow of messages. The 
Command Console is a centralized entity and controls the coordination between the IDSs and 
the Firewall in the CNP. Coordination is actually achieved through the exchange of messages 
between the Command Console, IDS Agent models, and the Controller model of the Firewall. 
5.3.2.2 Coordination Messages  
The Command Console, IDS, and Firewall models have Messenger models that play the 
role of exchanging messages. A Message is divided into a control message and a data 
message. It is distinguished by msg_type field. Table 5.3 presents the types of messages.  
Table 5.3 Types of messages 
 Message Number msg_type 
Control 
Messages 
0 Broadcast 
1 Announcement 
2 Bid 
3 Award 
4 Intrusion 
Data 
Messages 
5 broadcast_data 
6 bid_data 
7 packet_data 
8 intrusion_data 
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The Msg_content field is composed of an agent_name field used to search for the address 
of and agent and the data field includes actual information as depicted in Figure 5.17. 
Because the Command Console has a mapping table that maps agent_name to the address of 
an agent, it can receive or send messages to all agents. 
 
Figure 5.17 Structure of bid_data 
The Control message is used for the Command Console to control IDSs and the Firewall. 
Bid messages announce that all IDS agents should send bids to the Command Console. 
Award messages reports that an agent has been selected as the IDS agent for intrusion 
detection. Intrusion messages inform the Command Console that an intrusion has been 
detected and also makes the Firewall respond to the intrusion. The Announcement message 
informs the Command Console that all agents repeat the coordination cycle when a state 
switches to Failed state. Broadcast messages report to all IDS agents that the Command 
Console has broadcasted detection information. 
There are four types of data messages: bid_data, intrusion_data, packet_data, and 
broadcast_data messages. Bid_data messages provide information requested for agent 
selection. Packet_data messages contain packet data extracted from real packets. 
Broadcast_data messages include detection information. The data field of bid_data messages, 
used for agent selection during the bidding procedure, is composed of expertise, experience, 
and loading. 
5.3.2.3 Agent Selection Algorithm  
Each agent sends a bid_data message to the Command Console if the value of the overload 
field is not greater than the threshold value of the system overload. The Selector of the 
Command Console makes a list of bids and enters agent bids into the list. First, the Selector 
model sorts the list by expertise, in descending order, and then selects the agent that has the 
greatest value of expertise. If the bid numbers are greater than two, the Selector model deletes 
all bids from the list except those bids having the greatest value of expertise, and then re-sorts 
the list by experience, in descending order. The Selector model chooses an agent that has the 
greatest value of experience. If the bid number is greater than two, the Selector deletes all 
remaining bids from the list except those possessing the greatest value of experience and sorts 
the list yet again, by loading. and in ascending order. Finally the Selector selects the best 
agent, the first element on the list, and the selected agent begins to detect intrusions. Table 5.4 
depicts the selection algorithm representing the selection routine. 
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Table 5.4 Selection Algorithm 
Let bidi be bids 
Set bid_list = empty set 
Let bid_list = (bid1,bid2,..., bid n) be a list of bids 
for i = 1 to n 
 if loading of bidi >= threshold value 
  Delete bidi from bid_list 
Sort bid_list by expertise in descending order 
if the number of bid including the greatest value of expertise >= 2 then 
{ 
 Delete bids from bid_list except bids including the greatest value of expertise 
 Sort bid_list including bids of the same expertise by experience in descending order 
 if the number of bid including the greatest value of experience >= 2 then 
 { 
  Delete bids from bid_list except bids including the greatest value of experience 
  Sort bid_list including bids of the same experience by loading in ascending order 
 } 
} 
Select Agent from bid_list(the first element) 
5.4 Summary 
In this chapter, I discussed security protocol issues for the HUC-HISF. 
First, I proposed an effective session key distribution mechanism. In this mechanism, a 
mobile node obtains its session key from the previous access router and performs an SCTP 
based location update for corresponding nodes. Accordingly, the proposed mechanism 
provides reduced signaling costs and handover latency. The presented performance analysis 
and its numerical results confirm that the proposed mechanism outperforms existing mobility 
protocols such as Mobile IPv6 and Fast Mobile IPv6 in terms of signaling costs and handover 
latency. In this thesis, I consider a mobile node-initiated handover so that the proposed 
mechanism can be extended to the case of network-initiated handovers. In future work, I plan 
to extend the proposed session key distribution mechanism to network-initiated handover 
cases. 
Second, I proposed a number of WAKE protocols having a key recovery feature. I 
described a security hole arising in the public KRI validation phase, specifically within the 
VASP domain of Kim and Lee’s protocol. In response to this weakness, I designed a new 
security-enhanced key recovery protocol over the WAKE protocol and demonstrated how this 
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enhanced protocol retains the efficiency of Kim and Lee’s protocol. I then proposed a new 
privacy-enhanced key recovery protocol, which can strongly protect users’ location privacy. 
Third, I selected several indicators for this simulation and constructed the a DEVS-based 
network security simulation environment and applied the CNP for coordination between IDSs 
and a Firewall. I also evaluated the performance of IDESs applying a rete pattern matching 
algorithm. Through simulation, I confirmed that multiple IDSs coordinated by the CNP 
performs more effectively in the detection of intrusions than a single IDS and can protect the 
network in advance by cooperating with the firewall. The application of the rete algorithm 
absolutely improves the efficiency of multiple IDSs with CNP. In the future, it will be 
necessary to construct a general network security simulation environment that is able to 
perform various security simulations and develop more effective algorithms that may be 
applied to the inference cycle of expert systems that detect various intrusions. 
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Chapter 6. DH-RBAC: Dynamic Human-context Role Based Access 
Control 
In this chapter, I describe DH-RBAC which is the core elements on this thesis. To have a 
better understanding, I describe the formal definition of context and its expression, and 
definition and architecture of DH-RBAC. In addition, I discuss DH-RBAC operations 
through examples. 
6.1 Definition of the Context and Expression 
In this section, I describe the formal definition of context used in DH-RBAC and related 
expressions based on [CFZA02, FSGKC01, HW04, ZP04] - context type, context constraint, 
access control policy, resource access. 
Definition.1 Context Type 
A Context Type (CT) is defined as a property related to every participant in an application 
when it is running. The context type may be a definite property such as temporal or spatial 
information. In addition, context type can be used to describe an abstract concept. 
Based on context type, every application has its own Context Set (CS), which is defined as 
a set of context types: 
CS = {CT1, CT2 … CTn}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n    (6.1) 
In order to make this abstract concept of context type usable when decisions of access 
control need to be made, it is necessary to have each context type evaluated by some Context 
Implementation. A context implementation (CI) of context type is defined as a function with 
n context types that return an object of type CT. 
CI: CT1 × CT2  …×  CTn → CT, n ≥ 0    (6.2) 
Definition. 2 Context Constraint  
I define a context constraint as a regular expression. Based on this format, our access 
control is able to specify any complex context related constraint to describe all kinds of 
security requirements. 
Context Constraint = 
i
j
j=1
Cond , Cond = 
j
i
i=1
SubCond
  
 (6.3) 
SubCond:= <CT> <OP> <VALUE>,     (6.4) 
Where CT∈CS; OP is a logical operator in the set {>, ≥ < , ≤, ≠, =} and VALUE is a 
specific value of CT. Suppose I have a context set CS = {Time, Location, Security Class}, 
and I have a partial security rule such as “patient data can be accessed from and within the 
hospital between 09:00 and 17:00 with a security class of a password, otherwise a higher 
security class is required.” If  “in” is a human-centric logical operator and “hospital” is a valid 
value of context type as location, then this rule could be expressed as  
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Context Constraint: = (Time >= 09:00 ∩ Time < 17:00 ∩    (6.5) 
Location in hospital ∩ SecClass>= H(PW)) ∪ (SecClass > H(PW))  (6.6) 
Definition. 3 Access Control Policy  
I define an access control policy (ACP) as a triple, ACP = (S, P, CC). 
S is the subject in this policy, which could be a human or a role.  
P is the target permission in this policy, which is defined as a pair <K,O>, where K is an 
operation kind defined in {READ, WRITE, DELETE, MODIFY} and O is a resource object. 
CC is a context constraint in this policy. If CC is empty then this policy returns to simple 
RBAC. 
Definition. 4 Resource Access  
I define resource access as a triple, RA = (U, P, RC). 
U is a human who issues this resource access in human set.  
P is the permission that this human wants to acquire.  
RC is Runtime Context which is a set of values for every Context Type in the Context Set. 
That is, RC = {V1 of CT1, V2 of CT2, …, Vn of CTn}, where = {CT1, CT2 … CTn} is the 
context set of the application.  
A resource access RA (U, P, RC) is granted only if there exists an access control policy 
ACP (S, P′, CC), such that U ∈ S, P = P′, and CC evaluates to true under RC.  
6.2 Formal Definition of the DH-RBAC and its Architecture 
DH-RBAC executes context constraint process by using context information such as 
temporal and spatial information when permission – role assignment (PA) is established. DH-
RBAC model indludes basic characteristics of RBAC like Least Privilege, Role Hierarchy, 
SoD, and Cardinalities concepts. 
Table 6.1 Formal Definition of DH-RBAC 
U, R, P, S, C represent the finite set of humans, roles, permissions, sessions, and context 
information respectively within the system 
PA ⊆ P x R represents the finite set of permission to role assignments. This is a many-to-
many relationship. 
UA ⊆ U x R represents the finite set of human to role assignments. This is a many-to-many 
relationship. 
human: S → U, a function that maps a session si to a human. 
RH ⊆ R x R is a partial order on R, called the role hierarchy or role dominance relation, also 
written as ≥, where r1 > r2, only if all permissions of r2 are also permission of r1 are human 
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of r2. 
For RBAC 0: S → 2R, a function that maps a session si to a set of roles, where roles(si) ⊆ {r 
| (human(si), r) ∈ UA}, and each session si has the permissions ∪r ∈ roles si) {p | (p, r) ∈ 
PA}.  
For RBAC1, roles: S → 2R, is modified from RBAC0 to require roles(si) ⊆ {r | (∃r’≥ r) 
[(human(si), r’) ∈ UA]} and each session si has the permissions ∪r ∈ roles(si) {p | (∃r’ ≤ 
r)[(p, r’) ∈ PA]}. 
For Context Constraints (CC), DRBAC adds context constraints in the form of restrictive 
functions that operate on basic RBAC components to meet the specific needs of the protection 
policies of an organization and factor of dynamic environments. Constraints in DRBAC 
include SoD (Separation of Duties) and Cardinalities including concepts of the RBAC 2. In 
addition, It includes context such as environments, time, location, etc. 
CCA ⊆ CC x R represents the finite set of CC to role assignments. This is a many-to-many 
relationship. 
 
DH-RBAC assigns the essential role among sub-roles to the human. Human-role 
assignment (UA) relationship and the rights which are assigned to other sub-roles are 
assigned to the human by inheritance relationship of the sub-role level when a human makes 
an essential role active. Table 6.1 presents formal definition of DH-RBAC and Figure 6.1 
depicts DH-RBAC architecture.  
Figure 6.1 DH-RBAC Architecture 
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6.3  DH-RBAC Operation  
Before I explain DH-RBAC operations, I need to remind of the prerequisite - All subjects 
can communicate freely each others through WSN module - assumed in chapter 1. In addition, 
the WSN module must be embodied with context agent module to be able to process the 
context information real-timely.  
The role set in DH-RBAC model is divided into role subset and is assigned to human. 
Furthermore, it is set each role which owned privilege having access to resource, and is 
assigned as one permission subset from the permission. 
I describe DH-RBAC operation by giving a medical scenario example which controls 
access to patient information document by member of hospital.  
Figure 6.2 Role Hierarchy in Hospital 
The hospital is comprised with various subject’s roles which are related to their tasks. For 
example, I can classify those tasks like doctor’s role, nurse’s role, pharmacist’s role, staff’s 
role and patient’s role as depicted in Figure 6.2.  
Moreover, the patient information document consist s of personal information, medical 
record, prescription, and administration record shown in Figure 6.3.  
Figure 6.3 Patient Information Document Construction in Hospital 
The access to patient information documents is not complicate in those days, any member 
of hospital can access to this information by using only human class through human 
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authentication. However, critical matters including individual’s privacy exposures will be 
occurred if the access information having higher class of subject is exposed to malicious party.  
In this chapter, I present an access control mechanism by using temporal and spatial 
context information to patient information document. In addition, I assume Read (R), Write 
(W), Delete (D) and Modify (M) as permissions having access to patient information 
documents, and express these rights as P1, P2, P3 and P4 respectively.  
To apply temporal and spatial context information to our proposed access control model, I 
divide the time in T1 and T2. T1 means doctor’s regular working time from 09:00 to 17:00, 
and T2 as the other time. Moreover, for the spatial context information, I classify location as 
three spaces - inner medical office, outer medical office in hospital, and the other place, and I 
note as L1, L2 and L3 respectively.  
In this section, I describe the access control process applying doctor’s temporal and spatial 
context information. In addition, I can specify the access control based on temporal and 
spatial context information to patient information document as following Table 6.2.  
 
Table 6.2 Example of an access control to patient information document based on  
temporal and spatial information 
Subject Role Object Time Location Permission 
Kim 
Doctor A T1, T2 L1, L2 R 
 B T1 L1 R, W, D, M 
   L2 R, W 
  T2 L1 R, W 
   L2 R 
 C T1, T2 L1, L2 R 
 D T1, T2 L1, L2 R 
Nurse A - L1, L2 R 
 B T1,T2 L1,L2 R 
 C T1 L2 R 
. 
. 
. 
 
. 
. 
. 
 
. 
. 
. 
 
. 
. 
. 
 
. 
. 
. 
 
 
First of all, let’s take a look an access control mechanism using temporal context 
information. Doctor role is activated when Dr. Kim pretend to access to patient information 
document form 09:00 to 17:00 (T=T1). In addition, regarding to the personal information 
(object=A), only the permission R (P=P1) is assigned regardless of time. Permissions R, W, 
D, M (P=P1, P2, P3 and P4) about the medical record (object=B) are assigned for the regular 
working time (T=T1). In contrast, permission R or W (P=P1 or P=P2) is assigned for the non-
regular working time (T=T2). Furthermore, for the prescription record (object=C), the 
permission R (P=P1) is assigned regardless of time. (Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5)  
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Figure 6.4 Role Activation as Doctor in Hospital 
 
Figure 6.5 Permission Assignment for Object A, B, and C considering Temporal context 
However, when Dr. Kim pretends to access to patient information document at doctor non-
regular working time (T=T2), even if doctor role is activated like in Figure 6.4, the 
permission to each object might be changed like in Figure 6.6.  
 
Figure 6.6 Permission Assignment for Object A, B, and C considering Temporal Context 
That mean is, only the access permissions R (P=P1) to personal information, medical 
record and prescription record (object = A, B, C) are assigned. Permission assignments 
having access to patient information documents will be set in this way for other roles depicted 
in Figure 6.2. In this section, I consider only doctor role.   
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 The following is an example of access control mechanism using spatial context 
information. Dr. Kim want to access to patient information document when he is in his 
medical office (Spatial = L1) the access permissions for R, W, D, M (P=P1, P2, P3, P4) to 
personal information, medical record and prescription record are assigned. In addition, when 
he is in the hospital (Spatial = L2), only the permissions R, W (P=P1, P2) are assigned. In that 
case he is outside the hospital (Spatial = L3), permissions are not assigned (Refer to Figure 
6.7).  
 
Figure 6.7 Permission Assignment for Object A, B, and C considering Spatial Context 
Finally, I discuss an access control mechanism considering both temporal and spatial 
context information.  
I express access control status as following notation; 
{For x, Context kinds, Can-access, P=Py}    (6.7) 
It means that subject can access object x by permission Py under  condition of the context 
kinds. 
Let us take a look examples. The permission R is assigned to Dr. Kim wherever he is in 
hospital. I can express like {For Obj=A , Context: (Temporal=T1, T2) ∪ (Spatial =L1, L2), 
Can-access: P=P1}. In contrast, the permissions R, W, D, M to medical records are assigned 
at regular work time and only in medical office.  Permissions R, W are assigned when he is at 
the outer medical office in hospital and regular working time. I can express as {For Obj=B, 
Context: (Temporal=T1) ∩ (Spatial =L1), Can -access: P=P1, P2, P3, P4} ∪ {For Obj=B, 
Context: (Temporal=T1) ∩ (Spatial =L2), Can -access: P=P1, P2} (Refer to Figure 6.8). For 
the prescription record, only permission R is assigned inner medical office or in hospital 
regardless of time and I can express like {For Obj=C, Context: (Temporal=T1, T2) ∪ 
(Spatial =L1, L2), Can-access: P=P1}.  
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Figure 6.8 Permission Assignment for Object considering Spatial and Temporal Context 
 
That is to say, if I consider only temporal context, Dr. Kim can have to access to object A 
or B or C or D with permission P1 or P2, P3, P3 depend on temporal context. In addition, if I 
consider only spatial context, Dr. Kim can do too. However, If I consider temporal and spatial 
context, Dr. Kim can have to access to the only object B with permission P1, P2, P3, P4 
(Refer to Figure 6.8). 
Table 6.3 shows some parts of permission definition in DH-RBAC which is accessible to 
patient information document as XML format.  
Table 6.3 Some parts of permission definition in DH-RBAC by XML format 
<Rule RuleId="AllowAll" Effect="Permit"> 
<Subject> 
 <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id" 
DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:data-type:rfc822Name"> 
<AttributeValue>Doctor</AttributeValue>   
</Attribute> 
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</Subject> 
<Resource> 
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id"  
DataType="&xml;string"> 
<AttributeValue> Patient Information Document </AttributeValue> 
</Attribute> 
</Resource> 
<Action> 
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"  
DataType="&xml;string"> 
<AttributeValue>Read</AttributeValue> 
</Attribute> 
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" 
 DataType="&xml;string"> 
<AttributeValue>Write</AttributeValue> 
</Attribute> 
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"  
DataType="&xml;string"> 
<AttributeValue>Delete</AttributeValue> 
</Attribute> 
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"  
DataType="&xml;string"> 
<AttributeValue>Modify</AttributeValue> 
</Attribute> 
</Action> 
</Rule> 
Doctor has permissions - Read, Write, Delete, Modify to Patient Information Document 
Resource. If both Doctor and Nurse have permission READ to resource, I can add Nurse to 
the Object element and activate Read at the Action element. 
6.4 Summary of the DH-RBAC 
In this chapter, context constraint based RBAC was described. The main idea is providing 
expendability and security applying the temporal and spatial context information to Role 
Based Access Control model. 
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In addition, I presented the formal definitions for context type, context constraint, access 
control policy and resource access, etc. Furthermore, I presented the formal definition for 
DH-RBAC and its architecture, and detailed example scenarios to give better understanding 
for the proposed DH-RBAC model.  
DH-RBAC model is core technology related to secure and intelligent ubiquitous services 
supporting dynamic access control in smart home. Moreover, DH-RBAC model will be 
extended to H-Ubi Comp environment, and I expect to be applied various applications. 
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Chapter 7. Service and Application using HUC-HISF 
In this chapter, I discuss services and applications using the HUC-HISF. H-Ubi Comp has 
emerged as an exciting new paradigm for providing intelligent computing and 
communications at any time and in any place. But, in order to take advantage of such services, 
it is important that intelligent security frameworks be suitable for H-Ubi Comp. In this 
chapter, I propose a privacy and access control scheme for surveillance, a core security 
technology for ubiquitous hybrid intelligent security framework. In this scheme, device 
information and signature information can be added to the image data obtained by the image 
capturing device to maintain the security of the image data and use the image data as digital 
evidence when a specific incident occurs. 
Also, in today’s modern society, the rapid development of IT and distribution of the 
Internet and computers across super-high speed networks have led us to a cultural turning 
point as a u-knowledge-based society. This change has led to an environment where digital 
materials have rapidly increased and communication infra has expanded, thus allowing image 
and sound information to be shared through IP networks as the demand for integrated services 
increases. In providing IPTV through IP networks, IPTV may result in illegal control, illegal 
content distribution, service theft, access of unapproved users, sniffing, tapping, DoS attacks, 
War Dialing attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, Rogue Device attacks, or harmful software 
infection and all manner of security vulnerabilities. As such various Iaknesses exist, this study 
researches AAA, a subscriber authenticated technology, to provide more secure and efficient 
mobile IPTV services for the next generation mobile IPTV subscribers. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 7.1.1, I describe security 
requirements for H-Ubi Comp surveillance for H-Ubi Comp. In section 7.1.2, I discuss the 
proposed USF-PAS including its architecture and flow. I describe a case scenario based on 
USF-PAS in section 4. Section 7.2.1 presents an overview of IPTV and AAA, security threats 
to IPTV and security requirements. Section 7.2.2 analyzes existing IPTV security 
technologies, CAS and DRM. Section 7.2.4 presents secure subscriber authentication 
technologies for mobile IPTV services.  
7.1 U-Surveillance Service 
H-Ubi Comp has emerged as an exciting new paradigm that includes pervasive, grid, and 
P2P computing for intelligent computing and communications at anytime and in any place. 
As  environments expand into my everyday lives and the majority of security applications are 
designed and developed for ubiquitous environments, ubiquitous services may be offered 
anywhere, anytime and for any device. However, in order to take advantage of such services, 
it is important that intelligent security frameworks be suitable for UC [NSM05, CSE05, 
WADMV05]. 
Nowadays most services rely on authentication applications based on identity information. 
A number of authentication mechanisms may have been developed and implemented in 
various applications for heterogeneous features and environments. In real life, each entity 
using a service is likely to move from one space to another. Each space may opt to adopt an 
authentication mechanism for identifying the entity but this varies from application to 
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application. When an entity moves to a specific space where there is no applied authentication 
mechanisms, but the provided service needs the identity information about the entity, then I 
have no secure method for providing the services. 
I define USF, a Ubiquitous Hybrid Intelligent Security Framework (USF) that provides us with 
secure and intelligent services including core technologies: WSN / RFID, context awareness, 
information fusion, authentication, authorization and access control, surveillance, and so on [Pa08] 
(Refer to figure 7.1). 
 
Figure 7.1 Ubiquitous Hybrid Intelligent Security Framework (USF) 
Surveillance ensures that I monitor and keep track of objects of interest, which applies to a 
number of security deployments including home networks, USN, etc. Home networks are 
new IT technology environments enhancing the convenience and safety of people’s lives. A 
home network infrastructure provides a variety of home network services regardless of device, 
time, and place. This can be done by connecting home devices based on various kinds of 
communication networks, such as mobile communication, Internet, and sensor networks 
[ZCC05]. Recently, home networks have expanded into ubiquitous computing environments 
as boundaries between networks and systems grow more obscure. However, as surveillance 
systems are connected to the Internet and consist of heterogeneous network protocols, they 
are exposed to various cyber attacks over the Internet, including hacking, malicious codes, 
worms, viruses, DoS attacks and eavesdropping [SK06]. 
Sensor-data fusion from multiple cameras is a potential problem with many applications. 
The work in multisource fusion can be divided into two categories based on camera 
configurations: spatially non-overlapping and spatially overlapping. [SG00] attempts to fuse 
data from several non-overlapping cameras using a Bayesian reasoning approach. Since there 
might be significant gaps between each camera’s field of view, the precision of prediction 
may suffer. Most fusion algorithms assume an overlapping camera configuration and 
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concentrate on fusing local coordinate frames of multiple cameras onto one global coordinate 
system. The DETER project [KTB06] also uses an overlapping camera configuration. The 
homography between images from two cameras is computed, the images are mosaiced 
together to perform seamless tracking, and all data processing is then performed in the 
synthesized image plane. In this section, I use a two-level hierarchy of Kalman filters for 
trajectory tracking and data fusion from multiple cameras. The advantage of my formulation 
is that it enables both bottom-up fusion and top-down guidance and hence is robust even with 
partial occlusion. The Kalman filter is an important theoretical development for data 
smoothing and prediction. The traditional Kalman filter is a linear algorithm that operates 
under a prediction-correction paradigm. The quantities of the system to be estimated are 
summarized in an internal state vector, which is constrained by the observation of the 
system’s external behavior. The prediction mechanism is used for propagating the system’s 
internal state over time, and the correction mechanism is for fine-tuning the state propagation 
with external observations [BHAE02]. 
The Kalman filter and its variants are powerful tools for tracking inertial systems. 
Generally speaking, the standard Kalman filter performs satisfactorily for tracking the 
position of a moving object. However, for tracking the orientation of an object, where the 
governing equations in state propagation and observation may be nonlinear, the extended 
Kalman filter must be used [YHTFTSTS05, PM01]. 
In this section, I are interested in summarizing the trajectory of a vehicle, and hence only 
its position, not its orientation, is needed. I have thus employed the traditional Kalman filter 
for the purpose of efficient tracking. In addition to the Kalman filter, the hidden Markov 
model (HMM)has been used for object tracking. Both the Kalman filter and HMM can be 
used to estimate the internal states of a system. However, HMM is not an attractive online 
tracking method due to its high computational intensity with respect to the number of states. 
For tracking objects, where the number of possible locations (number of states) of the tracked 
objects is theoretically infinite, the Kalman filter is the popular choice [MPTH01] 
7.1.1 Security Requirements in Surveillance for H-Ubi Comp 
System-specialized security requirements contain policy used for authentication and 
authorization, as well as other kinds of security enforcement. Since there are a variety of 
requirements for surveillance system security and enforcement points, legacy security 
modules can be easily deployed without the complicated task of integrating them as each of 
them performs its’ own security function. However, this results in making the surveillance 
system more complicated and messy to manage. Also, because of inconsistency among the 
separated security modules, it may result in unexpected security holes. Thus I need a specific 
way to enforce security policies and manage inconsistency among them. A surveillance 
device is located at the border of each space and filters accesses based on rules with the help 
of security modules, enforcing authentication, authorization, and security policies. 
 Authentication and Privacy: Authentication is supposed to be the most fundamental 
function in all security systems and a first step into other security modules or services. 
The purpose of authentication is to identify an entity trying to access the system and 
verify the identity information by means of a trusted mechanism. General 
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authentication mechanisms include ID/password-based authentication mechanism, 
Certificate-based authentication mechanisms, authentication mechanisms, and 
mechanisms using biometric information. Surveillance devices offer authentication 
mechanisms. A user may choose one mechanism that he or she prefers. When most 
surveillance systems are deployed, an application server is responsible for 
authenticating users and devices.  
 Authorization and Access Control: The purpose of authorization is to control access 
and restrict privilege and access rights to resources even though the entity has been 
authenticated successfully. A few authorization mechanisms that are generally used 
include DAC (Discretionary Access Control), MAC (Mandatory Access Control), and 
RBAC (Role-based Access Control). The RBAC mechanism for authorizing 
surveillance system is suitable for many systems and guarantees extensibility and 
flexibility. RBAC mechanisms use role components between subjects and resources, 
creating the possibility of indirect authorization relationships. 
 Security Policy Manger: Security policy managers should generate and manage 
security policies specialized for their surveillance system which includes an 
authentication policy, an authorization policy, and other types of security policies. 
Considering the features of surveillance systems, they must be easy enough for users 
not familiar with IT.  
 Other Security Polices: Security policies should be a set of single rules consisting of 
conditions and actions. Whenever a condition is satisfied, an action is performed. The 
key issue is how to construct conditions. Elements to be contained in conditions 
include time (date, day, duration), event (sensor, user-triggering, state), and 
log(statistics). In addition, relationships (interaction, union) among above elements 
and supporting recursive structures should be defined. Building complex conditions 
should be possible. Times and events are the basic elements of conditions and can be 
used generally. On the other hand, log-based conditions control access by statistical 
information.  
7.1.2 USF-PAS 
[ Assumptions ] 
These are some assumptions for USF-PAS in this chapter: 
1. Surveillance camera is based on a Kalman Filter and HMM. 
2. Each space is monitored by at least a single surveillance device. 
3. Each surveillance device has functions for collaborating with 
other  
4. surveillance devices and relaying each entity’s identity 
information.  
5. Legacy authentication applications may communicate with other  
6. surveillance devices for send/receiving identity information. 
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7.1.2.1 USF-PAS Architecture  
USF-PAS includes three main components, an image capturing device, a surveillance 
device, and a surveillance management server (Refer to Figure 7.2). 
 
Figure 7.2 USF-PAS Architecture 
An image capturing device captures an image and converts the captured image into image 
data,. A surveillance device receives and stores the image data, and a surveillance 
management server provides various application services using the image data stored in the 
surveillance device. The image capturing device includes an imaging capturing unit for 
converting an optical image formed through a lens into image data and an image processor for 
receiving the image data and adding signature information or device information of the image 
capturing unit to the image data.  
The image capturing unit includes a lens for condensing light and a charge-coupled device 
(CCD) for converting the light condensed by the lens into image data, recognizes an object 
through the lens and images the recognized object to generate an optical image. This optical 
image can be converted into image data through a CCD sensor. The image data generated by 
the image capturing unit is transmitted to the image processor.  
7.1.2.2 USF-PAS Flows 
In this sub-section, I discuss three kinds of flows; device-side, server-side, and whole flow. 
 Flow of device-side at USF-PAS  
The image processor receives the image data from the image capturing unit, 
processes the image data and embeds signature information in the image data. The 
image processor can be constructed as additional hardware or included in the image 
capturing unit. The image processor adds at least one of information on the image 
capturing unit and signature information to the image data transmitted from the 
image capturing unit. By doing so, the image data can be protected from arbitrary 
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access and control. The signature information can be added to the image data at 
regular intervals. The surveillance device stores the image data to which the 
information on the image capturing unit or the signature information has been 
added by the image processor. The surveillance device includes a storage unit 
capable of storing the image data having the information on the image capturing 
unit or the signature information added thereto and can be connected to a 
communication network such as the Internet or a mobile communication network to 
transmit the image data processed by the image processor to a communication 
terminal. That is, the image data processed by the image processor can be stored in 
the surveillance device and applied to the surveillance management server through 
the communication network such as the Internet (Refer to Figure 7.3). 
 
 
 Flow of server-side at USF-PAS  
The surveillance management server provides a variety of application services to 
a mobile terminal of a communication service subscriber using the communication 
network at the request of the communication service subscriber.  
In another embodiment, the surveillance device can add the signature information 
or the information on the image capturing unit to the image data captured by the 
image capturing unit. In this case, the image processor transmits the image data and 
the information on the image capturing unit received from the image capturing unit 
to the surveillance device, and the surveillance device adds the information on the 
image capturing unit or the signature information to the image data transmitted 
from the image processor. The image data processed by the surveillance device can 
be applied to the surveillance management server through the communication 
network such as the Internet (Refer to Figure 7.4). 
 
Figure 7.3 Flow of USF-PAS (Device-side Signature) 
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The information receiver receives the image data generated by the image 
capturing unit and transmits the information to the device information processor. 
The information on the image capturing unit can include an identifier given to the 
image capturing unit or information on the place and time at which the image 
capturing unit obtains the image data. When the image capturing unit is a 
communication terminal, the information on the image capturing unit can include 
an identification number given to the communication terminal.  
The device information processor adds the information on the image capturing 
unit to the image data transmitted from the information receiver. The image data 
can be used as digital proof of a specific event when the place and time at which the 
image data is captured is added thereto and the source of the image data can be 
easily detected when the identification number of the image capturing unit is added 
thereto. The device information processor transmits the image data having the 
information on the image capturing unit added thereto to the signature information 
processor.  
 The signature information processor can embed signature information including 
a predetermined encryption key in the image data transmitted from the device 
information processor. According to an embodiment, the signature information 
processor can add public key based signature information, symmetric key based 
signature information or public key and symmetric key based signature information 
to the image data.  
When the signature information is added to the image data, the image data can be 
accessed only using a predetermined decryption key. Accordingly, the possibility 
that the image data is exposed to hacking or illegal copy according to arbitrary 
access can be reduced when the signature information is added to the image data. 
The surveillance management server that provides the image data to communication 
subscribers can provide the decryption key to only an authenticated communication 
subscriber through a text message to maintain security of the image data. 
The image transmitter transmits the image data received from the signature 
information processor to the image information server. The image receiver receives 
the image data from the image transmitter. The storage unit stores the image data 
transmitted from the image receiver. The image data transmitted from the image 
Figure 7.4 Flow of USF-PAS (server-side Signature) 
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receiver has at least one of the information on the image capturing unit and the 
signature information added thereto.  
The surveillance device can determine whether the decryption key transmitted 
from the application server corresponds to the encryption key embedded in the 
image data, extract the image data stored in the storage unit and transmit the image 
data to the surveillance management server when the surveillance management 
server requests the surveillance device to transmit the image data through the 
communication network. 
The receiver included in the surveillance device receives the image data and the 
information on the image capturing unit transmitted from the image processor and 
the device information processor receives the image data and the information on the 
image capturing unit from the receiver and embeds the information on the image 
capturing unit in the image data. The signature information processor adds 
predetermined signature information to the image data having the information on 
the image capturing unit added thereto and the storage unit stores the image data 
including the signature information. 
The receiver receives the image data and the information on the image capturing 
unit from the image processor. The device information processor embeds the 
information on the image capturing unit in the image data and transmits the image 
data to the signature information processor. The information on the image capturing 
unit depends on the type of the image capturing unit. The signature information 
processor is the same at the device-side signature. 
 Whole flow of USF-PAS 
The whole flow of USF-PAS is composed of five steps as follows; 
Step 1: The image capturing unit included in the image capturing device recognizes 
an image and captures the image.  
Step 2 : The image capturing unit acquires image data from the image captured. The 
image data can include meta data and main data. The main data can include 
information on the captured image and the meta data can include information that 
explains the main data.  
Step 3: When the image data is obtained, the image capturing device determines 
whether it is required to protect the image data. It can be determined whether the 
image data requires protection according to the type of the image capturing device 
or setting up by a user who captures the image.  
3-1. When it is determined that the image data does not require protection, the 
image data is transmitted to the surveillance device without undergoing 
additional image data processing.  
3-2. When it is determined that the image data requires protection, information 
on the image capturing device is added to the image data.  
Step 4: When the information on the image capturing device is embedded in the 
image data, the type of signature information to be added to the image data is 
determined. The signature information can be generated according to symmetric 
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key based algorithm, public key based algorithm or public key and symmetric key 
based algorithm and embedded in the image data.  
4-1. When the signature information according to the symmetric key based 
algorithm is embedded in the image data, safe authentication is difficult to 
perform and an additional secret key is required although encryption speed 
is high due to low algorithm complexity. Accordingly, it is desirable to use 
the symmetric key based algorithm in consideration of data processing load 
applied to the image processor in the case where the image processor 
embeds the signature information in the image data. 
4-2. When the signature information according to the public key based algorithm 
is embedded in the image data, safe authentication can be achieved and 
transmission of an additional secret key is not needed in spite of high 
algorithm complexity. Accordingly, it is desirable to use the public key 
based algorithm using the data processing speed and capacity of the 
surveillance device, which are greater than those of the image processor 
when the surveillance device embeds the signature information in the image 
data. 
4-3. When the signature information according to the public key and symmetric 
key mixed algorithm is embedded, a public key is generated using the public 
key based algorithm first, and then a data encryption key with respect to the 
public key based algorithm is generated using the symmetric key based 
algorithm.  Although the public key and symmetric key mixed algorithm can 
secure safe authentication as compared to the cases where the public key 
based algorithm and symmetric key based algorithm are used, it is desirable 
to use the mixed algorithm when the surveillance device can embed the 
signature information in the image data because algorithm complexity is 
high.  
Step 5:
 
 When the surveillance management server requests the surveillance device 
to transmit the image data through the communication network, the surveillance 
device can compare the decryption key transmitted from the surveillance 
management server with the encryption key included in the image data stored in the 
surveillance device to determine whether the requested image data is transmitted.  
 
While the present invention has been particularly shown and described with 
reference to exemplary embodiments thereof, it will be understood by those of 
ordinary skill in the art that various changes in form and details may be made 
therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention as 
defined by the following claims. According to the present invention, image data can 
be protected from security infringement such as illegal copy and arbitrary 
transmission. Furthermore, information on the place and time at which an image is 
captured is added to the image data such that the image data can be used as digital 
proof. 
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Figure 7.5 Whole flow of USF-PAS 
 
Use case scenario based on USF-PAS 
In the ubiquitous environments, each entity is likely to traverse multiple spaces, and each 
space implements its own authentication mechanism. It means that if an entity is going to use 
the service provided within a space, then it should be identified by the authentication 
mechanism implemented in the space. This results in the increase of user interventions, the 
decrease of performance and the increase of service time. To make matters worse, every 
space is not guaranteed by authentication mechanism. Some space adopt trusted 
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authentication mechanisms, but others not. Therefore, I couldn’t guarantee that an entity can 
be authenticated in every space. Figure 7.6 shows the ubiquitous environment for moving 
entity of multiple spaces [KLHK08]. 
 
Figure 7.6 Entity’s movement through multiple spaces in ubiquitous environment 
   Each space is categorized into two types: authenticated space, and not authenticated 
space. The authenticated space ensures that it is protected by a corresponding authentication 
mechanism implemented, while the not-authenticated space doesn’t support any 
authentication mechanism which is supposed be secure. 
There are a number services based on identity information such as authentication and 
access control, VOD services, ubiquitous health care service, object monitoring service, home 
network services, and so on. The above services are based on the identity and provide the 
differentiated service according the identity. The identity is one of the most important factors 
in the recent service areas, especially regarding ubiquitousness.  
 Collaboration for relaying identity 
In order to provide the identity-based services, the identity information of the 
entity should be useful in every space. To make it possible, the not-authenticated 
space should support some functions for relaying the identity. 
Currently, there are many researches on intelligent surveillance device and 
corresponding technologies. The technology on intelligent surveillance device 
includes object recognition and tracing. Strictly speaking, the object recognition and 
object tracing are not the scope of authentication. They are just for recognition. But 
it can be used in the new model. 
Fortunately there are a number of researches on surveillance system using 
surveillance devices that are expected to cover all future spaces. This monitoring 
system is designed for use in various locations and for simultaneous searches from 
different locations and offers reduced operating costs [LKSL06]. 
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Figure 7.7 Identity relay using surveillance device 
Figure 7.7 describes the overview of relaying identity using surveillance device. 
The space A and the space B provide their own authentication mechanism 
respectively. On the other hand, the space 1 doesn’t support any authentication 
mechanism. An intelligent surveillance device is just implemented.  
This example shows the hand-overs while moving from space A to space B. 
When the entity authenticated in space A moves toward the space B and enters into 
the scope of space 1, the surveillance device which is responsible for space 1 
recognizes the new entrance. At this moment, the authentication application of 
space A transmits the entity’s identity-related information to the surveillance device. 
The first hand-over occurs between space A and space 1. 
After receiving identity-related information, the surveillance device starts tracing 
the entity. The procedure of object tracing may occur among multiple spaces of 
surveillance devices depending on application. When it moves to space B, the 
second hand-over occurs. During the latter hand-over, the surveillance device relays 
the entity’s identity-related information to the authentication application of space B.  
The PII stands for Physically Identifiable Information. In the surveillance system 
using surveillance device, there is no explicit method to authenticate an entity. Of 
course, it’ s possible to identify an entity according to the application environment. 
But in general applications, I couldn’t guarantee it. 
In the surveillance system, the information about physical appearance of an entity 
is generally used. For relaying identity information, each intelligent surveillance 
device performs transmitting/receiving the corresponding information, tracing 
entity. The information exchanged between surveillance devices consists of ID and 
PII. ID was produced by the authentication application of the resource and PII was 
from the previous surveillance device. The information contained in the PII are 
entity type (person, car, object, …), physical appearance ( physical size, color, 
shape, cloth, hair, number), and location. 
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Figure 7.8 Hand-overs through multiple not-authenticated spaces 
 
7.1.3 Analysis of USF-PAS 
In this section, the analysis for security and efficiency of USF-PAS is discussed. For the 
case of security, I analyze USF-PAS based on the security requirements presented in section 
7.1.1. In addition, I compare two cases - the applied security requirements and non- the 
applied security requirements from the aspect of the efficiency of USF-PAS. 
First, I discuss security of USF-PAS considering security requirements as follows; 
 Authentication and Privacy: In this system, I assume that the subject of 
authentication is an application server. The application server is responsible for 
authenticating users and devices passing through it, while the surveillance device acts 
as a bridge between an accessing entity and the application server. The application 
server authenticates accesses from outdoor entities and just notifies the authenticated 
identity information to the surveillance device. As a result, a user can USF-PAS 
through the surveillance device and access the object without additional 
authentication process since the surveillance device trusts the surveillance manager 
and the notified identity information from it. It seems to be reasonable to store 
biometric information in surveillance device since an surveillance manager is open to 
public network and just managed by service provider. When the authentication server 
is going to authenticate an entity using biometric information, the surveillance device 
replaces authentication instead of it. In case of the surveillance device successfully 
authenticates an indoor entity, it performs the second authentication process with the 
application server in place of the entity, resulting in no additional logon.   
 Authorization and Access Control: When the authorization module receives an 
access request, it retrieves corresponding data from the authorization database and 
decides whether to permit or not. Authorization information is set by the security 
manager somewhere within the space, which is assumed to be trusted and the channel 
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between them has to be secure using legacy secure mechanisms such as TLS and 
IPSec.  
 Security Policy Manger: In my USF-PAS, I use a Drag-and-Drop mechanism to 
establish the security policy, so anyone can handle it if he has been authenticated 
successfully. 
Second, I explain efficiency of USF-PAC. I verify efficiency at the number of selection by 
comparing case of non-applied security requirements (A) with case of applied security 
requirements (B) when I use surveillance system of USF-PAS. As the following at the 
simulation graph [Figure 7.9], case A got 10 as the number of selection in surveillance system. 
But, case B got the numbers less than case A. Generally, if most systems will consider 
security factors, efficiency of performance will be decreased. These values are not bad values 
in case B considering security requirements.  
 
 
 
7.2 Mobile IPTV Service 
IT technology is advancing into ubiquitous environments such as the Internet and mobile 
devices develop. Such a change will provide users with various services, the demand for 
which will rapidly increase as users want services even while using mobile devices. The scale 
of the domestic market for these services in the next generation of telecommunication will be 
great as the use of services via mobile devices is expected to be centered on ubiquitous 
environments. 
However, in spite of the possibilities for advancing and diversifying services, the wireless 
environment has many risks and weaknesses compared to existing wired networks. For 
example, wireless environment for mobile devices are vulnerable to sniffing, tapping, DoS 
(Denial of Service) attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, Rogue Device attacks, harmful 
software infection, as well as the risks of existing wireless environments. In other words, 
Figure 7.9 Hand-overs through multiple not-authenticated spaces 
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receiving IPTV(Internet Protocol Television) via IP network exposes IPTV to other security 
vulnerabilities such as illegal control, illegal content distribution, service theft, access by 
unapproved users, sniffing, tapping, DoS attacks, War Dialing attacks, man-in-the-middle 
attacks, Rogue Device attacks, harmful software infection, etc. [XDZHG07, LP07]. Given 
such various weaknesses, this study researches applications of subscriber authentication 
technology, specifically of AAA (Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting) 
mechanisms for mobile IPTV services.  
7.2.1 Background 
This section presents an overview of bilinear pairing and AAA, and analyzes security 
threats and security requirements with regard to existing IPTV. 
7.2.1.1 AAA 
The AAA (Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting) standard devised by the IETF 
working group is applicable to the Diameter protocol. An AAA protocol has been established 
for next-generation roaming environments without restricting the existing RADIUS (Remote 
Authentication Dial In User Service) protocol. For this protocol standard, a formal working 
group was formed in December 1998, and the applicable AAA protocol was named Diameter. 
The basic structure of the Diameter protocol is divided into transmission protocols that 
include SCTP (Stream Control Transmission Protocol), a base protocol that includes 
accounting functions, and various high level application protocols.  
With the extension of IP-based Internet, there is an increase in demand for accessing the 
network through wireless mobile environments. Indeed multiple service environments may 
coexist in the same wireless environment including QoS (Quality of Service) provisions, pre-
payment cards, and others. In order to satisfy user requirements, wired and wireless 
businesses must provide secure and high level services for legitimate users. The AAA 
protocol is an essential element for such secure network access, mobile service, user 
authentication, authorization and account processing. In 1991, the AAA protocol was 
proposed with the Radius protocol by the Livingston Company, and provides an AAA service 
for the SLIP (Serial Line Internet Protocol) or PPP (Point-to-Point Protocol) linkage service. 
However, at present, service networks are gradually evolving into open-types and networks 
are evolving into a series of multiple domain environments. Therefore, the IETF (Internet 
Engineering Task Force) AAA working group is focused on the standardization of the 
Diameter protocol that provides AAA services appropriate for roaming environments. In the 
case of domestic environments, within the recent mobile Internet business domain, relevant 
businesses are quickly working on providing Mobile IPv4 and Mobile IPv6 services. For such 
mobile environments, AAA services must be applied between domains. For practical services 
in actual environments, there is a need for technological development in accordance with 
existing standards, however, technological development must also include mutual operation 
tests to determine if interworking is possible between products and standard adaptability tests. 
Between domestic standardization organizations and foreign standardization organizations, 
once the Diameter protocol standard is completed and the mobile Internet environment is 
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standardized, the use of the Diameter protocol will expand rapidly, and the market is expected 
to grow more rapidly [PC97, PBPC03, KI02, KLCYKLY05, VCFGGBLHS00, CLGZA03]. 
7.2.1.2 Security Technology of IPTV 
As representative IPTV security technologies, I present overviews of CAS and DRM and 
analyze their characteristics, advantages and disadvantages. 
7.2.1.3 CAS 
CAS (Conditional Access System) has been used as the basic system for controlling users' 
access to charged broadcasting services since the time of analogue broadcasting. Access 
conditions of CAS control include a subscription fee payment, receiving regions, receiving 
grades, etc. Thus, in principle CAS aims to protect the business and profits of charged 
broadcasting service providers.  
Two standards were established from CAS, DVB (Digital Video Broadcasting) CAS in 
Europe, and ATSC (advanced Television Systems Committee) CAS in USA. Additionally, 
OpenCable CAS is the standard for digital cable TV in USA and is based on ATSC CAS. 
Although CAS standards exist, the details regarding specific representations of CAS have yet 
to be defined. The coexistence of many CASs may be possible, but the compatibility of 
different kinds of CASs is not guaranteed. The authority given to users who apply for certain 
broadcasting services is called Entitlement, and CAS controls access so that only qualified 
users can receive services. The items applied may be certain programs, or a set of TV 
channels. 
CAS has grown in reliability as a content security solution and a growing number of 
broadcasting service providers have applied it to their existing services. However the 
condition of IPTV service is somewhat different because the current versions of CAS are 
based on the structure suitable for one-way broadcasting. CAS is a polling type system, not a 
Request / Response structure, and has the fundamental problem of wasting transporting 
streams. EMM (Entitlement Management Message) transmits information to qualified users 
via broadcasting media. Considering that with broadcasting all users share the same single 
bandwidth medium, committing every set-top box to the sole purpose of tracking EMM 
signals is a significant waste of bandwidth. The CAS standard adopts separate hardware such 
as smart cards and POD (Point Of Deployment) modules, and the necessity of such hardware 
generally results in an increase in service charges thus increasing the burden of subscribers. In 
addition to the inner problems of CAS, the fact that CAS is an access controlling solution for 
transmitting content channels causes difficulties to such functions as pure VOD (Video On 
Demand) and PVR (Private Video Recording) under the environment of an IP network. In 
this regard, the POD module structure defines content protection functions to some extent, but 
in the end, the basic problems are not solved since they only project the transmitting channel.  
As for storage of hard disk content, an advanced service of IPTV, illegal copy prevention 
and access controls have yet to be provided. Management of security keys for consistently 
managing saved contents and payments and authority control of various services such as 
VOD should be first issue dealt with relation to IPTV service security [LP07, WRL06]. 
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7.2.1.4 DRM 
DRM (Digital Right Management) is a technology used to manage the intellectual property 
of digital contents in an Internet-based environment. To prevent illegal copying, data 
encryption of digital contents and licensing for certified users and terminals are required for 
controlling contents. Licensing includes content authority and decryption keys. Only when 
requirements for use are met is decryption executed. By protecting the whole process through 
Tamper Resistant technology, illegal leakage of contents by hackers is prevented. 
Since DRM is a technology developed for Internet and PC based content distribution, it is 
suitable for IPTV service. Originally, it aimed to prevent the illegal copy of online contents, 
and thus CAS functions are only suitable for DRM as they are for IPTV services. . Not only 
are various payment methods available such as subscriptions, PPV (Pay per View), VOD, 
Usage Metering, Prepay, and Post Pay, but the cost-saving effects of excluding POD modules 
or Smart Cards are also outstanding as well. The modification and upgrade of security related 
modules mounted in a set-top box, key management, and authority of saved contents are 
easily implemented because of the basic structure of DRM. In existing broadcasting systems, 
leakage through intermediate distribution channels was always possible, but DRM enables 
End-to-End Content Protection from the content provider and end user, which is one of the 
most outstanding advantages. However, when there is no path available to return the issued 
license, DRM requires an ECM (Entitlement Control Message)/EMM [XDZHG07, LP07]. 
7.2.2 Bilinear Pairing 
Bilinear pairing is a problem in discrete mathematics about ellipses that was simplified by 
reducing it to a discrete logarithm in a finite field. It was originally proposed as a map that 
attacks a conventional crypto-system. Recently, an encryption map for information protection 
has been used, instead of an attack map, so, that Bilinear Pairing is equivalent to a Bilinear 
Map. The following terms are used as stated in this paragraph and this theory is defined 
below [Sh84]. 
Characteristics that satisfy an Admissible Bilinear Map are as follows. 
 Bilinear: Define a map  as bilinear if  where all 
, and all Zba ∈, . 
 Non-degenerate: The map does not relate all pairs in  to the identity in . 
Observe that since  are groups of prime order, this implies that if P  is a 
generator of , then  is a generator of . 
 Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute  for any . 
Based on the bilinear premise, the following definition was constructed.  
    (7.1) 
From this premise, for ellipses, the D-H (Diffie-Hellman) decision problem can be 
easily solved via the following equation.  
    (7.2) 
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Therefore, the following is the basis for resolving the difficulties of the bilinear premise 
that is used as an encryption tool by many encryption protocols. When elements , P , , 
bP ,  (BDHP, Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem) are given, this refers to  
calculation problem. This problem can be solved if the ellipse curve discrete mathematics 
problem can be solved. For example, a can be calculated from aP , then can be 
calculated through  
7.2.3 Security Threats and Requirements 
IPTV is a brand-new service combining the Internet and broadcasting. All security risks 
that existed with conventional Internet and broadcasting services remain, some of them for 
broadcasters as well as some for subscribers. 
7.2.3.1 Security threats  
 Security threats in IPTV include the following: exposure of personal information: 
there are possibilities that personal information be exposed through illegal access by a 
third party such as identification information and payment related information that 
could result in monetary losses to subscribers.  
 Masquerade: a malicious third party may be disguised as a legal subscriber through a 
communication channel that is not secure, and receive authentication and services. 
Thus, security should be secured to prevent such illegal access. 
 Session hijacking: session hijacking is a form of attack that detours an authentication 
procedure to a server or a system. First, an attacker blocks the user from accessing a 
session in such ways as a DoS attack, and then hijacks the session with a server in 
order to acquire access authority without log-on. Not only sessions but also all 
information exchanged between the server and user could be tapped through hijacking 
[KLCYKLY05]. 
 Data tapping: Since the data transmitted via a communication channel may be 
exposed to an attacker, the possibilities for analyzing confidential information even 
when a third party acquires data should be removed to prevent a tapping attack. 
7.2.3.2 Security requirements  
Basically, the following security requirements should be taken into consideration: 
 Confidentiality: the data used in communication should be recognizable only by 
legitimate users. Attackers must be prevented from noticing the source of data, 
destination, time, length, traffic characteristics of communication channels, etc. 
Confidentiality is secured through encryption preventing information analysis. 
 Integrity: Data saved in an information system or transmitted through a network must 
be protected from falsification. When the data are falsified, deleted, or altered, the fact 
should be confirmable. Such ways as electronic signature are used to notice illegal 
modification of transmitted data.  
 Authentication: it is vital to secure confidentiality in authentication services. The 
source of messages and electronic documents transmitted by a user, and whether the 
identification is false should be confirmable. 
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 Access control: Access authority over all reading and modification of resources 
should be clearly confirmed so as to prevent any unauthorized access. The access 
control level could be strengthened by utilizing invasion prevention systems in 
networks and access control functions in operating systems. 
7.2.4 Related Work 
This section describes the existing Kerberos authentication procedure, mobile commerce 
schemes, as well as their characteristics and advantages/disadvantages.  
7.2.4.1 Kerberos 
Kerberos uses a centralized authentication server and its encryption method uses symmetric 
encryption for authentication. Thus for a user to gain access he must be granted a ticket-
granting ticket issued from the authentication server and a service-granting ticket from the 
ticket granting server. The user should remember a password agreed in advance for accessing 
each Kerberos component. The current Kerberos protocol, version 5, has been upgraded from 
version 4and has been standardized to comply with ETF RFC 4120 [NYHR05]. The Kerberos 
protocol has a weak point, however, in that its granting server does not preserve the user’s 
anonymity and privacy when distributing the session key. Thus the message information is 
exposed and vulnerable to interception when being relayed between the user and the service 
provider’s server.  
7.2.4.2 Authentication Mechanism for Anonymity and Privacy Assurance 
Using the EAP-TLS (Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport Layer Security) 
authentication method and the Symmetric-Key Key Establishment scheme, this research 
designed a more efficient authentication mechanism for the various online activities users 
enjoy. The suggested mechanism offers SSO (Single-Sign On) service, a service ensuring 
anonymity and privacy for the user and reliable authentication for the content provider. Upon 
a user’s receiving authentication through the AAA server, content providers affiliated with 
the authentication server can continuously use the service without a separate login process. . It 
secures anonymity to the user and exchanges the session key for secure data transport 
between the user and content provider, without requiring the user to further engage with the 
authentication server. It secures the user privacy while guaranteeing content providers secure 
exchange of different session keys [LCY05]. 
7.2.4.3 AAA Mechanism 
Wireless LAN is rapidly becoming a crucial component in next-generation mobile 
communication. Despite its success, there are many user privacy and access control issues 
such as authentication problems, accounting, billing problems. Especially in the field of 
accounting, research about packet accounting based on the IP alone is insufficient, thus, 
several ISPs (Internet Service Provider)’s adopted a fixed-sum accounting system. This thesis 
presents a packet accounting model within the AAA mechanism that is compatible with 
international standards of mobile commerce and the verification results [KLPSJ02]. However, 
the disadvantage is that payment confirmation and recharge must proceed via separate 
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processes, thereby increasing the possibility of overhead communication between the home 
authentication server and the billing server. 
7.2.4.4 User Authentication for IPTV Service  
The goal of the proposed system is to provide an opportunity to use a flexible, user-centric 
authentication mechanism through Java Card applets in the IPTV application server and 3G 
Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (W-CDMA) networks. When a viewer watching 
IPTV is successfully authenticated, an authentication token allows the subscriber to 
conveniently use services that are adaptable to personal preference anywhere at anytime. In 
addition, this thesis presents analysis verifying the effectiveness and security of the proposed 
method. The main purpose of this research is to present a novel approach using Java Card to 
provide IPTV viewers with authentication, authorization and personalized services. In this 
thesis, the main focus is the design and development of architecture for IPTV viewer 
authentication, designed for use on the current popular 3G systems. Furthermore, identity 
management through Java Card provides users with more personalized services and control 
over who can view or use their private information [PLYLK08]. 
Figure 7.10 Whole flowchart for IPTV 
7.2.5 Subscriber Authentication Technology for Mobile IPTV Service Offer 
With regard to subscriber authentication technologies supporting mobile IPTV services, 
Figure 7.10 describes how in a home network environment, the device receives authentication 
from the home authentication server, receives the authorization ticket, presents the 
authorization ticket to the home network service, and receives IPTV services. In addition, 
when the device uses IPTV services by another service provider, the authorization ticket 
issued by the inner home domain of the foreign home is provided, authentication given, and 
services presented. 
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7.2.5.1 Notations 
I use the following notations for Mobile IPTV service in this section. 
Table 7.1 Notations for Mobile IPTV 
Notation Description 
* 
Objects ( D : Device, AAAH : Home Network Authentication Server, 
AAAL : Foreign Network Authentication Server, ServeringStream : 
IPTV Streaming Server) 
*ID  Identification of * 
OTP  One-time password 
g  Generator with order 1−n  in 
*
nZ  
)(h  One-way hash function 
CT  Synchronization counter value 
e  211 GGG →×  Bilinear Map 
][*E  Encryption with key of * 
*Sign  Signature of * 
KS  Shared symmetric key between D  and AAAH  
keyservice_  Shared service key between AAAH  and ServeringStream  
*KU  ID-based public key of * 
*KR  ID-based private key of * 
 
7.2.5.2 Proposed Protocol 
The proposed protocol is comprised of two phases, IPTV device authentication and 
authorization issuance phase in the home network, and the IPTV device authentication phase 
in foreign networks. It is supposed that a shared symmetric key will have been distributed 
between the device and home network prior to the time of authentication. 
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7.2.5.3 IPTV device authentication and authorization ticket issueance phase.  
When the device requests the home network authentication server to present authentication, 
the authentication server issues the proper authorization ticket, and transmits the authorization 
ticket and ID to the streaming server. The device presents the authorization ticket to mobile 
IPTV services at the time of use. 
Step 1.
)( CTKSPINhOTP ⊕⊕=
 IPTV device generates OTP after XOR operation and hash of the serial number and 
symmetric key, and generates an ID based on a private key/public key pair. To request the 
authentication, the device's ID, home authentication server ID, OTP and counter are all 
encrypted by symmetric keys and transmitted. 
       (7.3) 
DD IDKU =          (7.4) 
OTP
DD gIDKR •=         (7.5) 
],[,, CTOTPEIDID KSAAAHD        (7.6) 
Step 2.
)(' CTKSPINhOTP ⊕⊕=
 The home network authentication server generates an OTP based on the values 
transmitted, saves it in the database, and compares them with the OTP sent by the device 
requesting authentication. Upon completion of authentication, the private key/public key pair 
are generated based on the ID of the home network authentication server, the authorization 
values and authorization ticket are generated and encrypted through the device public key, 
and finally transmitted.  
       (7.7) 
'?OTPOTP          (7.8) 
AAAHAAAH IDKU =         (7.9) 
Step 3.
),(' DAAAH IDKSKReValueionAuthorizat •=
 The device certifies the values transmitted by the home network authentication server, 
specifically the acquired private key, home network authentication server ID, and symmetric 
key, by means of an Admissible Bilinear Map. 
    (7.10) 
'? ValueionAuthorizatValueionAuthorizat     
 (7.11) 
Step 4. The home network authentication server encrypts the device ID and authorization 
ticket through the service key shared with the streaming server, signs them, and then 
broadcasts them.  
Step 5. The device presents the ticket to the home network service the home network service 
certifies the ticket, and then provides the device with services. 
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Figure 7.11 IPTV device authentication phase protocol in foreign network 
7.2.5.4 IPTV device authentication phase in foreign network.  
In this step, for the device to move to a foreign network and use mobile IPTV services, the 
foreign network authentication server is given an authorization ticket issued by the home 
network authentication server for authentication and providing services. 
Step 1.
][,, TicketionAuthorizatEIDID
DKUAAAHD
 The device encrypts the authorization ticket issued by the home network 
authentication server by means of the public key of the home network authentication server, 
and transmits it to the foreign network authentication server along with the ID.  
     (7.12) 
Step 2.
][ TiucketionAuthorizatE
AAAHKU
 The foreign network authentication server transmits the values from the device to the 
home network authentication server; the home network authentication server certifies the 
authorization ticket, signs the authorization ticket authorizing the use of services, and then 
transmits it to the foreign network authentication server. The foreign network authentication 
server broadcasts the ticket to the foreign streaming server. 
      (7.13) 
][,_ TicketionAuthorizatSignAcceptAccess AAAH     (7.14) 
],[[ TicketionAuthorizatIDSignE DAAALkeyService ServeringStreamAAAH −   (7.15)
 
Step 3. The device presents the ticket to the foreign streaming server, the streaming server 
certifies it, and presents services to the device. 
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7.2.6 Analysis 
The proposed methods are analyzed according to the general security requirements in 
Section 7.2.4, security requirements against attacks, and security requirements in different 
networks. Table 7.1 presents the results of these analyses. 
7.2.6.1 Security Threats Analysis 
 Personal information security exposure: Personal information of users may be 
exposed to illegal access or hacking by a third party, which can cause monetary loss. 
Thus, to prevent leakage of personal information, data on a transmitting channel 
should be encrypted, and the authentication and authorization information should be 
managed in the form of a ticket to minimize the disclosure of personal information. 
 Masquerade: A third party may disguise himself as a legal user, and receive 
authentication or services. Thus, OTP is used, and the information encrypted through 
an ID based on public key/private key pairs to protect it from masquerade. 
 Session hijacking: Attackers may acquire access without proper procedures by 
snapping sessions on the communication channel. They also may steal the session 
through hijacking and even tap all information exchanged between the server and user. 
Thus, the time limit for sessions is set through a counter-based OTP, and the 
authentication values are not exposed even when the session is stolen, thereby 
preventing any risk of hijacking. 
 Data tapping: Since the data transmitted through communication channels may be 
exposed to attackers, in order to prevent any tapping attack, the secret values should 
be resistant to analysis even in the event that the data is acquired by a third party.. In 
forming the secrete values, data integrity and confidentiality are secured through hash 
values.  
7.2.6.2 Security Requirements Analysis 
 Confidentiality: The data used in communication must be readable only by legal users. 
The proposed method is the public key/private key pair (,) based on the symmetric 
key) and ID shared between the device and home network authentication server. In 
each step, encryption secures confidentiality. 
 Integrity: Any falsification and destruction of data transmitted through networks or 
saved in information systems should be prevented. The proposed method uses hash 
values to secure data integrity. 
 Authentication: The falsehood of a user should be certifiable. The proposed method 
uses synchronization OTP (), and certifies an Admissible Bilinear Map based on 
authorization values () and authorization tickets that certify the use of specific 
services. 
 Access control: It is necessary to classify the domains of authority to access such as 
reading and modifying information resources so as to prevent any attempts at 
unapproved access. Any device without authentication cannot be given an 
authorization ticket as well as foreign network access and services. 
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Table 7.2 Analysis of proposed scheme 
 Kerberos 
Authentication 
Mechanism 
for Anonymity 
and Privacy 
Assurance 
Mobile 
Commerce 
AAA 
Mechanism 
User 
Authentication 
for IPTV 
Service 
Proposed 
scheme 
Confidentiality Symmetric key 
Public key and 
symmetric key 
Symmetric 
key 
Symmetric key 
and PKI 
Symmetric 
key and ID-
based public 
key 
Integrity Non offer Implicit integrity offer Hash function 
Timestamp and 
Keyed-hash 
OTP and 
authentication 
Authentication Shared password EAP-TLS 
Challenge-
response Java Card 
Using OTP 
and Ticket 
Access control Unauthorized device is not accessed 
Personal 
information 
security 
exposure 
• • • USIM Ticket 
Masquerade • • • USIM Signature 
Session 
hijacking Nonce 
Timestamp and 
lifetime 
Nonce and 
sequence Timestamp 
Counter-
based OTP 
and 
Authorization 
Value 
Data tapping Secure 
Efficiency Delay of ticket issue 
Non offer 
roaming 
Overhead of 
authentication 
server and 
roaming 
problems 
Extension 
offers but non 
offer efficiency  
Fast roaming 
authentication 
and reduced 
home 
authentication 
server 
 
7.3 Summary 
In this chapter, I discussed services and applications using HUC-HISF. In ubiquitous 
computing environments, there are so many heterogeneous applications in the physical world. 
Each application implements its own authentication mechanism depending on the purpose of 
service and working environment. Within the real ubiquitous world, a user would be able to 
use ubiquitous services without any intervention by authentication applications for identifying 
himself. Namely, it is recommended that authenticating processes be performed without one’s 
knowledge. However, nearly all existing authentication mechanisms request users’ 
intervention and help. Thus I proposed a new model making it possible for a user to access 
any distributed service protected by heterogeneous applications and being authenticated only 
once at the initial stage. The centralized UIDM manages the object identifier that is 
universally unique. In addition, I proposed a novel privacy and access control scheme for my 
ubiquitous hybrid intelligent security framework using a surveillance system based on 
Kalman filter and HMM. Fortunately, in the near future spaces that are not covered by 
authentication applications can be managed by surveillance systems using surveillance 
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devices. This means that an entity’s ID can be relayed to the next application following the 
movement of the entity. 
As IT develops rapidly and the Internet and computers are widely distributed, thereby 
speeding up the expansion of digital materials and communication infrastructure, image and 
voice information shared over IP network connections, and the demand for integrated services 
is increasing. In addition, the demand is increasing for next-generation mobile IP networks 
that provide mobility among users. However, a number of problems are expected in terms of 
security on the other side of activation of IPTV services, and security threats will increase in 
these mobile environments. Thus, the development of security technologies is of great 
importance in order to ensure that mobile IPTV services are safe and efficient. This study also 
investigates subscriber authentication technologies, specifically the AAA mechanism, which 
provide safe and efficient IPTV services over mobile devices. For subscriber authentication, a 
method was used involving counters based on OTP and authorization tickets based on 
Admissible Bilinear MAP, and even when the service channel is changed from a home 
network to a foreign network, the mobile IPTV services are consistently guarded by means of 
authorization tickets. However, my protocol is not considered STB and standardized. In the 
future, there should be ways to evaluate services and their compatibility with IPTV standards 
through performance evaluations. Future studies will conform security protocols to STB 
standards and enhance compatibility. 
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Chapter 8. Simulation and Analysis of HUC-HISF 
In this chapter, I present simulations and analyses of HUC-HISF. Section 8.1 demonstrates 
the key recovery attack on 8-round mCrypton and related security analyses. Section 8.2 
shows the analysis of effective key distribution for my secure, fast handover model. I analyze 
the proposed mechanism in relation to existing mechanisms in terms of signaling costs and 
handover latency. Then I show the improved performance of my proposed mechanism 
compared to existing mechanisms. Section 8.3 summarizes the analysis of my privacy-
enhanced key recovery model, and Section 8.4 analyzes a security simulation model based on 
the contract network protocol. 
8.1 Advanced mCrypton 
I show Key Recovery Attack on 8 Rounds mCrypton. Using the 7-round related-key 
rectangle distinguisher my 8-round attack recovers 5 bytes of each subkey for 
whose nibble positions are marked as * on  depicted in Figure. 5.3, where 
, , , and  (recall that ). Since the 
keys  and  are related, the number of possible key quartets is 240. In order to 
understand the relations of the round keys of round 8, refer to Figure. 5.4. 
The basic idea of my attack is as follows. Let ( ) be right quartet, ( ) 
be the corresponding ciphertext quartet and  be a partial one round decryption with k, 
where k is a 5-byte key candidate of round 8. I guess a 5-byte key quartet  and 
check that  and , where  is a set of 5 gray 
nibbles described in  of Figure. 5.3. If the number of ciphertext quartets passing the above 
test is more than an appropriate threshold, I consider the guessed key quartet as the right one.  
Attack algorithm. 
Input: Two pools of 244 plaintext pairs. 
Output: 5-byte key quartet of round 8. 
1. Collect 244 plaintext pairs  and 244 plaintext pairs  with 
. Encrypt the ,  with the keys  and 
$K'^{*}$, respectively, to obtain their ciphertexts  and . Keep all the 
obtained ciphertexts in a table. 
2. Check that  and  for all i,j. Discard all the ciphertext 
quartets that do not satisfy this test. 
3. Guess a 5-byte key quartet  for round 8. 
3-1. For all ciphertext quartets ( ) passing the test of Step 2, check that 
 and . 
3-2. If the number of quartets  passing Step 3.1 is greater than or 
equal to 3, output the guessed key quartet as the right key quartet of 
round 8. Otherwise, go to Step 3. 
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Security analysis. Since the attack requires two pools of 244 plaintext pairs and memory 
space for their ciphertext pairs, the data complexity of this attack is 246 related-key chosen 
plaintexts and the memory complexity is  bytes. 
Step 2 requires 244 searches of 244 ciphertext pairs, which can be done efficiently by sorting 
the ciphertext pairs, 's by 's. In Step 2, the test requires a 88-bit filtration (this is 
due to the fact that  and  with probability  for a wrong 
quartet ), and thus the expected number of ciphertext quartets passing the test of 
Step 2 is about  (here,  ciphertext quartets passing the test 
are expected to be right quartets due to my 7-round related-key rectangle distinguisher). 
Using this expected number of quartets I can estimate the time complexity of Step 3, i.e., Step 
3 requires about  8-round mCrypton encryptions on average. Hence, the time 
complexity of this attack is dominated by Step 1, and thus this attack requires about 246 8-
round mCrypton encryptions. 
The success rate of the attack is computed as follows. The probability that for the right key 
quartet there exist at least 3 quartets passing the test of Step 3.1 is about 0.94
, while the probability that a wrong key is outputted by the 
attack algorithm is . Therefore, the success rate of this 
attack is about ). 
8.2 Effective Key Distribution for Secure Fast Handover 
8.2.1 Performance analysis 
In this section, I analyze the proposed mechanism with Mobile IPv6 and Fast Mobile IPv6 
in terms of signaling cost and handover latency. Signaling cost represents the cost for the 
establishment of handovers between different access networks. On the other hand, handover 
latency refers to the time duration from the time a mobile node switches over in the link-layer 
to the time a binding update is received by the home agent or a corresponding node. In 
conducting my performance analysis, I make the following assumptions. 
 The data session arrival for the mobile node is exponentially distributed with its mean 
session holding time . 
 The mobility rate, , is obtained as the ratio between the velocity of mobile node 
and the coverage. 
 The domain occupancy time of the mobile node is exponentially distributed with its 
mean occupancy time . 
8.2.1.1 Timing diagram 
I here present the timing diagrams for each protocol mechanism. The handover timing 
diagram consists of the link switching latency, tL, the IP connectivity latency, tI, the session 
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key distribution latency, tK, and the location update latency, tU [KP01, KK04]. Link switching 
latency refers to the link-layer handover latency. IP connectivity latency represents the time 
required for detecting the move and configuring the address. Session key distribution latency 
includes authentication latency, tK-auth and session key acquisition latency, tK-acq. The location 
update latency is the time incurred for binding updates. 
 
Figure 8.1 Timing diagram for Mobile IPv6 
Figure 8.1 shows the timing diagram for Mobile IPv6. The mobile node attaches to the new 
link as it finishes switching links. Then, the mobile node obtains its care-of address after 
movement detection and address configuration. Accordingly, IP connectivity latency is the 
sum of the movement detection latency, tMD, and the address configuration latency, tAC. Then, 
the mobile node is authenticated based on its pre-shared key. Subsequently, the mobile node 
obtains the session key that will be used in the new access network. Finally, the mobile node 
sends its binding update message to its home agent and corresponding nodes to inform them 
of its new location information. 
 
Figure 8.2 Timing diagram for Fast Mobile IPv6 
Figure 8.2 shows the timing diagram for Fast Mobile IPv6. In Fast Mobile IPv6, the mobile 
node previously obtains its care-of address for the new access network. In other words, the 
address configuration is completed before its link-layer handover takes place. Let tnCoA and tT 
be the latency for acquiring a new care-of address and for establishing tunneling between the 
previous access router and the new access router, respectively. Assume that tFBU is the latency 
for the FBU. As the mobile node attaches to the new access network, it needs to perform the 
duplicated address detection tMD. Then, the authentication procedure for the mobile node is 
performed and the mobile node obtains its session key. Fast Mobile IPv6 reduces handover 
latency due to early address configuration for the newly accessed network. However, its 
authentication and session key acquisition procedures are performed after the mobile node 
attaches to the new access network. Accordingly, the session key distribution latency, tK , 
cannot be reduced, e.g., tK for Fast Mobile IPv6 is the same as that of Mobile IPv6. 
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Figure 8.3 Timing diagram for the proposed mechanism 
In the proposed mechanism, the session key acquisition procedure is performed before the 
mobile node attaches to the new access network. In addition, the mobile node establishes new 
communication sessions for corresponding nodes in previous access networks using SCTP 
ASCONF messages. Let tACO-S and tACO-D be the latencies for ASCONF (Set) and ASCONF 
(Deletion), respectively. Then, tI, which is performed in the previous access network, is the 
sum of tnCoA, tACO-S, tFBU, and tK-ACQ. Accordingly, the proposed mechanism needs to perform 
three procedures, authentication, ASCONF (Deletion), and sending a binding update for its 
home agent procedures -- in order to access the new network. 
8.2.1.2 Signaling cost 
In this sub-section, I present the signaling cost for the proposed mechanism compared to 
Mobile IPv6 and Fast Mobile IPv6. Similar to [KK04], the signaling cost includes the 
processing cost at each communication involved node and the transmission cost at each 
communication path. I assume that the home agent and corresponding node are connected to 
its network through the wired link. In addition, the transmission cost is proportional to the 
distance between the communication source and destination. Let  be the proportionality 
constant. Then, I also assume the transmission cost over the wireless link is  times higher 
than the case of the wired link. For example, TNAR-HA is calculated as , where lNAR-HA is 
the hop distance between the new access router and the home agent. Let  and  be the 
authentication cost and the session key acquisition cost, respectively. I assume that all 
protocols have  as the same cost. I now denote the signaling costs of the proposed 
mechanism, Mobile IPv6, and Fast Mobile IPv6 as Cpro, Cmip, and Cfast, respectively. Then, the 
signaling cost for Mobile IPv6, Cmip, is expressed as follows. 
   (8.1) 
where  is the number of corresponding nodes for the mobile node. TMN-NAR is calculated 
as , where lMN-NAR is the hop distance between the mobile node and the new access 
router. Because the mobile node is connected to the access routers through its wireless 
interface, lMN-NAR and lMN-PAR are assumed to be 1. Other transmission costs are calculated in 
the similar way. In Eq. (8.1), the session key acquisition cost, , can be expressed as 
 if I assume the KDC is co-located to the home agent. 
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For the signaling cost of Fast Mobile IPv6, Cfast, I consider the transmission costs incurred 
between the mobile node and the access routers as follows. 
    (8.2) 
where  is the same to that of Eq. (8.1) because the mobile node in Fast Mobile IPv6 
needs to obtains its session key from the KDC for every movements. 
For the signaling cost of the proposed mechanism, Cpro, I additionally consider the 
transmission costs incurred between the mobile node and corresponding node as follows. 
    (8.3) 
where  is calculated as , because the session key is delivered from the 
previous access router, not connecting to the KDC located in the home agent. 
8.2.1.3 Handover latency 
Based on the presented timing diagrams in Section 8.2.1.1, I calculate the handover latency 
for each protocol. In this thesis, I only focus the network layer handover latency so that the 
link switching latency, tL, is assumed to be the same for each protocol. I denote the handover 
latencies of the proposed mechanism, Mobile IPv6, and Fast Mobile IPv6 as Lpro, Lmip, and 
Lfast, respectively. Then, the handover latency for Mobile IPv6, Lmip, is as follows. 
     (8.4) 
 where tI is calculated as the sum of tMD and tAC. In [JPA04], the movement detection is the 
half of the average time between the unsolicited router advertisement messages. Then, tMD is 
simply calculated as 
    (8.5) 
 
 where MinRtrAdvInterval and MaxRtrAdvInterval are the minimal value in milliseconds 
for the router advertisement message and the maximum value in milliseconds for the router 
advertisement message, respectively. Let RetransTimer and DupAddrDetectTransmits be the 
retransmission timer and the number of consecutive Neighbor Solicitation messages sent 
while performing duplicate address detection on a tentative address. As described in [TN98, 
HCH06], tAC is simply calculated as RetransTimer DupAddrDetectTransmits. 
As the mobile node attaches to the new access network,  is occurred for 
authentication and session key acquisition. I assume that the authentication latency for each 
protocol is the same. Let Bwl and Bwd be the wireless bandwidth and the wired bandwidth, 
4
ntervalMaxRtrAdvIntervalMinRtrAdvI +
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respectively. Also, I define  and  as wireless link latency and wired link latency, 
respectively. Then, tK-acq for Mobile IPv6 is calculated as 
)( )()(2 wd
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Mt σσ +++= −−    (8.6) 
where Mk is the session key message size in where the request and reply messages are 
assumed to be the same size. Let tU-h and tU-c be the locate update latencies for the home agent 
and corresponding host, respectively. tU is consists of two parts. Thus, I define tU as 
. Then, similar to Eq. (8.6), tU-h and tU-c for Mobile IPv6 are calculated as 
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where Mb is the binding update message size. Note that Mobile IPv6 standard document 
does not require the mobile node to receive the binding acknowledge message [JPA04]. 
The mobile node in Fast Mobile IPv6 performs its address configuration procedure before 
starting the link-layer switching. Accordingly, the handover latency for Fast Mobile IPv6, Lfast, 
is expressed as follows. 
      (8.8) 
 tAC is simply omitted compared to that of Mobile IPv6. For the latencies of tK and tU, I can 
calculate them in the same ways as shown in Eqs. (8.6) and  (8.7). 
In the proposed mechanism, the address configuration and location update for the 
corresponding node is completed before the mobile node attaches to the new access network. 
In addition, the session key acquisition is also performed in the previous access network. 
Therefore, the handover latency for Fast Mobile IPv6, Lpro, is expressed as follows. 
     (8.9) 
 where tU-h is calculated as the same way in Eq. (8.8). 
8.2.2 Evaluation results 
In this section, I compare the performance evaluation results of the proposed mechanism to 
Mobile IPv6 and Fast Mobile IPv6. The presented evaluation results are based on the 
signaling cost and handover latency models presented in the previous section. In order to 
perform the numerical evaluation, I first set the evaluation parameter values as shown in 
Table 8.1. The defined parameter values are common values and widely used in the literature. 
Table 8.1 Evaluation parameters [JPA04, KK04, TN98, HCH06] 
Notation Description Default Value 
 
The hop distance between the mobile node and the previous access 
router 1 
 
The hop distance between the mobile node and the new access 
router 1 
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The hop distance between the previous access router and the new 
access router 3 
 
The hop distance between the new access router and the home 
agent 7 
 
The hop distance between the new access router and the 
corresponding node 5 
 
The hop distance between the previous access router and the 
corresponding node 5 
 The processing cost at the previous access router 5 
 The processing cost at the new access router 5 
 The processing cost at the home agent 10 
 The processing cost at the corresponding node 5 
 & The authentication cost for the mobile node 10 
 The proportionality constant for the transmission cost 0.1 
 The additional wireless link cost 2 
 The number of corresponding node for the mobile node 5 
MinRtrAdvInterval The minimal value for the router advertisement message 30ms 
MaxRtrAdvInterval The maximum value for the router advertisement message 70ms 
RetransTimer The retransmission timer 1000ms 
RetransTimer The number of message sent during address duplication detection 1 
 The authentication time for the mobile node 0.5ms 
Mk The session key request/reply message size 50bytes 
Mb The binding update message size 72bytes 
Md The data packet size 100bytes 
8.2.2.1 Impact of mobile node velocity on signaling cost 
In this sub-section, I provide the evaluation results on signaling cost. For the mobility rate, 
, I vary the speed from 10 km/h to 120 km/h and consider two types of network coverage. 
In other words, I use the network coverage for 3GPP (7.5 km) and network coverage for 
WLAN (1 km). 
Figure 8.4 shows the impact of mobile node speed on signaling cost for wide network, i.e., 
3GPP coverage. First, I can see that at high speeds the mobile node incurs high signaling 
costs due to its increased movement between different access networks. Similar to previous 
results for handover performance, the results presented in Figure 8.4 show that Fast Mobile 
IPv6 incurs high costs to support its fast handover mechanism. Especially, the additional 
required messages that enable the mobile node to configure the new care-of address cost more 
in signaling than Mobile IPv6. However, the proposed mechanism consumes signaling costs 
similar to Mobile IPv6. This is because the proposed mechanism uses SCTP based address 
configuration and provides reduced session key acquisition latency. Note that the mobile node 
in the proposed mechanism obtains its session key from the previous access router, whereas 
the mobile node in other protocols obtains the session key from the KDC. 
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Figure 8.4 Impact of mobile node velocity on signaling costs for wide network coverage 
 
Figure 8.5 Impact of mobile node velocity on signaling cost for small network coverage 
When narrow network coverage is available to the mobile node, it moves frequently 
between different access networks. Such small network coverage increases the mobility rate, 
, and mobility rate increases the signaling cost for all protocols. Figure 8.5 shows the 
impact of mobile node speed on signaling costs for small networks, i.e., WLAN. Similar to 
the results in Figure 8.4, Fast Mobile IPv6 incurs a higher cost than others and the proposed 
mechanism outperforms all other protocols as well. 
8.2.2.2 Impact of hop distance between the mobile node and KDC on session key 
distribution latency 
Figure 8.6 displays the results of session key distribution latency when varying the hop 
distance between the mobile node and the KDC. From the analysis of timing diagrams 
presented in Section 8.2.1.1, I are well aware that the hop distance between the mobile node 
and the KDC is one performance factor contributing to session key distribution latency as 
well as the total handover latency. As shown in Figure 8.6, the proposed mechanism provides 
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a lower session key distribution latency than others. In addition, the latency of other protocols 
is increased as the hop distance between the mobile node and the KDC is increased. In the 
proposed mechanism, the mobile node obtains its session key from the previous access router 
so that the proposed mechanism is not affected by the hop distance.   The impact of hop 
distance between the mobile node and KDC appears to be a more important factor when the 
KDC is located in the AAA server. This is because the AAA server is usually located far way 
from the access router for mobile nodes. 
 
Figure 8.6 Impact of hop distance between the mobile node and the KDC on session key distribution 
latency 
8.2.2.3 Impact of mobile node velocity on packet loss 
Based on the handover latency for each protocol, I estimate the amount of packet loss. Let 
us assume that the corresponding node sends data packets at  kbps. Then, the amount of 
packet loss can be calculated as follows. 
      (8.10) 
 where L is the handover latency and PT is the packet time which can be expressed as 
[RASC07]. To estimate packet loss, I set  as 64 kbps and then I vary the velocity of 
mobile node from 10 km/h to 120 km/h. Figure 8.7 shows the amount of packet loss for wide 
network coverage. The mobile node with Mobile IPv6 losses much more than others and the 
amount of packet loss is increased as the velocity increases. Fast Mobile IPv6 shows low 
packet loss due to its reduced handover latency. While the proposed mechanism exhibited low 
packet loss similar to Fast Mobile IPv6, it still outperformed Fast Mobile IPv6 because Fast 
Mobile IPv6 and Mobile IPv6 must obtain the session key from the KDC for every movement. 
This delay in key acquisition accounts for the increased handover latency and increased 
packet loss. 
 
T
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Figure 8.7 Impact of mobile node velocity on packet loss for wide network coverage 
 
Figure 8.8 Impact of mobile node velocity on packet loss for small network coverage 
In Figure 8.8, the packet loss for the case of small network coverage is shown and these 
results are similar to that of Figure 8.7. Due to the reduced network coverage, the mobile 
node moves frequently, thus the number of movements is also increased. From the result of 
Figure 8.8, I can see that Mobile IPv6 does not provide acceptable support for real-time 
applications. In order to support such real-time applications, I need to deploy mobility 
protocols that support fast handover such as Fast Mobile IPv6 and the proposed mechanism. 
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8.3 Privacy-Enhanced Key Recovery 
8.3.1 Analysis of the proposed Security-Enhanced KR Protocol 
In B’s domain, if B sends a bogus value wBr’BgbrA instead of wBrBgbrA, A may 
generate h(wBr’B) and send it to B. In this case, a monitoring third party V can prove 
validity as follows.  
First V obtains public value B and computes  
c’B=h(wBr’B) mod q.    (8.11) 
Therefore,  
gsBc’BB.      (8.12) 
In my protocol, I used wBrB instead of rB when computing session key, KAB. Only B 
knows wB , and KRAB and rB is newly generated by B every session. Therefore, the security 
of wBrB depends on random number, rB.  
The user A can generate session key, KAB as follows. He calculates (gb)rA and then 
computes wBrB from wBrBgbrA using (gb)rA. Therefore,  
KAB= h1(wBrB, gbrA).     (8.13) 
B can generate session key, KAB as follows. She calcu7lates (grA)b and then computes 
wBrB , using wB and rB , which he knows. Therefore,  
KAB= h1(wBrB, grAb).     (8.14) 
I used sB instead of {sB}KAB in Token 2. Even if a monitoring third party V knows sB, it 
cannot fabricate session key KAB. This is because he cannot obtain h(wBrB) or rB from sB, wB, 
and grB , which he knows, until Token 2 is passed.  
Furthermore, the security of my protocol can be reduced to that of the non-interactive proof 
of possession of loggi implemented in Schnorr’s signature scheme [SC90] as in Nieto et 
al.’s proposal [NPBD00].  
Now I compare existing protocols and my proposed security-enhanced protocol in terms of 
computational overhead. In Table 8.2, I present the number of modular exponentiation in A’s 
and B’s side. The number within the bracket refers to the number of the required online 
modular exponentiation when pre-computation is allowed. My protocol supports public KRI 
validation on both A’s and B’s side and my session key computation, including only simple 
exclusive-OR operations, is more efficient than Kim and Lee’s protocol which multiplies gbrA 
by grB to obtain h1(gbrAgrB). 
Table 8.2 Comparison of WAKE Protocols 
Protocols Modular operation Additional transmission overhead 
Public KRI 
validation A’ side B’s side 
ASPeCT WAKE 2(1) 1(1)   
KR enhanced 3(1) 1(1) sA, {A}L or {A,rA}L None 
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Modified KR 
enhanced 
2(1) 1(1) {sB}KAB, sA, sB A 
Improved KR 
enhanced 
2(1) 2(1) grB, {sB}KAB, sA, sB A 
Proposed protocol 2(1) 2(1) h(wB⊕rB), {sB}KAB, sA, 
sB 
A, B 
8.3.2 Analysis of the proposed Privacy-Enhanced KR Protocol 
In this protocol, I protect the location privacy of user A by adding (grA, KA)KTDA-1 in Token 
1 for the authentication of A to B instead of eliminating certificate of A, ACert in Token 3. 
Here, the KA in Token 3 is A’s temporary verification key, which is generated by TDA for 
communication with B. The TDA can bind the key of A to the identity of A, but it can be 
connected and used by only user A for secure external computation and storing. Generally, 
the TDA is located in A’s house and shares public key pairs with A. For more detailed 
information regarding the TP method, please see the paper [KRJ98] and [KYPK05]. 
This feature guarantees that there would be no information revealing A’s true identity 
among any of the communication tokens. Therefore, even network operators and authorized 
third parties cannot get any user specific information from the network. Ultimately, this 
privacy-enhanced protocol guarantees wireless authentication, key establishment, key 
recovery, and privacy protection. 
8.4 Security Simulation Model based on Contract Network Protocol 
The increase of network utilization and the weekly increase in the number of critical 
application layer exploits means that NIDS designers must find ways to speed up their attack 
analysis techniques when monitoring a fully-saturated network and maintaining a good false 
positive to false negative ratio. To evaluate the simulation results, I have selected the 
intrusion detection time and the false positive error ratio as performance indices. The 
intrusion detection time represents the time that elapses while detecting an intrusion. The 
false positive error ratio is the ratio that regards no intrusion as an intrusion [Pr01]. I executed 
the simulation for a single IDS, multiple IDSs with CNP, and multiple IDSs with CNP & Rete 
algorithm. Figure 8.9 presents the difference of intrusion detection time as the detection 
threshold value of the DOS jolt attack is increased. According to the results of the simulation, 
the detection of multiple IDSs with CNP is faster than that of the single IDS and the detection 
time of multiple IDSs with CNP & Rete is fastest of them all. Simulation results show that the 
proposed system (multiple IDSs with CNP & Rete) delivers a superior performance over 
previous schemes by more than one performance indexes. In Scenario 1, the single IDS is 
attacked by the external attacker. In Scenario 2, the multiple IDSs with CNP are attacked and 
in Scenario 3, the multiple IDSs with CNP &Rete is the object of attack.  
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Figure 8.9 Intrusion detection time of jolt attack 
Figure 8.10 shows the difference in the false positive error ratio as the detection threshold 
value of the DOS jolt attack is increased. Multiple IDSs with CNP are superior to a single 
IDS and the application of the rete algorithm to multiple IDSs with CNP reduces the false 
positive error ratio. As the detection threshold value increases, the false positive error ratio 
decreases. 
Figure 8.10 False positive error ratio of jolt attack 
Figure 8.11 presents the intrusion detection time of DDOS trinoo attacks as the number of 
detection rules is increased. Detection by multiple IDSs with CNP is faster than that by a 
single IDS. yjr performance of multiple IDSs with CNP & Rete is yet faster and exhibits a 
nearly fixed detection time. 
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Figure 8.11 Intrusion detection time of trinoo attack 
Figure 8.12 shows the false positive error ratio for the DDOS trinoo attacks as the number 
of detection rules is increased. Multiple IDSs with CNP & Rete has the lowest false positive 
error ratio and is hardly influenced by the number of detection rules. 
Figure 8.12 False positive error ratio of trinoo attack 
  
 113 
 
Chapter 9. Conclusion 
New computing paradigms such as ubiquitous computing and human-centric computing are 
up and coming due to rapid advances in computing power and network development. Such 
paradigm changes offer convenient and delightful, human-centered services. However, the 
ubiquitous and human-centric computing environments have been integrated; there exists a 
much greater likelihood of exposure to security threats compared to ordinary computing 
environments. And there are additional threats not present in traditional computing 
environments; such threats include tampering, signal interference, and battery consumption 
attacks. Especially in one of most human closed network environment, the ubiquitous 
computing environment of the human-centered network is compromised by an attack, which 
could be network information derived from an individual's privacy can cause problems. Than 
a typical network environment comprised of a human-centered environments in ubiquitous 
environment is larger than in recent years expanded by service extension. 
In particular environment U-health system for the health of the individual person's, the 
individual's profile in the center of the system have to configured, also that should be prepare 
a human-centric services, however in your personally identifiable information, including 
personal health information, the details of the disclosure, number of frequency health 
problems, any health insurance available, and any u-health system is used information,  are 
used for any purpose whether can still be pirated and illegal market selling. In addition, 
sensor network system is one of human centered environment in ubiquitous computing area. 
Sensor networks is principal of information collecting in the individual's human-centered 
computing, human-centered information. Because of this, personal information about living 
in an environment, where temperature, humidity, and any location information, which also 
collects the most ubiquitous model, is presented in a smart home or ubiquitous environment. 
This is also theft to be, the individual pattern of living, any habit that the person have, the 
current home and whether or not, if the person is home than where stay in the house, and 
where stay at that time, where all the information about the acquisition, which the theft 
occurred, it makes another big problem occurring.  
In recent years, human-centered computing environment will develop reaches and clearly. 
As a representative of the reason, Smart Home and Smart Car system will be mostly 
important system and role based on Smart Grid as Human-Centric Service or system. In 
modern society, the electrical energy is the most important energy, energy conservation 
developed by the ultimate purpose of human-centric networks for large-scale energy that can 
be. So, we need intelligent and dynamic security frameworks for secure and flexible human-
centric ubiquitous computing environments. 
In addition, human-centered computing environment to take place in the center of the 
diversity of individuals, depending on the required profile, and more than profiling to provide 
services to individuals close to the basic information is available. This human-oriented, close 
to the human complex network computing technologies in the current configuration, it should 
be safe, and a variety of attacks that can occur in the future it is clear that the purpose be. 
In this chapter, I summarize and briefly describe contribution of this thesis. In the 
introduction, this thesis described the overview, scope, aim, method, contribution and outline 
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of this study. I described previous part which described a variety of today's network, it can 
occur in human-centered computing environment to be considered a sufficient security 
problems. And the thesis briefly mentioned the problem statements and motivation for a 
secure and H-Ubi Comp. In Chapter 2, the thesis discussed the background and related works 
of secure and H-Ubi Comp. I summarized most important existing human-centered 
computing environment research especially recent research on human-centered computing. 
One of them, large-scaled collaboration is critical issues of human-centered computing 
environment, the actual practices applied by checking the current implemented system such 
as Amazon automatic answering system on FAQ pages. Based on these summarized and 
analysis and the importance of human-centered computing environment, a report composed 
which part should be implement of effective and optimized security techniques.  
In Chapter 3, I proposed the HUC-HISF. To offer security for a human-centered computing 
environment described above, the development of a wide variety of computing environments 
and the resulting human-centered computing environment has suggestions for a secure 
composing. 
In Chapter 4, I presented cryptanalytic result on mCrypton, it is worthwhile to apply this 
attack to other block ciphers and to study simple key scheduling algorithms which may be 
resistant to this kind of attack. In addition, for many types of attacks, how to composing the 
method proposed to prevent and detection as effectively explained. 
In Chapter 5, I described an effective session key distribution mechanism and a number of 
WAKE protocols having a key recovery feature. In Chapter 6, I proposed dynamic human-
context access control mechanism. In Chapter 7, the thesis presented U-Surveillance service 
and Mobile IPTV service using HUC-HISF. In Chapter 8, to show the differentiated 
properties of HUC-HISF, the proposed schemes were analyzed by the aspects of performance, 
aspects of security among system requirements for the HUC-HISF.  
This thesis presented an intelligent and dynamic security framework considering human 
aspects for human-centric ubiquitous computing. The proposed HUC-HISF provides a light-
weight cryptography algorithm for security in resource-constrained applications, such as low-
cost RFID tags and sensors in USN. It has the structure with some improvements in software 
and hardware efficiency under resource-restricted environments – such as ubiquitous mobile 
devices. In addition, I proposed improved security protocols for the HUC-HISF and discussed 
surveillance service and mobile IPTV service for applying HUC-HISF. 
 To realize a more secure and dynamic human-centric ubiquitous computing environments, 
I need to expand our researches. As a further extended future study, the ubiquitous 
environmental and human-centric computing environments with extended smart grid, smart 
home environment, to apply to the security module. Also, specific architecture framework 
components for detailed studies should be preceded by the component definition. In addition, 
all modern computing environments are composed of human-centered environments, more 
close to human the technology, human to interact with humans must be based on the fact that 
the technology will become clear, the security technology must also be followed part is 
obvious. In future research can be applied to today's smart environments and will be define 
the detailed technology and security architecture will offer configurations.  
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Finally, I will develop our researches by combining them with other important issues in 
converged IT environments. 
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